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Abstract
Administrative registers maintained by statistical offices on vastly heterogeneous firms have much
untapped potential to reveal details on sources of productivity of firms and economies alike.
It has been proposed that firm-level shocks can go a long way in explaining aggregate fluctuations.
Based on novel monthly frequency data, idiosyncratic shocks are able to explain a sizable share of the
Finnish economic fluctuations, providing support to the granular hypothesis.
The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 has challenged the field of economic forecasting, and
nowcasting has become an active field. This thesis shows that the information content of firm-level
sales and truck traffic can be used for nowcasting GDP figures, by using a specific mixture of machine
learning algorithms.
The agency problem lies at the heart of much of economic theory. Based on a unique dataset linking
owners, CEOs and firms, and exploiting plausibly exogenous variations in the separation of ownership
and control, agency costs seem to be an important determinant of firm productivity. Furthermore, the
effect appear strongest in medium-sized firms.
Enterprise group structures might have important implications on the voluminous literature on firm
size, as large share of SME employment can be attributed to affiliates of large business groups. Within
firm variation suggests that enterprise group affiliation has heterogeneous impacts depending on size,
having strong positive impact on productivity of small firms, and negative impact on their growth. In
terms of aggregate job creation, it is found that the independent small firms have contributed the most.
The results in this thesis underline the benefits of paying attention to samples encompassing the
total population of firms in order shape more comprehensive policies. Researchers should continue to
explore the potential of rich administrative data sources at statistical offices and strive to strengthen
the ties with the official data producers.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Firm Dynamics, Ownership and Aggregate Effects
The link between micro-level behavior and aggregate outcomes has drawn the attention of economists
for a long time. For example, modern large scale macroeconomic frameworks (such as DSGE) are
based on so-called microfoundation, i.e. they model the optimization process of firms and individuals
to derive the aggregate equilibrium conditions. Recently, the interest around the possible effects of
firm-level performance on the economy has risen, with the works of Gabaix (2011) and Acemoglu et al.
(2012). Gabaix (2011) formulates the granular hypothesis, i.e. he considers the size of firms as the key
transmission mechanism of microeconomic (firm-level) shocks, due to the fact that the value added
of many modern economies are characterized by having a fat-tailed distribution of firms (in terms
of size), where the value added of few big companies accounts for a large fraction of the GDP, and
diversification due to the large number of enterprises does not eliminate the impact of idiosyncratic
disturbances.
Finland is a country that can provide the upper boundary of how large the granular effects can
be. The granular hypothesis in Finland is the topic of the second chapter in this thesis, based on
Fornaro and Luomaranta (2018). The results underline that micro level data can be an extremely
useful source of information to understand aggregate fluctuations. From that fact, one can presume
that such data can also potentially provide accurate predictions of the state of the economy in a timely
fashion. Nowcasting aggregate economic variables using disaggregated microdata as predictors is the
topic of the third chapter in this thesis.
Ownership and control are key characteristics of a firm. The instances where ownership is separated
from control can create conflicts of interest and tension between the owner (principal) and the manager
(agent). The so-called agency problem has been at the heart of much of the corporate finance literature
since at least Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Mecling (1976). At the same time, while
substantial work has been developed to investigate how firms’ decisions (say, investment and financing)
are shaped by agency conflicts, direct measures of agency costs are difficult to obtain. Extending
the analysis beyond typical samples of large public firms, the fourth chapter in the thesis shows that
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the agency costs are important determinants of firm productivity of small firms, and are stronger in
medium-sized private firms. The results highlight the importance of studying comprehensive datasets
encompassing the entire universe of firms.
Firms vary along multiple dimensions in economically meaningful ways. In particular, firm
heterogeneity has implications on capacity to sustain jobs, or on wealth generation. Size and ownership
links between firms are the focus in the last two chapters of the thesis. I study how activities of
business groups affect productivity and job creation within individual firms, drawing links to the
aggregate effects. Again, I demonstrate that the results are different depending on which part of the
firm population is analyzed, which is an observation that further underlines the importance of studying
total populations. Within firm variation suggests that enterprise group affiliation has strong positive
impact on productivity of small firms, and negative impact on their growth. In terms of aggregate job
creation, it is found that the independent small firms have contributed the most, after breaking down
job flows by business group membership status, age and size categories.
The results in the last two chapters provide further indication that almost any empirical study
interested in firms should also consider their complex ownership structures.
The rest of this introductory chapter briefly summarizes the different chapters.
1.2 Aggregate Fluctuations and the Effect of Large Corpora-
tions: Evidence from Finnish Monthly Data
In this chapter, based on Fornaro and Luomaranta (2018), we investigate whether the granular
hypothesis holds for the Finnish economy. In particular, we test if a sizable share of macroeconomic
fluctuations is generated by firm-specific shocks to sales and productivity. We examine monthly
firm-level data and find that the idiosyncratic shocks affecting large corporations explain around a
third of business cycle fluctuations. This fact holds true both when we use the cross-sectional averages
of sales and the estimated common factors, to control for common shocks. Moreover, we observe that
the largest four corporations are the main drivers of this result. Finally, we detect a clear break in this
relationship coinciding with the Great Recession. In particular, from 2010 onward the firm-level shocks
lose their explanatory power. The findings of this paper point toward the importance of studying the
granular hypothesis in a dynamic context, taking into account the possibility of breaks.
1.3 Nowcasting Finnish Real Economic Activity: a Machine
Learning Approach
In this chapter, based on a joint work with Paolo Fornaro, we develop a nowcasting framework based
on micro-level data in order to provide faster estimates of the Finnish monthly real economic activity
indicator, the Trend Indicator of Output (TIO), and of quarterly GDP. In particular, we rely on
firm-level turnovers, which are available shortly after the end of the reference month, to form our
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set of predictors. We rely on combinations of nowcasts obtained from a range of statistical models
and machine learning methodologies which are able to handle high-dimensional information sets. The
results of our pseudo-real-time analysis indicate that simple combinations of these models provides
faster estimates of the TIO and GDP, without increasing substantially the revision error. Finally,
we examine the nowcasting accuracy obtained by relying on traffic data extracted from the Finnish
Transport Agency website and find that using machine learning techniques in combination with this
big-data source provides competitive predictions of real economic activity.
1.4 Agency Costs and Firm Productivity
In this chapter, based on a joint work with Milo Bianchi, we explore how the separation between
ownership and control affects firm productivity. Using Finnish administrative data on the universe of
limited liability firms, we document a substantial increase in firm productivity when the CEO obtains
majority ownership or when the majority owner becomes the CEO. We exploit plausibly exogenous
variations to ownership and control structures, induced for example by changes in the CEO spouse’s
health status. Extending the analysis beyond typical samples of large public firms, we show that
our effects are stronger in medium-sized private firms. We also investigate possible mechanisms and
provide suggestive evidence that increased ownership boosts CEO’s effort at work.
1.5 How Business Group Affiliation Improves Productivity of
Small Firms: Evidence from Finnish Administrative Data
I inspect how joining a business group impacts firm productivity and job growth. Rich administrative
data on the universe of Finnish limited liability firms reveals that joining a business group increases
productivity, and decreases job growth within firms. This is driven by small firms that are mainly in
the service sector. I provide suggestive evidence of mechanisms. I document changes in (key) employees,
decrease in cost of capital and risk levels, and significant transfers of financial resources. Based on
the results, the role of business groups in the economy might be most relevant in the context of small
firms, which are usually not analyzed due to lack of data.
1.6 Job Creation and the Role of Dependencies
In this chapter, based on a joint work with Paolo Fornaro, we contribute to the extensive literature on
the relationship between firm size and job creation, by examining the role of dependencies between
enterprises. Using Finnish monthly data encompassing the population of Finnish private businesses,
we calculate the gross job creation and destruction, together with the net job creation, for different
size classes and industries. Importantly, we divide firms into a dependent (i.e. owned, at least partially,
by a mother company) and independent category. We find that independent companies have shown a
considerably higher net job creation, regardless of their size class. Once we control for age, we find
8
that independent firms exhibit higher net job creation rates during the early years of their existence,
but lower ones when they become older.
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Chapter 2
Aggregate Fluctuations and the
Effect of Large Corporations:
Evidence from Finnish Monthly
Data
1
Paolo Fornaro*, Henri Luomaranta**
*Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, Finland
**Statistics Finland and TSM, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France
Abstract
We investigate the effect of corporation-level shocks on the Finnish economy during the last 16 years. In
particular, we test for the existence of the granular hypothesis, i.e. that a sizable share of macroeconomic
fluctuations are generated by microeconomic shocks to large companies. We construct a dataset containing
enterprise groups monthly sales and we find that the idiosyncratic shocks to large corporations explain around
one third of business cycle fluctuations. This holds true both when we use the cross-sectional averages of
sales and the estimated common factors to control for common shocks. Moreover, we observe that the largest
four corporations in the dataset are the main drivers of this result. We also detect a significant break in this
relationship with the Great Recession. In particular, after that period the corporation-level shocks lose their
explanatory power. The findings of this paper point toward the importance of studying the granular hypothesis
in a dynamic context, taking into account the possibility of breaks.
JEL Classifcation Code: C22, C55, E32
Keywords: Business Cycles, Granular Residual, Business Groups
1This chapter is based on a published article Fornaro and Luomaranta (2018) in Economic Modelling.
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2.1 Introduction
The origins of business cycle fluctuations have been one of the most debated and explored topics
in macroeconomics. Traditional frameworks, such as the real business cycle model of Kydland and
Prescott (1982), identify the main shocks as being economy wide (e.g. aggregate productivity shocks)
and having somewhat mysterious origins. Subsequently, Long and Plosser (1983) and the later literature
(see, e.g., Horvath, 2000, and Conley and Dupor, 2003), consider sectoral disturbances in order to
explain the fluctuations of the aggregate economy. In his seminal paper, Jovanovic (1982) proposed a
model where microeconomic shocks are capable to generate business cycle variations.
Recently, the interest around the possible effects of firm-level performance on the economy has risen,
with the works of Gabaix (2011) and Acemoglu et al. (2012). Gabaix (2011) formulates the granular
hypothesis, i.e. he considers the size of firms as the key transmission mechanism of microeconomic
(firm-level) shocks. Many modern economies are characterized by having a fat-tailed distribution of
firms (in terms of size), where the value added of few big companies accounts for a large fraction of
the GDP, and diversification due to the large number of enterprises does not eliminate the impact of
idiosyncratic disturbances. An alternative explanation is provided by Acemoglu et al. (2012), who
identify linkages between firms as being the main transmission mechanism. Related to this work,
Frijters and AntiÊ (2016) develop a theoretical model that connects downturns with the collapse of
trade networks, through endogenous trade cycles.
di Giovanni et al. (2014) examine the universe of French firms and their annual sales growth, finding
that the firm-level component is important in explaining aggregate fluctuations, and that this is mainly
due to the firm linkages. Stella (2015) adopts similar methods as Foerster et al. (2011), to examine the
granular hypothesis using quarterly U.S. firms’ sales data. In particular, Stella (2015) uses a dynamic
factor model to estimate the firms’ idiosyncratic shocks and finds that the granular hypothesis does
not hold for the U.S. economy.
In this work, we test the granular hypothesis of Gabaix (2011) for Finland, using monthly enterprise
group data. Naturally, there have been multiple studies on the Finnish macroeconomy, especially
with respect to the real business cycle. One notable example is Gorodnichenko et al. (2012), where
the authors develop a dynamic general equilibrium model and they highlight how the collapse in the
trade relationship with the Soviet Union contributed to the dramatic Finnish recession of 1991-1993 .
Kuismanen and Kämppi (2010) study how fiscal policy shocks have affected Finnish real economic
activity, finding that an increase in government spending leads to a crowding out effect on the private
sector. Moreover there have been multiple works focused on the macroeconomic modeling of the
Finnish economy (see, e.g., Tarkka, 1985, Lehmus, 2009 and Kilponen et al., 2016).
Despite intensive macroeconomic research, there have been relatively few studies relating microeco-
nomic shocks to aggregate fluctuations, even though the Finnish economy seems to be one of the most
extreme cases of granularity. In fact, many would argue that Finland is (or at least was) a single-firm
economy, where Nokia activities represent an overwhelming share of GDP. For instance, Ali-Yrkkö et al.
(2010) have shown that Nokia’s production between the end of the 90’s and the Great Recession has
11
accounted for more than 2% of Finnish GDP and 10% of Finnish exports, with a peak of more than
20% of total exports during the 2000–2006 period. These considerations might explain why there has
been relatively small research effort on analyzing the impact of large firms’ shocks: when looking at the
Finnish economy, researchers might focus on the role of Nokia and disregard the other large business
groups. Given the importance of Nokia in terms of sheer size, during its golden years, this view might
be justified. However, Nokia has faced a substantial drop in size and one can argue that the study of
microeconomic shocks should extend to a wider group of companies. To reinforce this point, in Figure
2.1, we compute the sales herfindahl index for the top-572 enterprise groups in the Finnish economy. It
is defined as the squared sum of the sales to GDP ratio of the companies we are interested in, and it
can be interpreted as the degree of concentration for these enterprises. A higher index implies that
these groups are accountable for a larger share of aggregate output. In Figure 2.1 (a), we report the
scaled herfindahl index for Finland, together with the deflated monthly output measured by the Trend
Indicator of Output (TIO). In Figure 2.1 (b) we report the sales herfindahl using the whole set of firms
in our data against the same index obtained by excluding the top-4 corporations (in terms of average
monthly sales) from the calculations.
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Figure 2.1: The herfindahl index for the top-57 Finnish corporations
These plots give us some valuable preliminary insights about the dynamics of the Finnish economy
in the last 16 years. First of all, the herfindahl index has not been stable over time, but has actually
shown a substantial procyclicality (the correlation coefficient between TIO and the herfindahl index
is 0.92). This supports a possible granular hypothesis for the Finnish economy, where aggregate
fluctuations are heavily influenced by the success of large companies. The procyclicality of enterprise
groups’ sales is paired with the findings of Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012). In particular, they
find that in the U.S. large firms have experienced a strong procyclicality in employment creation and
2We initially selected the top 100 Finnish firms by sales value. We then removed corporations which experienced
extreme fluctuations or had data issues, ending up with 57 companies
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destruction at business cycle frequencies compared to smaller companies.
Figure 2.1 (b) is also very informative. The solid line indicates the herfindahl index computed using
the sales of the largest 57 Finnish enterprise groups, while the dashed line represents the same measure
computed excluding the top-4 corporations from the data. While the two indices are fairly close during
the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, we see a dramatic increase in the spread between them during the
mid-2000’s up until the Great Recession. Moreover, it is fairly evident that the herfindahl index shows
a much more stable behavior when we remove the four largest corporations from the data, and that
the top-4 companies in our dataset have been heavily affected by the Great Recession of 2008-2009.
This suggests that few, very large, companies can be considered as a key factor in the Finnish economy
and that their performance have been tightly linked with the business cycle fluctuations.
In this paper, we consider the approach of Gabaix (2011) using Finnish corporation-level sales. In
particular, we estimate the granular residual and consider its impact on Finnish economic activity.
One new key contribution of this research is the use of monthly data. Microeconomic level shocks
are likely to have a large effect in the short run, but their impact on aggregate fluctuations might be
attenuated when considering lower frequencies such as yearly data (which are commonly considered in
previous work due to their availability). For example, a strike in an enterprise during a month can have
a substantial effect on the aggregate output for that period, but might disappear when considering the
whole year, due to the effect of temporal aggregation. Another advantage of this type of data is that it
allows us to analyze the relationship of interest on a fairly short time span, without incurring in small
samples problems. This means that we can verify the granular hypothesis on different subsamples
and examine if events such as the Great Recession have affected it. In addition to the econometric
analysis, we provide a short narrative where we examine how key events affecting large firms might
have impacted the Finnish economy, using public sources. For simplicity, we restrict our analysis to
the largest 57 Finnish companies.
Another important distinction from previous research is that we group together firms that belong
to the same corporation, to better represent their influence on the Finnish market. Modern enterprise
groups include hundreds of subsidiaries and disregarding them from the calculations would lead us
to underestimate the actual influence of a company on the economy through its controlled firms.
The empirical literature on internal capital markets and resource allocation suggests that projects
and plants under common ownership of a parent company, have correlated investments and capital
allocation (see the survey in Maksimovic and Phillips, 2013, and, for recent empirical evidence, Giroud
and Mueller, 2015). Small and medium enterprises (SME) account for a large share of the gross value
added of many economies (the EU28 average is 57.8% of the GDP). Even though most of these firms
are independent, the gross value added generated by small and medium enterprises belonging to a
large corporation, in Finland, accounts for around 50% of the value added produced by SMEs (see
Airaksinen et al., 2015). This feature is present in many economies: one notable example is Germany,
where the gross value added of dependent SMEs is around 43% of the total value added of small
companies. These considerations should give a fairly clear idea of how important the dependences
between large corporations and small firms are.
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In addition to the monthly empirical analysis of the largest Finnish corporations, we use quarterly
data obtained from the public reports of Nokia to verify how this individual corporation has affected
the Finnish economy. The focus on Nokia is natural, given its renown importance in Finland, and can
be an appealing research direction also for other countries where a small number of firms dominate the
economy. One potentially interesting case could be South Korea, where Samsung and Hyundai sales
account for 22% of GDP (see di Giovanni et al., 2014).
Our results show that the granular residual computed as in Gabaix (2011) is useful in explaining
Finnish output fluctuations, accounting for around one third of the variation in monthly economic
activity. To check the robustness of our findings, we use a dynamic factor model to compute the
common component underlying our firm-level sales data. Moreover, we compute microeconomic shocks
using labor productivity (relying on domestic employment) to see if our results are driven by the use of
sales. In both cases, we verify that our findings are robust. We identify a clear break in the granular
hypothesis with the Great Recession of 2008-2009 . While the granular residual accounts for a large
share of output variation over the whole period up to the Great Recession, its explanatory power is
greatly reduced in the years between 2010 and 2013. We find that removing the top-4 corporations
changes the results dramatically. Notably, the explanatory power of the granular residual deteriorates
substantially throughout the sample. We also decompose the variance of enterprise group-level shocks
into a granular and a linkage component, finding that the granular component dominates throughout
the sample, with the notable exception of the Great Recession. In the narrative analysis, using public
sources, we cover a number of episodes where large Finnish companies have experienced extremely good
(or poor) performance, and find that the aggregate economy was influenced by individual corporations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we discuss the methodology underlying
the estimation of the granular residual. In Sections 2.3 and 2.4 , we describe the data and report the
main empirical results. Section 2.5 includes a brief narrative of the main events which have impacted
the largest Finnish firms, with a special focus onto Nokia. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Methodology
We start by introducing the methodology formulated in Gabaix (2011), in order to examine the granular
hypothesis. While the original paper considers productivity, defined as the ratio between sales and
the number of employees, we are skeptical in using this measure in our main analysis due to data
limitations. However, we will examine productivity data as a robustness check. We will discuss this
issue in more detail in Section 2.3.
To obtain the estimate of the granular residual, we compute the deviation of sales growth from the
cross-sectional average g¯t. We use the resulting series to compute a weighted sum where the weights
are determined by the enterprise group size. The granular residual is then given by:
Γt =
Kÿ
i=1
Si,t≠1
Yt≠1
(git − g¯t), (2.1)
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where K is the number of companies, Si,t≠1 denotes the sales of enterprise group i at time t− 1 and
Yt≠1 is the Finnish GDP. We compute g¯t from both the top-57 Finnish corporations and from a much
wider cross-section which includes more than 500 companies.
As an alternative to (2.1), we also compute the granular residuals by using the deviation of growth
rate of sales from industry specific averages g¯Ii,t, where Ii indicates the industry in which firm i is
active. The resulting formula is:
Γút =
Kÿ
i=1
Si,t≠1
Yt≠1
(git − g¯Ii,t). (2.2)
Once we obtain an estimate for the granular residual, we examine a model where we regress the
year-on-year growth of the Finnish monthly economic activity indicator (TIO), denoted by y, on the
granular residual and its lags:
yt = —0 + —(L)Γt + ut. (2.3)
Here ut is the error term, which we assume normally distributed and uncorrelated with the regressors,
and Γt = [Γt,Γt≠1, · · · ,Γt≠p] includes the current granular residual computed using (2.1) or (2.2)
and its p lags, which we select by using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). Given that we
are in a time series setting, the error term in (2.3) can be serially correlated. Therefore, we use the
misspecification robust standard errors, adopting the Newey and West (1987) estimator, to conduct
robust inference on the regression parameters.
We evaluate the explanatory power of Γ using the adjusted-R2:
Adjusted-R2 = 1− (1−R2)
T − 1
T − k − 1
,
where k is the dimension of Γt and T is the length of the time series.
As mentioned above, simple regressions do not manage to overcome the correlation-causality
issue. To examine the robustness of our results, we provide a short narrative similar to the one of
Gabaix (2011), where we examine large spikes (in absolute terms) in the TIO and consider shocks to
Finnish enterprise groups as possible cause of these dramatic fluctuations. Related to this, in Section
2.4.4 we consider a short analysis of Nokia’s implied contribution to the Finnish GDP growth using
quarterly labor productivity data, obtained from the company quarterly reports. These contributions
are computed using the measure
CNokia,t = ‚—proddprodNokia,t salesNokia,t≠1
GDPt≠1
(2.4)
where prodNokia,t is the labor productivity of Nokia at time t, as measured in Gabaix (2011),
dprodNokia,t is its year-on-year growth rate and ‚—prod is the coefficient obtained by regressing quarterly
GDP year-on-year growth onto dprodNokia and an intercept.
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2.3 Data Description
For the first part of the analysis, we use enterprise group level data from Statistics Finland (the national
statistical office). The main focus is on the monthly sales of the 57 most important corporations in
Finland, over the years 1998–2013, which we refer to as top-57. The second data that is analyzed
includes the sales of all the enterprises which have more than 250 employees on average, over the time
span 1998–2013. This latter data is mainly used for robustness. Notice that the latter data is not
aggregated to represent business groups.
It is important to notice that Gabaix (2011) focuses on firm-level productivity, while in this analysis,
at least for the main part, we look at sales. This is not an unicum in the literature: both Stella (2015)
and di Giovanni et al. (2014) use sales as main indicators, in order to identify microeconomic shocks.
Our choice is dictated, as in the case of the two examples cited, by data availability issues. First of all,
we do not have access to monthly value added, which would be the preferred measure to calculate
labor productivity. However, Gabaix (2011) uses sales to compute productivity, so we can disregard
this issue. A more problematic aspect is that we do not have access to the number of employees
of Finnish corporations, outside of the Finnish territory. We are left with two choices: we can use
the ratio of total sales to domestic employees or compute productivity as domestic sales divided by
domestic workers. In both cases, we would have an extremely partial view of the actual performance
of the enterprise groups we consider. The problem can be milder for the U.S., given the size of the
economy, but the share of domestic activity for large Finnish multinational companies is fairly small
(see Ali-Yrkkö et al., 2010, on this point). Given these considerations, we focus on sales, and leave
the analysis of productivity as a robustness check, to be taken with a grain of salt. It is true that
sales might have a larger risk of carrying an endogenous relationship between microeconomic shocks
and aggregate fluctuations (i.e. firms’ sales might be more affected by macroeconomic dynamics than
productivity), but the fact that our results hold also after using a dynamic factor model, which should
provide a more accurate estimate of the common components underlying our data and hence a better
identification of the microeconomic shocks, gives us some reassurance in this regard.
For labor productivity we use the sales to domestic employment ratio, similar to Gabaix (2011), i.e.
prodi,t =
Salesi,t
employeesDom,i,t
, (2.5)
where Salesi,t refer to the total sales of the business group i in month t, and employeesDom,i,t
is the number of domestic employees (expressed, in full time equivalents) for the same corporation.
We then compute the year-on-year growth rate for this labor productivity measure and compute the
granular residual as in (2.1). To analyze the role of Nokia, individually, we use quarterly productivity
and net sales figures between 2003 and 2013, obtained from the the corporation’s interim reports.
Statistics Finland forms the monthly turnovers by obtaining the contributions made by each
enterprise to the tax authority. The mergers and acquisitions are also controlled for in the value of the
comparison year (see the Appendix for a detailed explanation on the methodology). Thus, we are able
to use monthly year-on-year growth rates that represent the organic growth of each company. The
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enterprise groups are split into four main industries of the economy using the Standard Industrial
Classification (TOL 2008). 3 Below we report the number of groups belonging to each industry and
how much they are accountable for the total turnovers.
Industry Number of observations Weight of turnovers (%) Share of observations (%)
Finance 3 0.6 5.3
Construction 3 2.7 5.3
Manufacturing 25 66.2 43.9
Trade and Services 26 30.5 45.6
Table 2.1: Top-57 enterprises, weights by industry, January 2013
The top-57 sample is roughly evenly distributed between manufacturing (25 groups) and trade
and services (26 companies). The sample also includes 3 construction and 3 finance4 groups. By the
turnover figures, the manufacturing companies are much larger, forming roughly 66.2% of the sample,
while the corresponding share for trade and services is 30.5%. Construction companies account for
only 2.5% of the total turnovers of the top-57 sample. In 2013, the value added generated by these
57 enterprise groups was around 34 billion Euro, accounting for roughly 17% of the Finnish GDP. In
Table 2.2, we report similar descriptive statistics as in Table 2.1, for the larger dataset.
Industry Number of observations Weight of turnovers (%) Share of observations (%)
Finance 18 3.7 3.5
Construction 25 2.8 4.8
Manufacturing 195 47.3 37.4
Trade and Services 283 46.2 54.3
Table 2.2: All large enterprises, weights by industry in January 2013
The second dataset contains ca. 50% of the Finnish GDP (in terms of gross value added), and
includes 521 enterprises. The manufacturing industry has again the biggest weight in terms of turnovers,
with 47%, but the relative importance of trade and services has now increased to 46% share of the
overall sample turnovers. Construction and finance enterprises are less important, with a turnovers’
share of 4.8% and 3.5%, respectively.
3The 5 digit statistical classification system for economic activities used in the European statistical system.
4The data does not include the large banks of the economy, which are problematic in terms of measuring turnovers.
The corporations here are defined as "finance" by the statistical office by the value added of the headquarters, and are
actual turnover producing corporations, especially after grouping the affiliated firms together.
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In our analysis, we want to make sure that we capture the actual effect of a shock to a large company.
If we would focus solely on individual firms (identified as single legal units in the register), we would
underestimate their actual size by disregarding the potentially numerous subsidiaries. Instead, we
combine the legal units to form corporation-level data through the enterprise group register information.
Even though the final dataset is anonymous, the enterprise group register allows Statistics Finland to
track the ownership and control relationships to achieve this systematically for the top-57 firms. Thus
in our data, the mother company includes the sales of its subsidiaries, if they are relevant business
units and the mother has full control over them.
2.4 Empirical Results
In this study, we use the Trend Indicator of Output (TIO) as main indicator of real economic activity.
It is a monthly series constructed by Statistics Finland and provides the basis for the GDP flash
estimates. In Figure 2.2, we report the TIO and the granular residual obtained using (2.2). The
Finnish economy has experienced a moderate to high growth throughout the period going from the
end of the 1990s until 2007, with a modest downturn around 2002-2003. However, the Great Recession
had a dramatic impact on the economy, with year-on-year growth rate plunging to -10% and with
economic activity growth still lagging behind toward the end of the sample.
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Figure 2.2: Finnish real monthly output and the granular residual based on the top-57 Finnish
corporations
2.4.1 The granular residual in the Finnish economy
We start our empirical exercise by regressing the growth of TIO onto the granular residual computed
using the full sample period available. In Table 2.3, we report results for g¯t based on the top-57
companies, together with the ones obtained using the much bigger sample comprising all enterprises
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defined as large based on the Statistics Finland’s criteria, i.e. having more than 250 employees.
Full Sample
Top-57 Large
Model 1. 2. 3.
Γt 0.821
úúú 0.590úúú 0.671úúú
(0.057) (0.029) (0.073)
Γt≠1 0.384
úúú
(0.021)
Constant 3.4úúú 3.7úúú 3.1úúú
(0.2) (0.2) (0.3)
Observations 192 191 192
R2 0.312 0.354 0.306
Adjusted-R2 0.308 0.347 0.302
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01
Table 2.3: Results of the regression of TIO onto the granular residual computed using (2.1), in the
sample period going from January 1998 to December 2013. Top-57 and Large indicate how many
firms were used to calculate g¯t. The lag length is selected based on the BIC.
Table 2.3 gives some important insights about the granularity of the Finnish economy. We find
that the contemporaneous value of Γt and its first lag has a statistically significant positive effect on
the TIO growth. This result follows the granular hypothesis intuition, which indicates that positive
idiosyncratic shocks to large enterprise groups should benefit aggregate economic activity. Moreover,
the adjusted-R2 values (around 0.30) indicate that the granular residual is helpful in explaining a
substantial part of real economic activity fluctuations, which supports the view of Finland as a granular
economy.
It is interesting to notice that we get a quantitatively similar result as in Gabaix (2011), where
the granular residual obtained from the top-100 US firms is able to explain around a third of GDP
fluctuations. This might seem peculiar, given the smaller size of the Finnish economy, where larger
corporations should be relatively more important in driving aggregate dynamics, compared to a big
economy such as the U.S. one. We believe that the time frequency of our data might explain this
aspect. We are dealing with monthly data, which are inherently more volatile compared to the annual
ones used in Gabaix (2011), and hence harder to track. To verify this issue we compute the basic
granular regression, using the contemporaneous residual and its first lag, using quarterly and annual
data. The adjusted-R2s we obtain are 0.39 and 0.44, for quarterly and annual data respectively. A
similar specification in Gabaix (2011), using annual data, provides an adjusted-R2 of 0.24, so we can
see that for the Finnish case the granular residual is able to explain a substantially larger share of
GDP growth. Moreover, we are going to see, in Section 4.2, that controlling for common shocks using
19
a factor model, as suggested in Stella (2015), lowers the explanatory power of the granular residual,
but the latter remains sizable. On the other hand Stella (2015) finds that, once he uses a dynamic
factor model to control for common shocks, the explanatory power of the granular residual for U.S.
GDP is virtually nonexistent. These considerations point toward a quantitatively larger importance of
the granular residual in explaining aggregate fluctuations for the Finnish economy, compared to the
U.S. case.
Using industry demeaning might give us a more appropriate estimate of the granular residual, so we
re-estimate the linear regression model using formula (2.2) to compute the granular residual. In Table
2.4, we report the results using demeaning based on the top-57 firms and the larger dataset, for the full
time period. These regression results give us similar findings as the ones reported in Table 2.3. The
granular residual, together with its first two lags, has positive and statistically significant coefficients,
and it is able to explain a considerable share of Finnish business cycle fluctuations. However, the R2s
are slightly lower than the ones in Table 2.3.
Full Sample
Top-57 Large
Model 1. 2. 3. 4.
Γ
ú
t 0.600
úúú 0.401úúú 0.557úúú 0.448úúú
(0.028) (0.015) (0.057) (0.028)
Γ
ú
t≠1 0.252
úúú 0.150úúú
(0.0078) (0.016)
Γ
ú
t≠2 0.236
úúú
(0.0071)
Constant 3.0úúú 3.5úúú 2.7úúú 2.7úúú
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
Observations 192 190 192 191
R2 0.239 0.333 0.252 0.259
Adjusted-R2 0.235 0.322 0.248 0.252
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01
Table 2.4: Results of the regression of TIO onto the granular residual computed using (2.2), in the
sample period going from January 1998 to December 2013. Top-57 and Large indicate how many
firms were used to calculate g¯t. The lag length is selected based on the BIC.
One peculiar characteristic about the Finnish economy is the presence of a single large company,
Nokia, which has been shown (see Ali-Yrkkö et al., 2010) to contribute considerably to GDP growth. In
the light of this information, it is interesting to see if the explanatory power of the granular residual is
concentrated on few very large corporations. In Table 2.5, we report the results obtained by regressing
TIO on the granular residual computed after removing the top-4 companies from the dataset. We
report results for both specifications (2.1) and (2.2).
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Full Sample
Top-57 Large Top-57 Large
Model 1. 2. 3. 4.
Γt 0.57
úú 0.503úú
(0.11) (0.14)
Γ
ú
t 0.56
úú 0.47úú
(0.11) (0.14)
Constant 2.5úú 2.4úú 2.5úúú 2.4úúú
(0.46) (0.52) (0.46) (0.52)
Observations 192 192 192 192
R2 0.052 0.051 0.052 0.050
Adjusted-R2 0.047 0.045 0.047 0.045
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01
Table 2.5: Results of the regression of TIO onto the granular residual computed using (2.1) and (2.2),
in the sample period going from January 1998 to December 2013 and removing the top-4 corporations
from the dataset. Top-57 and Large indicate how many firms were used to calculate g¯t.
Columns 1. and 2. in Table 2.5 include the results for the model based on the granular residual
computed using (2.1), while 3. and 4. contain the parameter estimates and the R2s for the industry
demeaning specification. The outcomes of these regressions indicate that the four largest corporations
have been a key driving factor behind the granularity of the Finnish economy. Removing them from the
computation of the granular residual leads to much lower R2s, indicating no substantial explanatory
power of the microeconomic shocks (even though their regression coefficients remain statistically
significant).
Finland has undergone a deep recession in the 2008-2009 period, followed by sluggish growth and
further drop in GDP up until the end of our sample. It seems that the Great Recession represents a
breaking point for the Finnish economy and for many of its largest enterprises (e.g. Nokia). Given this
consideration, we analyze a pre-recession period from January 1998 until December 2007 and a sample
covering the remaining years up to December 2013. We also examine the data from January 2010 until
the end of the sample, to disregard the effects of the Great Recession. In tables 2.6 and 2.7, we report
the results for regression (2.3) using the pre- and post-recession subsamples, respectively.
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Pre-2008
Top-57 Large Top-57 Large
Model 1. 2. 3. 4.
Γt 0.455
úúú 0.348úúú
(0.007) (0.0061)
Γ
ú
t 0.423
úúú 0.313úúú
(0.0066) (0.0059)
Constant 4.4úúú 4.4úúú 4.0úúú 3.8úúú
(0.1) (0.1) (0.08) (0.1)
Observations 120 120 120 120
R2 0.218 0.214 0.205 0.194
Adjusted-R2 0.212 0.207 0.198 0.187
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01
Table 2.6: Results of the regression of TIO onto the granular residual computed using (2.1) and (2.2)
in the sample period going from January 1998 to December 2007. Top-57 and Large indicate how
many firms were used to calculate g¯t. The lag length is selected based on the BIC.
The results indicate a stark contrast between the pre- and post-Great Recession period, in relation
to the granular hypothesis. Before 2008, we find that the granular residual is able to explain a moderate
chunk of real output variations, with adjusted-R2s consistently around 0.2. Moreover, the coefficients
associated to Γ are highly significant and positive, even though lower than for the whole sample. On
the other hand, as seen in Table 2.7, the Great Recession changes the results dramatically. If we include
the economic decline of 2008-2009 in the analysis, we find that the granular residual is able to explain
an even greater share of real activity growth, with R2 reaching 0.4, and estimated coefficients reaching
substantially higher values (being statistically significant as well), compared to the results in Table 2.6.
However, by looking at the bottom panel in Table 2.7, the granular hypothesis does not seem to hold
for the years after the Great Recession. The share of explained variance becomes very small for all
specifications and the coefficients become negative (even though they remain statistically significant).
Based on these results, it seems that the bulk of the relationship between the granular residual and
the Finnish economy, during the 2008–2013 period, is generated during the Great Recession.
This break in the explanatory power of the granular residual is extremely interesting. We can only
give a tentative reasoning for this phenomenon, but one of the main suspect is Nokia, specifically its
drop in importance relative to the aggregate economy. In Section 2.4.4, we focus more on the role
the telecommunication giant had in driving the Finnish economy. In Figure 2.4 (a), in Section 2.4.4,
we depict the share of Nokia sales to GDP and notice a dramatic and steady drop after the Great
Recession. Interestingly, after the large post-recession drop, there is a fairly stable period which is
interrupted around 2011, where the company sales to GDP ratio restarted falling. The drop in the
relatively importance of Nokia seems to be temporally linked with the loss of explanatory power of the
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Post-2008
Top-57 Large Top-57 Large
1. 2. 3. 4.
Γt 0.892
úúú 0.951úúú
(0.037) (0.012)
Γ
ú
t 0.455
úúú 0.778úúú
(0.034) (0.02)
Constant 1.1úú 0.8úú 0.5 0.7ú
(0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04)
Observations 72 72 72 72
R2 0.391 0.607 0.183 0.500
Adjusted R2 0.382 0.601 0.171 0.493
Post-2009
Γt −0.34
úú 0.167úú
(0.03) (0.05)
Γ
ú
t −0.372
úú −0.183úú
(0.0163) (0.05)
Constant −0.1634úú 0.5úú −0.5úúú 0.2úúú
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.09)
Observations 48 48 48 48
R2 0.057 0.014 0.011 0.014
Adjusted-R2 0.037 -0.008 -0.09 -0.008
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01
Table 2.7: Results of the regression of TIO onto the granular residual computed using (2.1) and (2.2)
in the sample period going from January 2008 to December 2013. Top-57 and Large indicate how
many firms were used to calculate g¯t. The lag length is selected based on the BIC.
Granular residual, and this fact can offer a possible explanation in the break we found in the data.
However, we have seen, in the Introduction, that the herfindahl index for the largest Finnish firms
is roughly the same as in the pre-2008 period, so, statistically speaking, the Finnish economy has a
similar degree of concentration before and after the break, and we might (ex-post) expect that the
granular hypothesis holds throughout the sample. This can point toward the need to analyze different
variables which can indicate the influence of large companies on the economy, such as investments.
In tables 2.8 and 2.9, we report the results of regressions of TIO onto the granular residual, while
excluding the top-4 corporations from the computation of the latter. The evidence in these two tables
shows a striking shift in the influence of the largest corporations on the Finnish economy. In the
pre-recession period we find that removing the 4 largest corporations substantially eliminates the
explanatory power of the granular residual, which is in line with what we found with the full sample.
If we look at the post-2008 period, it seems that our results depend on how we define the granular
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residual. If we use the larger panel of firms to estimate the cross sectional average, then the granular
residual keeps its explanatory power (albeit getting lower R2s) even if we remove the top-4 firms. If
we consider the data in the 2010-2013 period, we see that excluding the largest corporations does not
change the results significantly, i.e. the granular residual is unable to explain a substantial share of
economic fluctuations. Interestingly, it seems that the R2 of certain specifications actually increases
after we remove the largest corporations, even though it remains fairly low.
Pre-2008
Top-57 Large Top-57 Large
1. 2. 3. 4.
Γt 0.35
úúú 0.28úúú
(0.024) (0.021)
Γ
ú
t 0.36
úú 0.28úú
0.(0.028) (0.021)
Constant 4.14úúú 4.1úúú 4.14úúú 4.12úúú
(0.1) (0.2) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Observations 120 120 120 120
R2 0.074 0.075 0.074 0.075
Adjusted-R2 0.066 0.067 0.066 0.067
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01
Table 2.8: Results of the regression of TIO onto the granular residual computed using (2.1) and (2.2),
in the sample period going from January 1998 to December 2007 and removing the top-4 corporations
from the set of firms. Top-57 and Large indicate how many firms were used to calculate g¯t. The lag
length is selected based on the BIC.
To summarize, the shocks of large enterprise groups seem to have a substantial effect on real
economic activity on all sample periods considered, except for the post-2009 years. Moreover, we find
that the explanatory power of the granular residual is concentrated on the four largest corporations in
the data, at least until the Great Recession. In the years after the economic downturn this relationship
has deteriorated. In the narrative analysis (Section 2.5), we discuss how the poor performance of some
of the largest Finnish companies might have affected this result.
2.4.2 Robustness check: factor analysis
As argued by Stella (2015), using the cross-sectional average of sales to control for the overall economic
condition of the economy can be inappropriate. The dynamic factor model of Stock and Watson
(2002a) provides an alternative approach to estimate the common component underlying the enterprise
groups data. Stella (2015) shows that once the estimated factors are used to obtain the idiosyncratic
shocks to firms, the granular hypothesis does not hold anymore for U.S. data.
We use the factor estimation proposed in Doz et al. (2012) to obtain the common component
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Post-2008
Top-57 Large Top-57 Large
1. 2. 3. 4.
Γt 0.73 2.25
úú
(0.55) (0.30)
Γ
ú
t 0.81 2.16
úú
(0.52) (0.38)
Constant −0.28 0.70 −0.21 0.60
(0.83) (0.67) (0.75) (0.72)
Observations 72 72 72 72
R2 0.04 0.40 0.05 0.34
Adjusted-R2 0.025 0.38 0.03 0.33
Post-2009
Γt −0.33
úú −0.03
(0.03) (0.30)
Γ
ú
t −0.80
úú −0.15
(0.10) (0.28)
Constant −0.16 0.40 −0.25 0.32
(1.04) (1.13) (1.32) (1.1)
Observations 48 48 48 48
R2 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.02
Adjusted-R2 0.09 -0.02 0.08 -0.019
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01
Table 2.9: Results of the regression of TIO onto the granular residual computed using (2.1) and (2.2),
in the sample period going from January 2008 to December 2013 and removing the top-4 corporations
from the set of firms. Top-57 and Large indicate how many firms were used to calculate g¯t. The lag
length is selected based on the BIC.
underlying our data and subsequently use it to compute the company-level shocks. In particular, denote
the estimated factors, extracted from our dataset containing K enterprise groups, of dimensionality
T × r as F , and the r ×K loadings matrix as Λ. The common component underlying the enterprise
group-level shocks is given by Ct = FtΛ and the granular residual is obtained by
ΓFt =
Kÿ
i=1
Si,t≠1
Yt≠1
(git − Ct). (2.6)
We estimate equation (2.3) using ΓF to see if the granular hypothesis holds given the factor model
specification and we analyze the relationship on both the whole sample and on the pre- and post-Great
Recession periods. For the sake of readability, we report here the results of the static specification
based on factors extracted from the larger dataset including all enterprise groups with more than 250
employees. The number of factors is selected by using one of the criteria formulated in Bai and Ng
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(2002b), which suggests a very conservative specification with only one factor selected. For robustness,
we estimate up to ten factors and find that only the first factor presents a strong correlation with real
economic activity growth (0.71).
Table 2.11, confirms the results obtained so far. The granular residual seems to explain a substantial
share of fluctuations of real output, even though the adjusted-R2 values are slightly lower for the
whole sample. We again find that the granular hypothesis has a clear break after the Great Recession,
where the granular residual becomes statistically insignificant and the resulting R2 is extremely low.
Estimating the granular regression after using up to ten factors does change slightly our conclusions5.
If the number of factors is fairly low (up to three), the results are qualitatively similar to the ones
reported in Table 2.11, albeit with slightly different R2s values. If we adopt ten factors, we get that
the explanatory power of the resulting granular residual remains strong only for the pre-2008 sample,
presenting low R2s during the Great Recession and over the whole sample. The selection of the optimal
number of factors is a sensitive topic, especially in a setting like the one presented in this analysis. If
we use a large number of factors, we risk to include pervasive idiosyncratic shocks into the common
component underlying our data, but on the other hand, it is arguable that using too few factors
would lead us to underestimate the real common forces driving the firms’ turnovers. Nevertheless, it is
important to underline that the granular residual retains its explanatory power until the beginning of
the Great Recession, regardless of the number of factors selected.
One reason between the discrepancy between our results and the ones obtained in Stella (2015)
can stand in the type of data we use, i.e. firm-level versus enterprise group-level data. As the author
points out, and as discussed in the previous paragraph, the statistical factor model used in the analysis
of this subsection can have problems in distinguishing the common component from the propagation of
idiosyncratic shocks to the rest of the firms. The use of corporations, instead of firms, in the analysis
can alleviate the issue: grouping legal units together in the same mother company leads us to control
for possible propagations of idiosyncratic shocks within an enterprise group. Stella (2015) uses the
structural approach of Foerster et al. (2011) to filter out the possible propagations of firm-level shocks,
using input-output relationships. However, because of data constraints, he has to rely on sectoral data
to calibrate the input-output matrix and this might affect his results.
2.4.3 The role of linkages
While the focus of this study is on the granular hypothesis, the literature has also been interested in
the effect of firm-level shocks to aggregate fluctuations through the so-called network channel (see
Acemoglu et al., 2012). In practice, shocks to single enterprise groups can have substantial impact
on the business cycle through the links between companies, e.g. through the intermediate goods
supplier-user relationships. If these linkages would be important, we should observe a strong covariance
in the company-level shocks ‘it = (git − g¯t). To examine the relative importance of the granular
versus linkage channel, we follow the approach of di Giovanni et al. (2014), i.e. we decompose the
5To keep the analysis contained, we do not report the results for the richer factor specifications, however they are
available upon request.
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Whole Sample Pre-2008 Post-2008 Post-2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ΓFt 0.601
úúú 0.384úúú 0.871úúú -0.231
(0.085) (0.065) (0.121) (0.207)
Constant 1.304úúú 3.355úúú −1.990úúú 0.788
(0.275) (0.203) (0.416) (0.522)
Observations 192 120 72 48
R2 0.209 0.229 0.424 0.026
Adjusted-R2 0.205 0.222 0.416 0.005
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01
Table 2.11: Results of the regression of TIO onto the granular residual computed with (2.6) and using
the dataset including the largest 57 corporations.
variance of the enterprise groups shocks (the top-57 sample) in two components. The enterprise group
specific volatility can be written as ‡2t =
qK
j
qK
i Cov(wj,t≠1‘jt, wi,t≠1‘it). We can subsequently use
the following decomposition, suggested in Carvalho and Gabaix (2013) and di Giovanni et al. (2014),
for the variance of the microeconomic shocks:
‡2t =
Kÿ
i
V ar(wi,t≠1‘it) +
Kÿ
j ”=i
Kÿ
i
Cov(wj,t≠1‘jt, wi,t≠1‘it), (2.7)
where wi,t≠1 =
Si,t≠1
Yt≠1
, implying that the terms in inside the variance and covariance operators are
the granular residuals of the individual corporations6. The first summation in (2.7) is the granular
component of the variance-covariance matrix of the shocks, which we denote hereafter GRAN . The
second summation represents the covariance of the enterprise groups shocks and we label it LINK.
Figure 2.3 presents the variance decomposition for the whole time period. To make the figure more
readable, we have aggregated the series at the annual level. As we can see, the GRAN component has
been the dominant one for almost the entire sample, with a notable exception in 2009. This might
point out that during the Great Recession the effect of corporation-level shocks has been transmitted
through the linkages between firms, instead of separated individual shocks to large companies. Overall,
the granular component of the variance of the microeconomic shock is predominant, which is in contrast
to what has been found for the French economy in di Giovanni et al. (2014). At the monthly level,
GRAN accounts on average for 70% of total variance over the whole sample period, dropping to 60%
during the Great Recession and with a contribution above half of total variance for almost 90% of the
sample. It would be interesting to see how much this result is affected by our decision to use business
groups instead of firms as the unit of observation. This could be done by replicating the analysis on
firm-level data and possibly including smaller enterprises. This is, however, left for future work.
The fact that we use contemporaneous correlations with monthly data might lead us to disregard
6We have also estimated this decomposition using fixed weights, in line with di Giovanni et al. (2014). This alternative
specification yields very similar results and hence it is not reported.
27
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
LINK
GRAN
0
.0
0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
5
0
.0
0
1
0
0
.0
0
1
5
0
.0
0
2
0
0
.0
0
2
5
Figure 2.3: Contribution of GRAN and LINK component to the enterprise shocks variance.
linkages between corporations which have an effect with a lag. For example a negative shock to a
firm which is supplier for a number of corporations might be transmitted after a certain number of
months. To make sure that the prevalence of granularity in the variation of idiosyncratic errors is not
due to the use of monthly data, we perform the analysis after aggregating the sales data at the annual
level. The results are very similar to the ones reported in Figure 2.3, i.e. the LINK components is
predominant only in 2009. One additional interesting robustness check lies in separating our data into
different industries. The fact that the contribution of the LINK component becomes large during
the Great Recession might indicate the spread of idiosyncratic shocks within a particular industry,
such as the financial one. We estimate the decomposition in (2.7) using the data of different industries
separately. We find that the trade and services industry, as well as the manufacturing one, show a
similar pattern as the one in Figure 2.3. On the other hand, the decomposition for the construction
and financial sectors evidences an even more prevalent role of the GRAN component, even during the
Great Recession.
2.4.4 The role of the size class
Next, we divide our sample of top-57 companies into three groups based on their average sales, each
group containing 19 corporations. We denote the largest subset of corporations as Large (corporations
1 to 19), the second subset as Medium (20 to 38) and the last one as Small (39 to 57)7, plus the
subset containing the four largest corporations in the dataset, denoted as Giant. We then estimate the
7It is important to point out that even the companies in group Small and Medium are corporations with high sales
and a large number of employees, in absolute terms.
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following regressions
yt = —0 + —iΓi,t + ut, (2.8)
where Γi,t indicate the granular residual, and possibly its lags, of subset i at time t. Table 2.12 reports
the adjusted-R2s for the whole 1998-2013 sample and the pre- and post-recession periods.
Size Class (N. Firms) Whole Sample Pre-2008 Post-2008 Post-2009
Giant (4) 0.34 0.21 0.43 0.01
Large (19) 0.31 0.21 0.38 0.036
Medium (19) 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.03
Small (19) 0.002 0.09 0.16 0.003
Observations 192 120 72 48
Table 2.12: Adjusted-R2 for different subsets of the top-57 corporations, divided by size. The number
of lags used in the granular regression is based on the BIC.
Table 2.12 give us some interesting insights. It seems, as already pointed in the main analysis,
that the explanatory power of the granular residual is substantially based on a very small number of
large corporations. While the subsets Medium and Small do not carry any significant explanatory
power, the granular residual based on the subset containing only the largest Finnish corporations is
able to account for a large share of output fluctuations. Indeed, the top-4 enterprise groups seem to be
the best at explaining TIO growth. The Great Recession provides an interesting shift, where all the
subsets of corporations are unable to explain business cycle fluctuations after the end of the Great
Recession. However, the granular residual obtained from the smaller corporations in our top-57 data is
able to explain a moderate share of TIO fluctuations during the Great Recession.
These findings are also in line with what we described in Figure 2.3, where we can see that in 2009
the covariance component of the microeconomic shock dominates the granular component. Therefore,
we can argue that during the Great Recession the main channel through which the company-level
shocks were transmitted was through linkages, leading to a higher explanatory power of the relatively
smaller companies, during this period. While this analysis is able to give us some interesting findings,
it must be complemented with a more narrative approach (presented in the next section), where we
can examine single episodes of granularity and their effect on economic fluctuations
2.4.5 Productivity analysis and the Nokia’s case
As we mentioned before, the original study on the granular hypothesis, by Gabaix, is focused on
productivity shocks. There are multiple studies in the literature that have used sales, due to data
limitations, and the exercise presented here follows this practice. However, we can still calculate
productivity based on domestic employment, giving us the possibility of conducting an analysis more
in line with Gabaix (2011). In particular, we use (2.5) and compute the granular residual in a similar
fashion as for sales, i.e. using formula (2.1). First, in Table 2.13, we report the results from regressing
TIO onto the granular residual obtained from the total sales to domestic employment ratio, together
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with the domestic sales based productivity measure, using both a static and dynamic specification.
The cross-sectional average is based on the top-57 firms.
The results in Table 2.13, columns 1. and 2., confirm the findings we obtained throughout our
analysis. Firm-level shocks, based on the total sales to domestic FTEs productivity measure, present a
positive and statistically significant regression coefficient, together with a fairly large R2 value. On the
other hand, once we use domestic sales, the explanatory power of the granular residual is significantly
reduced, reflecting the fact that the Finnish market is fairly small, and that the largest companies
are highly export oriented, thus deriving most of their value added from exports. Looking at our
dataset for confirmation, we find that domestic sales share of total sales in the top-57 sample is 55%,
averaged over the whole period in consideration. However, Nokia is a notable exception. Looking at
the publicly available annual report for the company, in 2007, we see that the share of domestic sales
to total sales is much lower. In particular, it corresponds to 0.6% in 2007, 0.94% in 2006 and 0.96% in
2005. While the average share of domestic sales for the largest companies is considerable, this measure
becomes extremely small for what is widely considered historically as the most important company
of the Finnish economy. As a consequence, the domestic demand cycles should have only a minor
influence on the productivity dynamics of the largest firms, even though the idiosyncratic shocks (as
reflected in the granular residual) appear to have a significant impact on domestic aggregate output.
We interpret this evidence as lending support to the economic significance of our obtained results.
Full Sample
Total Sales/Emp. Domestic Sales/Emp.
Model 1. 2. 3. 4.
Γ
ú
t 0.59
úúú 0.39úúú 0.23úúú 0.14ú
(0.06) (0.08) (0.049) (0.06)
Γ
ú
t≠1 0.28
úúú 0.13ú
(0.08) (0.06)
Γ
ú
t≠2
Constant 3.07úúú 3.21úúú 2.37úúú 2.7úúú
(0.26) (0.25) (0.28) (0.2)
Observations 192 190 192 191
R2 0.34 0.38 0.10 0.12
Adjusted-R2 0.33 0.37 0.10 0.11
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01
Table 2.13: Results of the regression of TIO onto the productivity granular residual computed using
(2), in the sample period going from January 1998 to December 2013. The lag length is selected based
on the BIC.
We conclude the empirical analysis by looking specifically at Nokia, using publicly available data
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obtained from the company’s interim reports. In particular, we compute quarterly labor productivity
using (2.5) and we are able to obtain the total number of employees working for the company (not
only the domestic ones), giving us a fairly complete view of the actual size of the group. We estimate
the regression of the year-on-year growth rate of quarterly GDP onto Nokia’s labor productivity
growth starting from 2004, due to data limitations. The resulting R2 is 0.25, indicating that the
labor productivity of Nokia is able to explain around a quarter of GDP fluctuations during the period
2004–2013. The estimated regression coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level and it is
around 0.71. In Figure 2.4, we report the Nokia’s sales to GDP ratio and the labor productivity
contribution to GDP growth, computed using (2.4).
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Figure 2.4: Relationship between Nokia productivity and sales and Finnish GDP.
Figure 2.4 (a) shows how the importance of Nokia in the Finnish economy has shifted dramatically
in the recent years. The sales to gdp ratio reaches its peak around 2007, where Nokia’s sale represent
roughly 30% of GDP. However, since 2008 the company has faced a continuous decline, with the
ratio reaching its lowest values at 11%. Notice that in this analysis we are not considering the sale
of the mobile division to Microsoft. Figure 2.4 (b) give us another insight on how important Nokia
has been for the Finnish economy. Between the second quarter of 2005 and the first quarter of 2006,
the implied contribution to GDP of Nokia’s productivity is around 1.8 percentage points, accounting
(on average) for around 60% of GDP growth in this period. Even more surprising is how the drop
in productivity during the Great Recession seems to have affected the aggregate economy. Nokia’s
implied contribution during 2009 is -3.72% points on average, accounting for around 41% of the GDP
drop during the year. While these figures give an idea of how large the influence of Nokia has been
during the last 10 years, we have to keep in mind that there are various caveats behind this result.
The productivity measure we use, while handy in terms of computation and data availability, is not
the most sophisticated one and alternatives like the Solow residual can be taken into consideration.
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Moreover, we are considering labor productivity without removing the cross sectional average, as we
did with the granular residual and this can overestimate the correlation between Nokia’s productivity
and GDP growth. This is due to the lack of data on total employment for the rest of the corporations
in our data (we only have domestic employment). Finally, it would be nice to use value added data
and adopt a more "accounting" oriented approach as in Ali-Yrkkö et al. (2010).
2.5 Narrative analysis
In Section 2.4, we have found multiple results pointing toward the granular hypothesis holding in
Finland. In this section, we look in detail at a number of episodes where output growth (or drop) has
been particularly strong. We then inspect events, using public sources and data, that have affected
the largest Finnish corporations around the periods of interest. We consider, as in Gabaix (2011),
episodes where |yt| ≥ 1.3‡y, where ‡y is the standard deviation of monthly real output growth (yt). In
this fashion, we obtain 50 monthly episodes and we analyze the years which include at least one of
those months. Given the importance of Nokia, we split the analysis in two subsection: the first one
focuses on large firms excluding Nokia, while the second part concentrates on the latter. In Table
2.14, we report some meaningful episodes to give the reader a sense of the impact of granular shocks.
Unfortunately, due to confidentiality reasons, we cannot use our firm-level monthly data to investigate
these episodes and, instead, we need to rely on available annual and interim reports. We cite both
yearly and quarterly episodes of granularity and we specify the time frequency to which they refer to.
2.5.1 The effect of large firms’ shocks
For each year included in the analysis, we describe the overall macroeconomic conditions (which we
take from the corresponding Bank of Finland annual reports) and subsequently look at the performance
of the largest Finnish corporations during the selected periods. If available, we rely on quarterly sales
figures, otherwise we use annual sales. Because we need to work with annual and quarterly sales
data, we re-estimate (2.3) using variables at lower frequency to estimate the impact of the granular
residual on real economic activity. The coefficient we obtain for annual data is 1.20, while for quarterly
frequency regression we obtain that the granular residual coefficient is 0.97.
1998: This year was marked by sustained growth and moderate inflation (related to the global
fall in oil prices). However, output growth decelerated during the second half of the year, mainly
due to a drop in exports caused by the southeast Asia and Russian crises. The decrease in export
affected various sectors of the economy in dramatically different ways. For example, while the growth
of exports for the manufacturing industry was 1.5%, the same figure for the electrical and electronics
goods industry amounted to 24%. The months in which the growth rates were especially high are
January to March, May, July and September, while the average TIO growth for the year was around
5%. One of the largest Finnish corporation of that year was Fortum, a majority state-owned energy
and oil production company. This enterprise group was founded in 1998, from the merger of Neste
and Imatra Voima. 1998 was not a good year for the company, mainly due to the drop in oil prices,
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Year/Quarter Company Granular Residual % Contribution to GDP Growth % Explanation
1998 Fortum -2.15 -2.58 Fall in oil energy prices (partly due to heavy rain falls)
1999.Q4 Nokia 4.5 4.3 Release of models 7110 (first to use WAP technology) and 3210
2000 Fortum 1.14 1.36 Expansion of gas trading network (in Germany and Netherlands)
2001 Nokia -2.4 -0.6 Difficulties in commercializing the 3G technology
2004 Rautaruukki 0.11 0.14 Two large deliveries for the Sakhalin II project
2007 Nokia 3.7 4.4 Large expansion in the Indian market
2007.Q4 Neste Oil 0.48 0.46 Increase in refining margin due to various refinery shutdowns in U.S. and Europe
2009 Nokia -2.5 -2.44 Competition due to the release of iPhone 3Gs, together with products by HTC and Samsung
2011 Nokia -4 -4.8 Poor performance in the smartphone’s market
2013 Nokia -2.7 -2.6 Persistently poor performance leading to the sale of the Mobile Phone division to Microsoft
Table 2.14: Selected granular episodes in the Finnish economy from 1998 to 2013.
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heavy rain falls which led to higher hydroelectricity production and subsequent energy price drops.
These factors, together with a planned reduction in crude oil trading, led to a yearly drop in sales of
around -15%. The average growth rate in sales of the Top-57 corporations was around 10% and the
sales of Fortum in 1997 accounted for almost 10% of Finnish GDP, implying a granular residual for the
company of -2.15% in 1998. Following the granular hypothesis, we can argue that the bad performance
of Fortum during 1998 affected negatively GDP growth, which was almost 7%, by -2.58% points.
1999: The Finnish economy faced another period of sustained economic growth, albeit slightly
lower than in 1998. The beginning of the year was still affected by low export demand caused by the
southeast Asia and Russian crises, even though the internal demand and the success of the electronic
and telecommunication sector kept output growth to high levels. The highest growth rates in TIO
are found in the first three months of the year. However, many Finnish groups did not experience a
positive year in terms of sales growth. A good example is UPM, a paper manufacturing company. The
poor performance of UPM was mainly due to the oversupply of paper pulp during the year leading to
a newsprint, magazine and fine paper price fall. The granular residual for the firm during the year is
-0.4%, implying -0.48% points impact on output fluctuations for 1999.
2000: This was another extremely positive year for the Finnish economy. Together with the success
of Nokia, which we discuss in the next subsection, Fortum’s excellent performance provided a boost to
economic activity. The yearly granular residual of Fortum is 1.14%, with a positive impact on output
growth amounting to 1.36% points, i.e. almost 20% of the GDP growth for this year. There were
multiple factors behind the success of the energy company: a substantial increase in crude oil prices,
the increase of the international refining margin and the expansion of its gas trading network (starting
operations in Germany and Netherlands). Moreover, the group experienced a 30% increase in fuel
exports to North America and 45% increase in export of CityDiesel, an extremely low-sulfur diesel
fuel. UPM faced a 8-day strike during April, with an estimated loss of 60 million euro over the profits
for the second quarter of the year. However, this episode did not have a substantial effect over the
company’s performance over the year.
2004: Another good year with substantial growth, especially in the November–December period.
The steel manufacturing company Rautaruukki faced a particularly positive year, with an average
year-on-year demeaned growth in sales of around 6%. Various factors contributed to this successful
performance: substantial increase in steel product prices in the international markets, efficiency
improvements due to management decisions and two large delivery agreements for the Sakhalin II
project (a gas and oil extraction facility). The implied contribution to GDP growth for the year is
around 0.14% points, accounting for around 4% of output growth.
2006: Average GDP growth for the year is around 5%. Between the most successful corporations,
we find the stainless steel manufacturer Outokumpu which made its best-ever operating profits in the
last of quarter of the year. This was mainly due to the high increase in international demand together
with productivity improvements through the commercial and production excellence programme. The
implied contribution of Outokumpu during the last quarter of 2006 is around 1% points, amounting to
almost 17% of GDP growth for that period. Moreover, increased demand from China, Latin America
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and Eastern Europe boosted two important companies in the paper manufacturing sector: Stora Enso
and UPM. In particular, Stora Enso expanded in Latin America and became the only producer of
coated mechanical paper in the area.
2007: Throughout the year Finland experienced sustained growth, especially during the last
quarter. In this period, Nokia was one of the main driver of the good economic performance, together
with the oil company Neste Oil. The latter was founded in 2005, after splitting from Fortum. The
Finnish government controls 50.1% of the company. The granular residual for Neste Oil in the fourth
quarter of the year is around 0.48%, implying a contribution of around 0.46% points and accounting
for almost 6% of output growth. Behind the group’s success was the launch of the NExBTL Renewable
Diesel, which was employed by the Helsinki City Transport network. Even more importantly, Neste
Oil benefited from increasing gasoline and diesel refining margins due to various refinery shutdowns in
U.S. and Europe during the second half of the year.
2009: This year, together with 2008, has been marked by a profound crisis of the global economy.
Finland faced an average 9% drop in monthly output throughout the year and most of the main
Finnish groups had a very negative performance. For example, the yearly granular residual of Neste
Oil is around -2.6% . During the April-September period the main diesel production line in the Porvoo
refinery had to be shut down because of a fire leading the quarterly granular residual for Neste Oil to
reach its lowest point at -2.8% (second quarter) and -3.2% (third quarter). The implied contribution
of Neste Oil to GDP growth rates are 2.7% points and 3.1% points for the second and third quarter,
respectively. The global crisis affected industrial production and demand in stainless steel, influencing
greatly Outokumpu’s activities. The company faced a great decline in sales and its granular residual
for the year is -1.26%, with an implied contribution of -1.5% points. Moreover, in order to reduce fixed
costs and boost profitability the group cut almost 10% of the personnel, with temporary layoffs of
most employees at the Tornio factory (2350 employees), 250 workers of the Kemi mine and other 1600
employed in the steel production lines.
2010: This was a rebound year after the Great Recession. Various large firms had a positive
performance, with Neste Oil having the highest granular residual in the last quarter of the year. The
residual is around 1.21%, with an implied contribution to GDP growth equal to 1.17% points and
accounting for 20% of the increase in GDP during the last quarter of the year.
As we can see, on multiple occasions the good performance of the Finnish economy was associated
with the success of few large companies. However, especially in 1998 and 1999, we find cases where
large groups have a negative contribution to output growth, even though the latter is very high.
This can be explained by the fact that we have omitted, so far, the manufacturing of electronic and
telecommunication products sector and its predominant firm, i.e. Nokia.
2.5.2 Nokia and the Finnish economy
In this subsection we shift the focus to Nokia. The analysis we report below is based on Nokia’s
annual and quarterly reports. Given the importance of this corporation, we describe in broad terms its
performance in each year from 1998 to 2013, together with the main events which have affected the
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group.
1998: The strategic decision to focus on the telecommunications market, adopted in 1992, con-
tributed to a strong development of the company, which became the largest mobile phone manufacturer
worldwide by 1998. Net sales for the group increased by 50% from the previous year, thanks to the
success of models such as Nokia 6110 and Nokia 5110 and the expansion of the GSM technology.
During the first quarter of 1998, when Nokia 5110 was released, Nokia’s granular residual is almost
1%, implying a contribution to output growth for the quarter of around 0.97% percentage points (14%
share of GDP growth in Q1).
1999: Another great year for the company, with net sales increasing by 40% with respect to 1998.
In October, the 7110 model was introduced and it proved to be extremely successful. In particular,
this model was the first mobile phone allowing for internet access through the WAP technology. The
granular residual for the quarter of release (fourth quarter) is 4.5% and its implied contribution to
the 5.7% GDP growth for that period amounts to 4.3% points. Another model which proved to be
extremely successful was the Nokia 3210, with 150 million units sold.
2000: This was another extremely successful year for Nokia, with a yearly increase in net sales of
54%. As we have seen in the previous subsection, the Finnish economy experienced a year of sustained
growth with a spike of almost 8% increase in the last quarter of the year. On September 1st, Nokia
announced the 3310 model, which was then released in the last quarter of the year. The granular
residual for the group reaches its highest point in Q4 of 2000, amounting to around 2.6%. This implies
a contribution of 2.5% points to output growth, amounting to around a 32% of the year-on-year
increase in quarterly GDP. During 2000, there was another episode which exemplifies the vast influence
that the corporation had on the whole Finnish economy. As reported in Helsingin Sanomat (2000), on
July 28th the company released its interim report for the first half of the year. The figures indicated a
record profit with a 65% improvement to the first half of the previous year. However the stock market
did not respond well to the news because the company did not reach its expected performance. Nokia
share went down by 21.3% and the Helsinki Stock Exchange Index was heavily impacted by this drop,
with a decline of 15.9% in a single day.
2001: The period going from September to the end of the year was characterized by slow growth
of Finnish output, including a TIO fall of almost -1.7% in December. Nokia experienced a substantial
slowdown in the growth of sales, with a yearly increase of only 2.6% (the average top-57 growth is
around 5% for the year), implying a -0.6% points contribution to annual GDP growth. The slowdown
of the global economy was an important factor behind this result, however the company also pointed
out difficulties in launching and commercializing the 3G technology as a cause of the low growth in
sales.
2002: This was a year of fairly slow economic growth for Finland. While the mobile phones division
of Nokia did not register a meaningful drop in sales, Nokia Networks had a -14% annual decline. One
of the events behind this bad performance was the insolvency of the German operator Mobilcom, due
to financial difficulties of the latter. In particular, as reported in CNN.com (2002), Nokia decided to
write off a 300 million euro loan as part of a new financing agreement with the German operator.
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2003: Another year of weak growth for Finland, especially during the first few months. Nokia
experienced an overall drop in net sales, caused by a bad performance of Nokia Networks. This led to
a dramatic reorganization of the company, with the creation of a multimedia division. However, mobile
phone sales rose throughout the year. In the last quarter of 2003, the company experienced an increase
of 22% of mobile phone units sold with respect to the previous year. The release of Nokia 1100, the
most successful model in the history of the group, can give an explanation for the good performance
of Nokia Mobile in this period. Interestingly, in the last quarter of 2003, Finnish economic activity
started to accelerate with a growth in GDP of around 2.6%, compared to the 1.6% growth during the
previous quarters. In Q4, Nokia’s implied contribution to GDP growth is around 0.2% points (around
8% share).
2004: Finnish output growth was particularly high in the last quarter of the year. During the
same period, Nokia experienced a moderate increase in net sales, mostly due to the success of Nokia
Networks and the good performance of imaging smartphones. On the other hand, sales of standard
mobile phone decreased, as a consequence of the price pressure dictated by increased competition.
2005: Nokia has a large granular residual in the first quarter of the year, amounting to an implied
contribution to output growth of 0.3% points (10% share). Even more importantly, in the last quarter
of the year, Nokia’s share of the global mobile phone market reached 35%. In Q4 2005 the implied
contribution of the corporation is around 1.3% points, accounting for almost half of the GDP growth.
2006: This year was marked by the volume record for the group, with 347 million units sold.
The net sales growth for the Mobile Phones division was almost 20% over the year, mostly due
to the competitiveness of the entry-level products and the success in fast-growing markets such as
Latin America and China. GDP growth for that period was almost 5% on average and the implied
contribution of Nokia is around 0.8% points (15% share of yearly GDP growth). During the year, the
company started releasing the N-series handsets and even the 770 Internet tablet, with the aim to
expand into the high-margin product market (The Economist, 2006).
2007: In April, Nokia Siemens Networks was officially formed. Nokia annual net sales increased by
24%, driven especially by the Multimedia division (producing and marketing smartphones). Despite
the release of Apple’s iPhone, Nokia kept its role as leader in the smartphone and mobile phones
market. One factor behind the success of the company during the year was the large expansion in
the Indian market, which became the second most important for the company in terms of production
volume (Nokia press release, 2007). Nokia’s granular residual for the year is around 3.7%, with an
implied contribution to yearly GDP growth of 4.4% points, roughly half of the GDP increase for the
2007.
2008: Finnish output growth had a breaking point around June 2008, with the spread of the
financial crisis from the United States. Up until then, TIO growth was around 2.7% per month on
average. In the second half of the year it dropped to an average decline in output of around -0.7%
(the average growth of monthly output for 2008 was around 1%). Together with the macroeconomic
consequences of the Great Recession, Nokia had to a face a much stronger competition, especially
with the release of Apple’s iPhone 3G and the failure to adapt to the new smartphone demand (an
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interesting example on the feedback on Nokia Symbian smartphone can be found in Helsingin Sanomat,
2013). This led to a poor performance for the year, with a drop in the yearly sales of -1%. The implied
contribution to the average growth of TIO during 2008 is around -3.6% points.
2009: This year was marked by the dramatic drop in Finnish output (around -6.5% on average
through the year) and Nokia difficulties. The granular residual for the group during 2009 is around
-2.5%, with an implied contribution of -2.44% points. This corresponds to almost 40% share of GDP
drop for 2009. The global economic crisis, together with the growing competition in the smartphone
market, with the release of iPhone 3GS and products from LG, HTC and Samsung, were the main
cause of this weak performance. During the 3rd quarter of 2009 Nokia faced its first quarterly losses
since it started to report on a quarter-by-quarter basis in 1996, amounting to 913 million euro loss
(The Guardian, 2009).
2010: After the Great Recession, the Finnish economy returned to positive growth from March
onward. Nokia performance was still fairly weak, with net sales increasing by 3%. The cross-sectional
average for the top-57 Finnish corporations for that period is around 15%, implying a -12% demeaned
growth rate. The estimated contribution to annual GDP growth (which was roughly 3%) is around
-3% points. It seems that the negative performance of Nokia during 2010 was a key factor holding
back the rebound of the Finnish economy. A contributing factor behind this decline was the success of
iPhone 4 and Samsung Galaxy S, together with problems in the supply chain with the shortages of
components for mobile phones production. In particular, supply of components such as memory chips,
resistors and transistors did not respond strongly to the increased demand after the Great Recession,
which led to weak results for many consumer electronics manufacturers (Reuters, 2010).
2011: While this was a positive year for the Finnish economy, with a 5% output growth on average,
Nokia had another extremely disappointing year with a yearly net sales drop of -18% (implying a
demeaned growth of -32%) and a granular residual of around -4% (implying a -4.8% points contribution
to yearly output growth). Nokia started a partnership with Microsoft to adopt Windows operating
system as a primary platform for the company’s smartphones. After the announcement of the
partnership, Nokia share dropped to its lowest value since July 2009. Moreover, the group implemented
a series of strategical and operational changes, including a large reduction in personnel and the closure
of various facilities (among them, the Cluj factory in Romania, which was opened only three years
earlier, Reuters, 2011).
2012: Finnish economy turned to negative year-on-year growth, with an average quarterly GDP
drop of -1.4%, following the overall trend of the Euro Area. Nokia continued to struggle due to the
strict competition among smartphone manufacturers, and this led to a dramatic reduction in market
share. The company demeaned yearly change in sales was almost -27% and the decrease of personnel
amounted to -25% with respect to the previous year. The number of smartphones sold in the last
quarter of the year amounted to around 16 million units, against the 65 million Samsung devices and
27 million iPhones. As a consequence of these difficulties, Standard and Poor’s eventually downgraded
Nokia bonds to ’junk’ status (Bloomberg, 2012). The granular residual for the company was around
-5.4%, with an implied contribution of around -6% points.
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2013: Both the Finnish economy and Nokia declined throughout the year. The GDP year-on-year
growth was around -1.1%, while the annual granular residual of Nokia was close to -1.1%. The highest
drop in GDP was in the first quarter of the year with a -2.9% year-on-year decline. Nokia’s granular
residual for that quarter is around -2.7% and implies almost a -2.6% points contribution (which
accounts for most of the decline in GDP in Q1 2013). Nokia’s year was marked by two operations:
the re-acquisition of half of Nokia Siemens Network from Siemens and, more importantly, the Mobile
Phone division was sold to Microsoft. Even though the announcement was made on September the
2nd, the actual deal was finalized in April 2014, which falls out of the sample period we have analyzed.
This section has outlined how the role of Nokia in the world-wide telecommunication market has
dramatically shifted over the past 16 years. Since 2008, the group has lost its dominant role in the
mobile phone business, due to the success of its various competitors and the rise in popularity of
smartphones. After selling the Mobile division to Microsoft, in 2014, Nokia’s annual sales amounted to
around 13 billion Euro, against the 30 billion Euro in 2012. Interestingly, the decline of Nokia could
have been the driving factor behind the post-2009 results in Table 2.7, showing that the granular
residual is unable to explain a substantial amount of output growth variation. It would thus be
interesting to follow up on the performance of the group in the next few years in order to track the
development of its impact on Finnish output, given the company’s significantly reduced size, and the
apparently successful shift in it’s product mix.
2.6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the granular hypothesis within the Finnish economy of the last 16
years. To do this, we use a monthly dataset comprising the top-57 Finnish business groups, in terms
of sales. We then use the methods suggested in Gabaix (2011) to extract the granular residual and
verify its importance in explaining output fluctuations. We complement the econometric analysis with
a short narrative comprising the main events which have hit the largest Finnish companies, with a
special focus on Nokia. To examine individual corporations, in the narrative analysis, we use publicly
available data obtained from the groups’ annual and quarterly reports.
We find that the granular residual is able to explain a substantial share of the fluctuations in Finnish
real economic activity. Interestingly, the Great Recession marks a strong break in the relationship,
with R2s dropping to very low levels when we analyze the period going from 2010 up to 2013. As a
robustness check, we also estimate the granular residual using a factor model, as in Stella (2015), and
we get similar results as in the main analysis. We also split the top-57 corporations in our dataset into
four different size classes, based on their sales, and study the explanatory power of groups of different
sizes. We find that the idiosyncratic shocks to the largest companies are the most important predictor,
especially until the Great Recession. After 2008, the explanatory power of all corporation-level shocks
drop substantially. Furthermore, we examine the explanatory power of Nokia’s labor productivity,
using quarterly data obtained from the company reports, and find that it accounts for around 25%
of GDP fluctuations. Finally, we follow the approach of di Giovanni et al. (2014) to decompose the
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variance of the enterprise group shocks and find that the granular component has dominated the
covariance component, except for 2009. This confirms the fact that the main transmission mechanism
for microeconomic shocks has indeed been the granular one, with the network channel playing a
secondary role.
In the narrative analysis, we delineate a number of episodes where large Finnish companies have
experienced particularly successful (or weak) periods and examine their effect on Finnish output growth.
Moreover, we dedicate a subsection to study the performance of Nokia in the last two decades and find
a dramatic change in the importance of the group in the Finnish (and World) economy. From being
the largest mobile phone manufacturer in the World during the mid-2000s, the company has faced a
continuous decline during the years after the Great Recession, which ended with the sale of the mobile
phones and smartphones division to Microsoft in 2014.
One of the most significant results of this analysis is the break in the Granular Hypothesis after
the end of the Great Recession. As reported in tables 2.7 and 2.9, the impact of the shocks of large
corporations onto aggregate output becomes very small from 2010 onward. At a first glance, this result
can be interpreted as the effect of the decline of some large firms during the Great Recession, above
all Nokia. However, the Finnish economy remains highly granular, in terms of the dominance of few
large firms, as we can see from Figure 2.1 (b). While the Herfindahl index shows a large drop after
2010, it quickly reaches a similar levels as the ones of the pre-crisis period. This indicates that the
sales of large corporations account for a similar share of GDP as in period before the recent economic
crisis. Given that the network effect seems not to be driving our results, as shown in Section 4.3,
we should seek a different explanation. It is arguable that the real impact of corporations as large
and influential as Nokia goes beyond their actual size, measured by their sales. Moreover, even if a
corporation plays a central role in the economy, it might not be a particularly important supplier or
client for the rest of the firms in the economy (e.g. it might buy its intermediate products from foreign
firms and affiliates). One additional explanation could be that the success of large corporations might
indirectly influence the overall economic environment, possibly through generation of know-how or
by investing into research and development outside the company. It could be interesting to carry an
analysis in the fashion of Ali-Yrkkö et al. (2010), focusing on a limited number of firms and studying a
wider array of economic variables and possible channels of influence of the large corporations on the
economy.
While the result that the aggregate output of a small country, like Finland, might be heavily affected
by the performance of few large firms can be expected, this does not reduce the practical importance
of the findings of the current study. First of all, they reinforce the point that macroeconomic models
and analyses of the business cycle should not discard microeconomic shocks and dynamics. Many
economies have a non-normal distribution of firms, especially when considering the ownership structure
that can link smaller enterprises with large corporations, and hence the standard models relying on the
representative firm might be inappropriate. This also highlights important policymaking consequences,
indicating that economic institutions (such as the government) should pay close attention to the
performance of larger enterprises, given the potentially large effects on aggregate fluctuations.
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While this analysis provides many useful insights, there are multiple possibilities to expand this
research further. First of all, we focus on sales as the main indicator of a business group success, due
to their monthly availability for a wide range of companies. We have also tested our results using
measures of productivity such as the one in Gabaix (2011), but it can be interesting to see how relying
on value added (see Ali-Yrkkö et al., 2010) would affect our findings. Moreover, we can expand the
factor model analysis by employing the filtering technique of Stella (2015) and Foerster et al. (2011),
to make sure that the estimated factors do not incorporate the effect of idiosyncratic shocks. However,
the use of enterprise group-level data can milden this issue by grouping firms inside the same mother
company. Furthermore, it would be interesting to shift the focus from the granular hypothesis to
the network channel suggested in Acemoglu et al. (2012). While we touch this issue by studying
the variance decomposition of the group-level shocks and examine how much the granular and link
components account for their fluctuations, a more extensive analysis of the network channel can be
very interesting in the light of the possible influence of Nokia onto the rest of Finnish firms. Related
to this, it would be interesting to use within company relationships to examine the contribution of
individual firms and establishments within a business group to the granular residual of that company.
As illustrated by the case of Nokia, the large granular effects can be sourced to the success of particular
products or divisions inside the firm, and developing this line of thought can indicate that the analysis
of the dynamics within firms can be useful in explaining aggregate effects.
2.7 Appendix: Adjustment for legal restructuring.
In this appendix, we discuss the details of the procedure adopted by Statistics Finland to control for
merger and split-offs in a set of enterprises. Assume that firm 1 is examined after an event (merger or
split-off) where N firms are involved. Then the estimated sales of firm 1 one year ago is calculated by:
sales(firm1,t≠12) =
sales(firm1,t) ∗ sales(firm1,t≠12, firm2,t≠12...firmN,t≠12)
sales(firm1,t, firm2,t...firmN,t)
where t is the time periods in which the adjustment is computed, and N is the number of firms involved
in a merger or split-off. The sum of the previous year sales levels in all the firms involved in the event
is divided for each continuing firm weighted by their relative size at present time t. Let us go through
some simple numerical examples to see how this works:
1. Assume a firm A with 2 billion euro sales in period t, that had 1 employee in t-12. Firm A
acquires firm B with billion sales at time t, m and 1 billion euro one year ago. Firm A, which
continues existing, will be assigned a new estimated number of sales for the comparison year,
in order to make the growth rates comparable year-on-year. The comparison values of firm A
is estimated as 2(1+1)(2+1) = 4/3, and the rate of change for A becomes (2 + 1)/(4/3) = 2.25 (as
opposed to 3 if no correction is done)
2. Consider the situation where firm A is split into smaller units, say B and C. A has 3 billion euro
sales at time t− 12, B has 3 billion euro sales at t and C has sales for 2 billions at t. B and C
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did not exist at t− 12, so their comparison values become: (3/3)3 = 3 and (2/3)3 = 2, resulting
in the rate of change for B and C to be 3/3 and 2/2 (equal to 1 for both firms). The growth rate
is forced to be the same among the continuing firms after a split-off.
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Abstract
We develop a nowcasting framework, based on micro-level data, to provide faster estimates of the Finnish
monthly real economic activity indicator, the Trend Indicator of Output (TIO), and of quarterly GDP. As main
predictors we use firm-level turnovers, which are available shortly after the end of the reference month. We rely
on combinations of nowcasts obtained from a range of statistical models and machine learning techniques which
are able to handle high-dimensional information sets. The results of our pseudo-real-time analysis indicate
that a simple nowcasts’ combination based on these models provides faster estimates of the TIO and GDP,
without increasing substantially the revision error. Finally, we examine the nowcasting performance obtained
by relying on traffic volumes data, and find that using machine learning techniques in combination with this
big-data source provides accurate predictions of real economic activity.
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3.1 Introduction
We live in a data-rich world. Statistical agencies, central banks, research institutes and private
businesses have access to (and produce) hundreds of economic and financial indicators. The list of
available data is continuously growing, with the introduction of "big data" encompassing sources such
as Internet search engines, social media sites, cash registry data and many more. However, this wealth
of information has not been directly translated into a faster and more accurate production of important
economic statistics, such as the GDP. Instead, statistical institutes publish economic indicators with
considerable lag and the initial estimates are revised considerably over time. For example, in Finland
the first estimate of GDP provided by Statistics Finland is released 45 days after the end of the
reference quarter (flash estimate), while the first "appropriate" version is released 60 days after the end
of the quarter.
The advantages of having a timely picture of the state of the economy are multiple and concern a
range of economic actors such as the central bank, the government and private investors and businesses.
Therefore, nowcasting and the production of economic activity indicators in real time have been the
focus of a growing econometric literature. Early works related to the tracking of economic conditions
in real time are Aruoba et al. (2009), for the U.S. economy, and Altissimo et al. (2010) for the Euro
Area. In these studies, the authors develop econometric frameworks with the objective to create
high-frequency indicators of real economic activity. On the other hand, the nowcasting literature is
interested in estimating an existing economic indicator (usually quarterly GDP growth) in real-time.
Few examples drawn from the nowcasting literature are Doz et al. (2012), Evans (2005), Modugno
(2013) and Aastveit and Trovik (2014), among many others. Usually, nowcasting models rely on a
wide array of data, such as consumer surveys, financial variables and macroeconomic indicators, and
use factor models or large Bayesian vector autoregressions to produce predictions of the variables of
interest.
In this study, we combine confidential firm-level datasets and machine learning techniques, as well
as traditional statistical models which can deal with large datasets, to provide faster estimates of
Finnish real economic activity, both at the quarterly and monthly frequencies. The monthly series
we target is the Trend Indicator of Output (TIO)2, published by Statistics Finland 45 days after
the reference month, while the quarterly series is GDP. For both series we compute nowcasts of the
year-on-year growth rate. In addition, we examine the predictive power of a novel dataset based on
traffic volumes’ measurements, created by combining disaggregated data obtained from the Finnish
Transport Authority website. The use of novel data sources, such as firm-level turnovers data and
traffic measurements, in combination with the use of a wide array of machine learning techniques
provides the main contribution of our study to the nowcasting literature. The use of firm-level data
in providing fast estimates of real economic activity is not unique: Matheson et al. (2010) rely on
qualitative responses obtained from business surveys, to obtain nowcasts of New Zealand GDP growth,
while Fornaro (2016) uses a similar firm-level dataset to estimate Finnish economic activity. We expand
the latter work in two main ways: firstly, we consider an additional data source, i.e. the trucks’ traffic
2A description of this indicator is available at http://www.stat.fi/til/ktkk/index_en.html
44
volumes, which can be interesting with respect to the use of big data in economic forecasting and
nowcasting (e.g., see Baldacci et al., 2016). Moreover, we consider a much larger array of statistical
frameworks and machine learning techniques compared to Fornaro (2016), which focuses exclusively on
factor models.
Before we go to the summary of our results, it can be useful to depict the timing of the statistical
releases of a typical month and quarter, i.e. when the firm-level data becomes available, when the
current estimates of Statistics Finland are published and when we compute our nowcasts.3 We do this
for the TIO in Figure 3.1.
t
End of
reference
month
t+16
Firm data
avail-
able/nowcast
t+45
Official
publication
Figure 3.1: Official release and nowcast schedule for the TIO.
For the TIO, the monthly variable considered in this exercise, the release schedule and the timing
of our nowcast process is fairly simple. Denoting the end of the reference month by t, the firm-level
data becomes available 16 days after the end of the month (t + 16) and we compute the nowcast.
Statistics Finland then publishes its first version of the TIO 45 days after the end of the month (t+45).
The timing of the nowcast process and of the publication schedule for quarterly GDP is slightly more
complicated, and we report the timeline of the events in Figure 3.2.
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t-45
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2nd Nowcast
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t+45
Official flash
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Figure 3.2: Official release and nowcast schedule for quarterly GDP.
To keep Figure 3.2 readable, we do not mention explicitly when the firm-level data for a given
month of the reference quarter becomes available. However, the nowcasts are computed as soon as the
firm-level data is available for the period of reference. Let’s index the end of the reference quarter by t.
We produce three nowcasts: the first one is done 45 days before the end of the quarter (t− 45), i.e.
during the second month of the reference quarter; the second nowcast is produced during the third
month of the reference quarter, which correspond to 15 days before the end of the quarter (t− 15).
We then compute our final nowcast for the quarter 16 days after its end (t+ 16). Statistics Finland
releases the flash estimate of GDP 45 days after the end of the reference period, while the first official
figure is published at t+ 60.
We find that our approach of combining predictions obtained by using a large set of machine
learning algorithms, based on firm-level data, is able to provide accurate estimates of monthly economic
3In our exercise, we compute both nowcasts (predictions of a variable while the reference period is still ongoing) and
backcasts (estimates referring to a period which already ended), we refer to our predictions as nowcasts, to be in line
with the literature (see Banbura et al., 2011).
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activity growth, with revision errors that are in line with the ones of Statistics Finland, while shortening
the publication lags by 30 days. The resulting early estimates of the monthly indicator are used to
compute three nowcasts of GDP year-on-year growth. The first two nowcasts provide good accuracy,
even though there are some notable revision errors. However, the estimates produced after the end of
the quarter are very accurate, while providing a 45 days reduction in the publication lag. Moreover,
the methods we use are computationally feasible and easily automatable, making them appropriate for
a real-time setting. We conduct a similar analysis using truck traffic volumes’ measurements, and find
satisfactory results, albeit inferior to the ones obtained from firm-level data.
The remainder of this paper is divided as follows: in Section 3.2 we discuss some of the large set
of models adopted in the analysis, in Section 3.3 we describe our target indicators and data sources,
and we delineate the structure of our nowcasting exercise. The results of the exercise are reported in
Section 3.4, while Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Methodological Aspects
Given that the main contribution of this study is the use of novel data sources, we keep the description
of the models adopted brief. This section does not cover comprehensively the techniques we use for
two reasons: firstly, the sheer number of statistical models and machine learning techniques adopted in
the exercise does not allow a thorough discussion (the full list of the techniques adopted in our study
is reported in the appendix). Secondly, these techniques have been used in previous econometric or
statistical studies, hence a detailed description would be superfluous. We instead try to give the basic
intuition underlying some of the main classes of models used and redirect the interested readers to
the original works in which the models we employ were developed or to some previous forecasting
applications in which these models are adopted.
One of the most important models in our exercise is the dynamic factor model, in the form of
Stock and Watson (2002a,b). The basic idea is that a handful of constructed variables, the factors, can
summarize the information contained in a large dataset. Formally, the K-dimensional set of predictors
for period t, Xt, follows the Stock and Watson (2002a) representation with r latent factors
Xt = ΛFt + ut, (3.1)
where Ft is r × 1 and Λ is the K × r matrix of factor loadings. Stock and Watson (2002a) have
shown that the factors can be estimated using principal components, i.e. the r factors correspond to
the first r eigenvectors of the K ×K matrix XX Õ.4 Factor models are especially important in our
application because, in addition to the basic specifications including raw firm-level data and traffic
data as predictors, we estimate specifications where we utilize latent factors (estimated via principal
components) as predictors. This is done to see whether reducing the noise in our input data improves
the performance of the models (for techniques which rely on dimensionality reduction we do not
4Alternative estimators of latent factors are presented in Forni et al. (2000) and, more recently, Doz et al. (2011).
Bai and Ng (2002a) developed a series of information criteria that provide an estimate of the number of static factors r.
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use factors as input variables). We have tried using the Bai and Ng (2002a) criteria to determine
the optimal number of factors, but these always suggested to use a very large number of principal
components (usually the upper bound). Therefore, we use three different specifications with 10, 20
and 30 principal components (using less than 10 factors leads to significantly worse results).
Another important class of models we use is shrinkage regression, in particular the ridge regression,
the Lasso (Tibshirani, 1996) and the elastic-net (Zou and Hastie, 2005). The main intuition of these
models is to regularize the coefficients of the predictors, in order to reduce the predictions’ variance.
Hastie et al. (2009) provides an in-depth review of these techniques, while De Mol et al. (2008) offers
an economic forecasting application of shrinkage regressions, with an interesting comparison with
principal components.
Our nowcasts are then based on a large number of machine learning techniques, which are
covered extensively in Hastie et al. (2009): boosting (for forecasting applications see Bai and Ng,
2009 and Wohlrabe and Buchen, 2014), regression trees and random forests (for an application in
recession forecasting, see Nyman and Ormerod, 2017), regression splines, support and relevance vector
machines, neural networks (an interesting time series application that considers these three techniques
is Plakandaras et al., 2015), and k-nearest neighbors (see Fernandez-Rodriguez et al., 1999 for an
application in exchange rate forecasting). Finally, we include in our models set an automated ARIMA
where we use principal components (extracted from the firm-level or traffic data) as external predictors.
All the models utilized in our nowcasting exercise are implemented using the caret package for R.
The tuning of the models hyperparameters is done automatically, using a rolling forecasting origin
technique, discussed in Hyndman and Athanasopoulos (2018). Once considering specifications with
different input variables (raw data vs. sets of principal components extracted from the data), we arrive
at a total of 130 models to estimate. As benchmark model, we utilize an automated ARIMA procedure,
implemented using the package forecast for R, as described in Hyndman and Khandakar (2008).
3.3 Data description and empirical exercise formulation
In this section, we briefly describe the data used in our exercise and we give few details about the
nowcasting process.
3.3.1 Target variables
The target variables in our exercise are quarterly GDP, and the TIO, in particular their year-on-year
growth rates in real-term. The GDP is published as an early version at t+ 45, and updated at t+ 60.
The t+ 60 version is considered as the first official and reliable estimate of GDP, and it is the one
we target. The TIO is a monthly series that describes the development of the volume of produced
output in the economy. It is constructed by using early estimates of industry-level turnover indexes
(not publicly available), which are appropriately weighted to form the monthly aggregate index. The
TIO is published monthly at t+ 45, and its value for the third month of a quarter is used to compute
the flash estimate of GDP. We plot our target variables in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: Target variables.
One aspect that is important to underline is how closely related the TIO and GDP growth are. If
we aggregate the latest version TIO growth to the quarterly level, using a simple arithmetic average,
we obtain a series that closely tracks GDP growth (the resulting correlation coefficient is 0.99). This
demonstrates that providing a good estimate of TIO leads to a greater nowcasting accuracy of GDP.
3.3.2 Firm data
The main predictors in our nowcasting application are firm-level sales extracted from the sales inquiry,
a confidential monthly survey conducted by Statistics Finland for the purpose of obtaining turnovers
from the most important firms in the economy. This dataset covers around 2,000 enterprises and
encompasses different industries (services, trade, construction, manufacturing), representing ca. 70%
of total turnovers. The data is available soon after the end of the month of interest and a considerable
share of the final data is accumulated around 15 to 20 days after the end of the reference month.
Formally, Statistics Finland imposes a deadline to the firms on the 15th day of the month after the
reference period, but this deadline is not always met, thus our set of firms’ sales does not cover the
entire sample. We compute the nowcast of TIO on the 16th day after the reference month and typically
have 800 firms in the predictors’ set. We compute the year-on-year growth of sales, starting from
January 2006 until the month we want to nowcast. If the firm has reported sales by the t+ 16 of the
target month, but has missing values during the time span (i.e. the firm did not reply at some earlier
date, or the firm was not included in the turnover inquiry at some point in time), we try to obtain the
missing growth rates from VAT data, which should include all the firms in the economy. VAT data
is available at t+52 days after the month has ended, and we can therefore use it for all the missing
values occurring up to two months before the reference month. We trim the remaining firms for which
we can not impute their missing values, leading us to have a balanced panel of firm-level data. The
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data accumulation (i.e. how new firm-level data becomes available over time) is realistically simulated
by using the time stamp of the reported sales, which allows us to track what data was available by
each date of a month. Furthermore, starting from January 2017 we have collected data in real-time.
Overall, we reliably mimic the information available to the statistical institute at each point in time.
3.3.3 Traffic data
The other main predictors used in our exercise are the traffic volumes records obtained by the Finnish
Transport Agency website.5 This dataset contains records of individual vehicles passing through a
number of measurement points (about 500) around Finland, observed through an automatic traffic
monitoring system. The information recorded includes direction, speed and, importantly, vehicle class.
This dataset contains numerous missing values, due to the fact that some measurement points do not
have observation for certain days or months, and it is not structured. For our nowcasting analysis, we
collect data for trucks’ traffic volumes from January 2006 onward, and consider only measurement
points in the region of Helsinki (which contains a bit less than 100 measurement points), because
the data download procedure is time consuming. Focusing on this region should give us valuable
information, given that it accounts for a large share of the Finnish economy. Trucks’ traffic presents an
interesting link with aggregate economic activity. We expect that in periods of economic growth, when
trade volumes and production are increasing, we should observe a higher number of trucks’ passages,
in order to move goods. Of course, this does not cover the transfer of services and other types of
economic activities, but it should still present some positive correlation with economic activity growth.
As first step, we download raw daily records of traffic volume, where one file contains measurement
informations for each vehicle passing through a single measurement point for a given day, from the
Finnish Transport Agency website. The traffic data is then aggregated at the monthly level, by
averaging the daily volume of truck traffic over the month, and we then compute year-on-year growth
rates for each month and for each measurement point. We assume that our estimation of TIO is
conducted around 16 days after the end of the reference month (as in the main exercise). This allows
us to use the Statistics Finland’s estimates of TIO for the t− 1 month, where t represents the period
we want to nowcast. In principle, the traffic data we utilize allows for nowcasts during the month of
interest, given their daily frequency, but a daily estimate of TIO which relies on traffic volumes would
risk to be extremely volatile, given the large variations in traffic volumes at the daily frequency. As
mentioned previously, data on traffic volumes contain many missing values; in order to impute the
missing observations, we rely on the regularized principal component technique illustrated in Josse and
Husson (2016).
3.3.4 Nowcasting exercise formulation
In this study, we try to mimic as well as possible the conditions faced by the statistical institute
in real-time. In particular, we use the original vintages of data (both for the target variables and
the predictors), reflecting the information available at the time that the nowcast would have been
5The data is available at https://aineistot.vayla.fi/lam/rawdata.
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computed. Both TIO and GDP series are revised multiple times, because of new data availability
and of benchmarking.6 Consequently, we use vintages reflecting the first estimate of TIO and adopt
these initial figures as target to evaluate our nowcasts (because otherwise our nowcasts would contain
errors that are not due to the lack of predictors but that are instead caused by the lack of smoothing
and benchmarking). Unfortunately, the historical vintages for TIO are available only since March
2012, meaning that our nowcasting exercise does not cover some interesting periods such as the Great
Recession of 2008–2009. However, we are left with more than 80 predictions to be made and the
timespan going from 2012 until the end of 2018 does include periods of high growth and months of
considerable output drop.
We described the timing of our exercise in the introduction, but it can be beneficial to use an
example to make clear how the procedure is carried out in practice. Suppose that we want to nowcast
TIO year-on-year growth for March of a given year: we would compute the nowcast on April 16th,
using TIO data up to February to estimate the models and then compute the nowcast using the March
firm-level sales as predictors. When estimating quarterly GDP, we do not rely directly on the GDP
series but rather use TIO, which means that we do not have problems in terms of publication lag.
Now to the structure of our empirical exercise: we start to compute monthly nowcasts of the TIO
from March 2012. In particular, we extract a panel of firm-level sales which starts in January 2006
and ends in March 2012 (the same goes for traffic volumes). Moreover, we include the first 12 lags of
TIO as predictors, starting from the TIO growth for t− 1 (in this case February 2012) until t− 12
(March 2011). Notice that the lags of TIO which are included in the predictors set reflect the available
information realistically, because we obtain it from the proper data vintage. We repeat this procedure
for each month until December 2018, expanding the estimation window (instead of using a rolling
window approach). As an example, in the case where we use r factors, extracted from the firm-level
data, and the first 12 lags of TIO as predictors in a linear model, the nowcasting model for period T is
given by:
yT = y
Õ
T≠1—1 + Fˆ
Õ
T—2 + ‘T , (3.2)
and the nowcast is obtained by
yˆT = y
Õ
T≠1—ˆ1 + Fˆ
Õ
T —ˆ2, (3.3)
where ‘T is a normally distributed idiosyncratic error, y
Õ
T≠1 = [yT≠1 · · · yT≠12], Fˆ
Õ
T = [FˆT,1 · · · FˆT,r],
and —ˆ1 and —ˆ2 are vectors of coefficients estimated by ordinary least squares, using data from January
2006 until T − 1. Of course (3.2) and (3.3) can take many forms depending on the model we adopt,
but the principle is similar: we first estimate the models using data until the latest month for which
we have TIO values and then we use the most recent micro data information to compute the nowcast,
given the estimated model parameters.
6Statistics Finland adjusts monthly TIO figures so that they are consistent with quarterly GDP growth estimates,
once the latter become available. The same adjustment is done to quarterly GDP when yearly GDP figures are released.
The practical implication of this procedure is the presence of large revisions of historical growth rates at the monthly
and quarterly frequency.
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Our quarterly estimate of GDP are entirely based on TIO, both the released version and our
nowcasts. As we mentioned in the data description, TIO provides the basis for the initial estimate
of GDP, hence it is optimal to use it as a predictor in a nowcasting exercise. We compute the GDP
nowcasts differently, depending on the month in which we make the estimate. In our setting, the
nowcasts for a given quarter are computed three times: during the second month of the quarter, during
the third month and 16 days after the end of the quarter. In the first case, we would use the nowcast
of TIO for the first month of the quarter, then estimate an automated ARIMA model to obtain the
forecasts of the remaining months. If we compute the GDP nowcast during the third month, we would
use the first TIO estimate made by Statistics Finland for the first month, then use our nowcast of TIO
growth for the second month and then compute the 1-step ahead forecast for the third month. When
we estimate GDP growth 16 days after the end of the quarter we use the TIO growth computed by
Statistics Finland for the first two months and augment them with our nowcast of TIO for the last
month of the quarter. Eventually, we are going to have an estimate of TIO growth for each month of
the quarter of interest and we obtain GDP growth by taking a simple average over the three months
(the same procedure is done by Statistics Finland to obtain the flash estimate of GDP). Denote the
estimate of GDP growth for quarter q going from month t − 2 to t as\GDP q,t, then our quarterly
nowcast is\GDP q,t = 1/3(yˆt≠2 + yˆt≠1 + yˆt) Notice that this procedure is rather similar to the one
of bridge regression, which links quarterly and monthly variables via simple linear models. We have
tried to estimate a linear regression of GDP growth onto the quarterly average of TIO growth, i.e.
estimating the linear model GDP q,t = —
(yˆt≠2+yˆt≠1+yˆt)
3 + ‘t, but our results indicate that the simple
average of TIO growth is a better predictor than using the bridge formulation.
Another practical issue we wish to mention is computational feasibility. We estimate more than
130 nowcasting models, some of which are computationally burdensome. Given that we would like to
produce the nowcasts around t+ 16, using the information set available by then, we need to find some
sort of compromise between having the largest spectrum of models and being able to estimate TIO
quickly. In order to do that, we first select the models which produce nowcasts with historical mean
error (in absolute terms) below the 20th percentile.7 Afterward, we compute a simple unweighted
average of this subset of models (Stock and Watson, 2004, point out that a simple forecasts’ average
outperforms more complex schemes) and use this combination to form the latest nowcast. The choice
of keeping models with low historical mean error is driven by the high importance, for the statistical
institute, of having unbiased flash estimates. Notice, that the selection of models retained in the
combination is based on the out-of-sample performance of the individual models over the whole period
of the analysis (from March 2012 to December 2018). We have also computed the nowcast combinations
iteratively, allowing different sets of models to be selected each period, but this leads us to give up on
a number of evaluation periods, in order to compute the first combination. The results do not change
substantially from the ones in the main analysis, thus they are not reported, but they are available
upon request.
7In our exercise, this set of models includes 21 specifications, such the factor augmented automated ARIMA,
regression splines, tree based regressions, ridge regressions, support vector machine, k-nearest neighbors and boosting.
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3.4 Empirical results
3.4.1 Results for TIO nowcasts
As pointed out in Section 3.3, the TIO is a monthly indicator of real economic activity. Our nowcasting
exercise is centered on providing fast estimates for the year-on-year growth rate of TIO, starting from
March 2012 (the first month for which we have the vintage of the data) and ending in December 2018.
We now provide the results for our pseudo out-of-sample analysis, starting from the nowcasts obtained
from firm-level data. Specifically, we report the results of the models which provide the lowest root
mean squared error (RMSE), the lowest mean error (ME), mean absolute error (MAE), and finally for
the model with the lowest maximum absolute error (MaxE). In addition, we report the results for the
simple nowcast combination. We plot the nowcasts obtained from the nowcast combination against
the first published version of TIO, in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: First version of TIO year-on-year growth and nowcasts combination, using the unweighted
average of models selected based on low mean errors. The first version of TIO is published 45 days
after the end of the reference month, while the nowcasts are computed 16 days after the end of the
reference month. The set of predictors is based on firm-level turnovers.
Figure 3.4 indicates that our firm-level data offer a good basis for providing flash estimates of
TIO. The nowcasts track fairly well the original series, while they provide a substantial gain in terms
of publication lag (around 30 days). Next, we provide some numerical indicators of the nowcasting
performance, for the models described at the beginning of this subsection. Moreover, we report the
results obtained by using an automated ARIMA procedure, using the latest available TIO vintage at
the time of the nowcast to estimate the model and compute the prediction.
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Lowest ME Lowest RMSE Lowest MAE Lowest MaxE Combination ARIMA
ME -0.00 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.01 0.11
MAE 1.06 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.78 1.36
RMSE 1.35 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96 1.79
MaxE 4.60 2.17 2.17 2.17 2.52 5.85
Table 3.1: ME, MAE, RMSE and MaxE for different nowcasting models. Lowest ME, RMSE, MAE
and MaxE indicate the models with the lowest mean error, root mean squared error, mean absolute
error and max error, respectively. The Combination column contains performance measures for the
simple nowcast combination based on the unweighted average of a subset of our models. The set of
predictors is based on firm-level turnovers.
As we can see from Table 3.1, the nowcasting performance of our selected models is better than
the one of an automated ARIMA procedure. In the first column, we report the results for the model
with lowest mean error (an automated ARIMA with principal components extracted from the firm
data), which shows a fairly poor performance in terms of MAE, RMSE and max error. Interestingly,
the same model (a boosted generalized additive model with factors as input variables) has the best
performance in terms of MAE, RMSE and MaxE, however its mean error is fairly high (indicating
biased nowcasts). The simple combination of nowcasts shows very similar performance compared to
the best possible model in terms of MAE and RMSE, with a slightly higher maximum error. The
benefit brought by the nowcasts combination approach is the very low mean error, which means that
the combination of nowcasts does not systematically undershoot or overshoot the TIO. Consequently,
for the rest of this paper, e.g. when we look at the results for quarterly GDP growth, we focus on the
nowcasts obtained by combining different model predictions.
The main target of our nowcasts is the first version of the TIO. This is because the later versions of
this series are adjusted both for prediction errors and for additional benchmarking, meaning that we
cannot be sure whether the nowcast error is due to the mistake in the prediction or because of some
subsequent benchmark. However, it is still interesting to check the performance of our nowcasting
framework against the final version of TIO, also because it allows us to compare our revision error
against the one based on Statistics’ Finland publications. We first plot the nowcasts obtained by
combining the original predictions, together with the latest version of TIO. We also plot the first
version of TIO against the final revision available.
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(a) TIO year-on-year growth, final version and nowcasts
combination.
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(b) TIO year-on-year growth, final version and first publica-
tion.
Figure 3.5: TIO year-on-year growth rate, first publication, final version available and nowcast. The
set of predictors is based on firm-level turnovers.
Figure 3.5 (a) shows a lower nowcasting performance for our approach, which is expected, given
that the TIO series we use in the estimation of our model has substantial difference from its later
revisions. This can be seen from Figure 3.5 (b), where we depict the first and final version of TIO:
the difference between the two series is remarkable, especially for certain periods. For example, the
first official release of the year-on-year growth of TIO for June 2017 was -0.02 percentage point, which
was then revised to 3.25 percentage points (interestingly, our nowcast for this month is much closer to
the final value of TIO than the first release of Statistics Finland). While such extreme revisions are
not common, they do show the difficulties in creating flash estimates of real economic activity. Next,
in Table 3.2, we report the predictive performance measures for the nowcast combination approach,
using the final value of TIO as target, even though we still use the original vintages of TIO in the
estimation. We also report the same measures to evaluate the performance of the Statistics Finland’s
first publication.
Combination Statistics Finland’s first
ME -0.03 -0.03
MAE 1.15 0.95
RMSE 1.50 1.20
MaxE 4.19 3.64
Table 3.2: ME, MAE, RMSE and MaxE for the nowcast combination approach and for the Statistics
Finland’s first publication of TIO. The target is the latest available version of the year-on-year growth
of TIO. The set of predictors is based on firm-level turnovers.
The performance measures reported in Table 3.2 confirm the fact that our nowcasting approach
fares worse when it is evaluated using the latest revision of TIO. However, it is interesting to see
that the predictions of our simple nowcasting combination do not show a much larger revision error
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compared to the first publication of Statistics Finland (which suffers from a much longer publication
lag).
So far, we have evaluated the performance of nowcasts based on firm-level turnovers, the core
predictors of this study. However, as mentioned before we have also constructed flash estimates based
on measurements of trucks’ traffic volumes. First, we report the plots of the predictions obtained by
simple model combinations, where we use a similar procedure as the one explained in Section 3.4. We
depict both the nowcasts against the first version of TIO and compared to the latest available revision,
in Figure 3.6.
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(a) TIO year-on-year growth, first version and nowcasts
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(b) TIO year-on-year growth, final version and nowcast com-
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Figure 3.6: TIO year-on-year growth rate, first publication, final version available and nowcasts. The
set of predictors is based on trucks’ traffic volumes.
While there are still some substantial nowcasting errors, it is impressive that an unstructured and
peculiar data source such as traffic volumes is able to provide estimates that track economic activity
fairly well. To gain a better grasp of how our approach is performing, we report the nowcast error
measurements that we have used throughout the report in Table 3.3, both for the first and final version
of TIO.
Combination vs. First Combination vs. Final ARIMA vs. First ARIMA vs. Final
ME -0.07 -0.09 0.11 -0.14
MAE 0.86 1.19 1.36 1.68
RMSE 1.09 1.58 1.79 2.23
MaxE 3.16 4.44 5.85 5.76
Table 3.3: ME, MAE, RMSE and MaxE for the nowcast combination approach, evaluated using the
first version of TIO growth and its latest available version.The set of predictors is based on trucks’
traffic volumes.
Table 3.3 gives us some really interesting insights. With respect to the first version of TIO, the
nowcasts combination based on traffic data provides slightly worse predictions, at least compared to
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the sales’ data. However, the MAE and MaxE are fairly low, and much lower than the ones of the
automated ARIMA model, indicating a satisfactory nowcasting performance. When looking at the
nowcasts error with respect to the final version of TIO, the gap between the performance of traffic
data based nowcasts and the predictions computed using firm-level data narrows, even though the
latter remains superior. We have also checked whether merging the firm-level and traffic volumes
datasets improves our nowcasts. The predictions obtained are very similar to the ones produced by
using firm-level data, hence we do not report these results (they are available upon request).
To summarize the results of this subsection, we have seen that combining firm-level data with
statistical models and machine learning techniques that are able to deal with large dimensional datasets
provide fairly accurate nowcasts, both with respect to the first and to the final version of TIO. The
good predictive performance is matched with a substantial gain in timeliness, around 30 days compared
to the current publication schedule. The results for the estimates based on traffic volumes evidence
the potential of this data source. While the predictions are slightly worse then the ones based on
firm-level data, especially compared to the first release of TIO, the errors are not extremely large.
Notably, the maximum revision error obtained from this data source is even lower than the one of the
first Statistics Finland’s publication. The potential real-time availability of traffic data, combined with
their satisfactory nowcasting performance, indicates that it is a data source that should be studied
further.
3.4.2 Results for quarterly GDP nowcasts
We now turn to the results regarding the estimation of quarterly GDP year-on-year growth, in real
terms. In particular, we nowcast the t + 60 release of GDP, which is the first official release made
by Statistics Finland. As we did for TIO, we start by plotting our nowcasts (based on the nowcast
combination procedure), against the GDP year-on-year growth. We do this for the nowcasts computed
during the second month of the quarter, the ones produced during the third month and finally the
nowcast computed 16 days after the reference quarter. The nowcasts are provided for the period going
from 2012 Q2 until 2018 Q4.
G
D
P
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
−
2
−
1
0
1
2
3
GDP
Nowcast
(a) Nowcasts second month
G
D
P
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
−
2
−
1
0
1
2
3
GDP
Nowcast
(b) Nowcasts third month
G
D
P
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
−
2
−
1
0
1
2
3
GDP
Nowcast
(c) Nowcasts 16 days after
Figure 3.7: GDP year-on-year growth rate, first publication, and the nowcasts’ combination. The set
of predictors is based on firm-level sales.
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Figure 3.7 indicates that the estimates of TIO based on our nowcasting approach provide good
predictions for GDP growth, in a timely fashion. The performance of our models seems to be particularly
strong when we compute the predictions during the third month of the quarter and 16 days after the
end of the quarter, providing us a 45 to 75 days reduction in the publication lag. Next, we report the
nowcasting performance measures for these three sets of predictions. We also compare our results
against the performance of the Statistics Finland’s flash estimate of GDP, which is based on the
arithmetic average of TIO year-on-year growth for the three months of the reference month, and it is
published 45 days after the reference quarter. Notice that even in this application, we are using only
the vintage of data which would have been available at the time the nowcasts or flash estimates were
to be computed.
Nowcast second month Nowcast third month Nowcasts 16 days after StatFi Flash
ME 0.24 0.03 0.00 -0.04
MAE 0.82 0.66 0.50 0.50
RMSE 1.00 0.85 0.63 0.64
MaxE 2.13 1.86 1.15 1.45
Table 3.4: ME, MAE, RMSE and MaxE for the nowcast combination approach, evaluated using the
first version of quarterly GDP year-on-year growth. The set of predictors is based on firms’ sales.
Nowcast second month refers to the estimates of GDP computed during the second month of the
reference quarter, nowcast third month are the estimates computed during the third month of the
quarter and nowcasts 16 days after are computed after the end of the reference quarter.
Looking at Table 3.4, we see that our nowcasting framework is able to predict GDP accurately.
As we can expect, the performance of the models improves the later we compute the nowcasts and,
from the second estimate onward. In particular, the latest estimates presents a very similar (actually
slightly better) performance compared to the Statistics Finland flash estimates, providing a 30 days
reduction in publication lag.
Finally, we examine the performance of the nowcasts based on traffic data. We start by depicting
plots similar to the ones in Figure 3.7, i.e. we report the predictions computed during the second and
third month of the reference quarter, together with the 16 days after the end of the quarter estimates.
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(c) Nowcasts 16 days after.
Figure 3.8: GDP year-on-year growth rate, first publication, and the nowcasts combination. The set of
predictors is based on truck’s traffic volumes.
Figure 3.8 confirms the promising performance of traffic data for the production of early estimates
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of GDP, especially for the t+ 16 nowcasts. To assess in a more formal way the performance of our
nowcasts, we report the error measures as before.
Nowcast second month Nowcast third month Nowcasts 16 days after StatFi Flash
ME 0.17 0.07 -0.01 -0.04
MAE 0.83 0.66 0.51 0.50
RMSE 0.99 0.85 0.66 0.64
MaxE 2.07 1.95 1.43 1.46
Table 3.5: ME, MAE, RMSE and MaxE for the nowcast combination approach, evaluated using the
first version of quarterly GDP year-on-year growth. The set of predictors is based on trucks’ traffic
volumes. Nowcast second month refers to the estimates of GDP computed during the second month of
the reference quarter, nowcast third month are the estimates computed during the third month of the
quarter and nowcasts 16 days after are computed after the end of the reference quarter.
The results of Table 3.5 confirm that the nowcasts produced using traffic date have a satisfactory
predictive performance, very similar to the one based on firm-level sales. Overall, it is interesting to
see that traffic data are allowing us to create precise estimates of GDP growth well before the official
publication by Statistics Finland.
The quarterly results reported in this subsection highlight the ability of models based on firm-level
data and traffic data to provide accurate estimates of GDP growth. Even if the very early estimates, the
ones computed during the quarter of reference, exhibit substantial nowcasting errors, the performance
of our framework becomes significantly better when we consider the predictions at t+ 16. While these
flash estimates occur after the end of the quarter of reference, they allow for a 45 days reduction in
the publication lag compared to the first official release (and 30 days reduction w.r.t. the Statistics
Finland’s flash estimate), which represents a substantial improvement.
3.5 Conclusions
We have examined the potential of large micro-level datasets, in combination with statistical models
and machine learning techniques that are able to handle high-dimensional information sets, for the
production of faster estimates of real economic activity indicators, both at the monthly and at the
quarterly frequency. In particular, we have examined the nowcasting performance of firm-level data,
and of trucks’ traffic volumes measurements.
We find that a simple combination of the nowcasts obtained from a large set of machine learning
techniques and large dimensional statistical models is able to produce accurate estimates of monthly
real economic activity, or at least estimates that do not lead to a much larger revision error compared
to the current official publications. While the revision errors do not increase substantially, our approach
allows for a reduction in the publication lag of roughly 30 days, when considering the monthly indicator.
Turning to the results related to quarterly GDP, we find that our nowcasts would produce accurate
estimates of GDP growth during the third month of the reference quarter, even though there are
few large errors. On the other hand, the nowcasts computed at t+ 16 do not show large revisions,
or at least produce revisions that are compatible with the ones of Statistics Finland. Even though
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these estimates would be released after the end of the quarter, they still allow for more than a month
reduction of the publication lag. Finally, it is important to underline the satisfactory performance
of traffic measurements data. The potential of this source of information should be explored further,
given its real-time availability.
In the Finnish setting, the traffic loop data is open to the general public, while the firm level
data is collected for the purpose of official statistics production and is subject by strict confidentiality
standards. However, similar data collections exist in the other statistical offices of most countries,
making our proposed approach and data source an interesting possibility for data users who need
timely information on the state of the economy. Statistical offices have the possibility to increase their
own relevance as information producers by using this kind of novel techniques. The relatively small
investments that are required are related to modeling skills (in maintaining and updating the models)
and adding a few features in the existing IT systems for storing information on the models, results and
source data. The users of these types of estimates should be regularly informed about the expected
and realized nowcast errors and revisions in the target indicators.
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3.6 Appendix: Model List
In the table below we report the list of the main model families used in this study. Notice that we
do not report every specifications (which depend also on the type of input variables used), thus the
number of models reported here are fewer than what is mentioned in the main text (130 specifications).
For each model family we report the full name, the method name in caret (for variations of the same
model family, we report the different caret names related to the model family) and a reference where
the reader can find a description of the technique.
Table 3.6: List of models
Model/Technique Name in caret Reference
Factor models/principal components regression pcr Stock and Watson (2002a)
Independent component regression icr Hyvärinen. and Oja (2000)
Ridge regression glmnet Hastie et al. (2009), Chapter 3.4.1
Lasso glmnet Hastie et al. (2009), Chapter 3.4.2
Elastic-net glmnet Zou and Hastie (2005)
Least angle regression lars Hastie et al. (2009), Chapter 3.4.4
Bayes Generalized Linear Model bayesglm Gelman et al. (2008)
Gaussian process gaussprLinear, gaussprPoly,
gaussprRadial Williams and Barber (1998)
Partial least squares kernelpls, pls, simpls Hastie et al. (2009), Chapter 3.5.2
Bagged MARS bagEarthGCV Hastie et al. (2009), Chapter 9.4
Regression Trees ctree Hastie et al. (2009), Chapter 9.2.2
Boosting BstLm, gbm, xgbTree Hastie et al. (2009), Chapter 10
Random forests parRF, ranger, RRFglobal Hastie et al. (2009), Chapter 15
Nearest-neighbors knn, kknn Hastie et al. (2009), Chapter 13
Neural network pcaNNet Hastie et al. (2009), Chapter 11
Support vector machine svmLinear, svmPoly, svmRadial
svmRadialCost, svmSigma Hastie et al. (2009), Chapter 12
Penalized regression penalized, rqnc Hastie et al. (2009), Chapter 16
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Abstract
We explore how the separation between ownership and control affects firm productivity. Using Finnish
administrative data on the universe of limited liability firms, we document a substantial increase in firm
productivity when the CEO obtains majority ownership or when the majority owner becomes the CEO. We
exploit plausibly exogenous variations to ownership and control structures, induced for example by shocks to
the CEO spouse’s health. Extending the analysis beyond typical samples of large public firms, we show that
our effects are stronger in medium-sized private firms. We also investigate possible mechanisms and provide
suggestive evidence that increased ownership boosts CEO’s effort at work.
JEL Classifcation Code: G30, M12, D24, E23, L25.
Keywords: agency costs, firm productivity, CEO ownership
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4.1 Introduction
How costly is the separation between ownership and control within a firm? The question is perhaps
one of the most fundamental in the study of modern corporations, it has been at the heart of much of
the corporate finance literature since at least Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Mecling (1976).
At the same time, while substantial work has been developed to investigate how firms’ decisions (say,
investment and financing) are shaped by agency conflicts, direct measures of agency costs are difficult
to obtain.
From an empirical viewpoint, a satisfactory answer to this question needs to confront (at least) two
major obstacles. The first is data availability. Ideally, the question requires having detailed information
on the firms’ operations and outcomes, on their employees (in particular, the top management) and
on their ownership structure. While both firm micro data and matched employer–employee data are
increasingly available, firm ownership structure is typically observed only for listed firms. This limits
substantially the scope of the analysis. Listed firms are a tiny minority of the population of firms,
they may have specific ownership and control structures, they may face specific regulatory constraints,
or, more generally, they may be intrinsically different from the other firms. Relying only on listed
firms also makes the empirical exercise difficult as in these firms there is basically always separation
between ownership and control, so it is not clear how to define a benchmark in which agency costs are
minimized.
The second key challenge is endogeneity. Ownership and control structures are not randomly
assigned, and they are often likely to be themselves affected by firm outcomes, or by possibly unobserved
factors affecting both firm’s outcomes and its governance. This makes it hard to interpret these relations
as causal, and to provide clear guidance to the corporate governance policy debate.
This paper provides an estimate of agency costs by exploiting Finnish administrative data covering
the universe of limited liability firms. We have access to detailed firm-level data on the firm balance
sheet, a rich set of information about its employees and, importantly, the firm’ ownership structure in
terms of identity and holdings of its shareholders. This offers the unique opportunity to investigate
issues of ownership and control in the entire population of firms, and to uncover whether agency
conflicts can be even costlier outside the usual sample of listed firms. The exceptional richness of these
data and its panel structure will also allow to address in a novel and we believe convincing way some
issues related to the endogeneity of ownership and control structures, as we detail below.
Our setting is also interesting in terms of external validity. Finland is a country that scores very
highly in terms of corporate governance; for example, it was ranked first in the world by the World
Bank’s Corporate Governance Index (Kaufmann (2004)). As we will see, our estimates of agency costs
are quite large, and we find them remarkable especially in a setting in which, under this perspective,
these costs should be minimal.
The logic of our empirical exercise is very simple. We define the person who has control over the
firm’s operations as the CEO (we explain below our procedure to identify the CEO among the firm’s
employees), and we say that there is no separation between ownership and control when the CEO is
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also the majority shareholder (we perform various robustness checks using other thresholds on CEO
ownership). We then compare firm productivity (defined, in our baseline specification, in terms of
value added per worker) when ownership and control are in the same hands relative to when they are
separated.
We start with fixed-effects regressions in which we exploit variations in CEO ownership within
the same firm with the same CEO. That is, we compare firm productivity within the same firm-CEO
pair in years in which the CEO is the majority owner vs. years in which ownership and controls are
separated. In addition to any common time trend, this specification allows to capture any time-invariant
characteristic of the firm, of the CEO, and of the firm-CEO matching. In our preferred specification,
we show that when the CEO is also the majority owner output per worker is approximately 1, 000 euros
larger, which corresponds to a 1.9% increase in labor productivity. The effect is large, as compared for
example to an average productivity growth in our sample of 0.7%.
This effect is robust to alternative definitions of our treatment and, as we show, it is related to
changes in CEO ownership and not to any change in the ownership structure. The effect is also
confirmed when employing alternative measures of productivity and profitability, and when performing
specification tests, checking for the possibility of selection bias and for violations of parallel trends.
At the same time, a causal interpretation of these result requires that unobserved heterogeneity
is time invariant within a given firm-CEO pair. This assumption may be violated if unobserved
pair-specific shocks induce a change in CEO ownership and at the same time they affect future firm
productivity. An ideal setting to address these concerns would be one in which the CEO has majority
ownership and for exogenous reasons she has to step down as CEO while at the same time keeping
her shares. This would induce an exogenous separation between ownership and control within the
same firm and the same ownership structure. Our IV procedure attempts to get closer to such ideal
situation by exploiting shocks to CEO ownership induced by CEO’s retirement, by worsened health
conditions of the CEO, and of the CEO spouse.
The CEO retirement decision may be useful as it is partly driven by reasons that are orthogonal
to the future productivity of the firm (see Weisbach (1995), Denis and Denis (1995) for studies
employing this instrument). At the same time, the decision is voluntary and as such may be related to
unobservable confounding factors. We address this by looking at CEO changes induced by shocks to
CEO health, which we measure by the amount of health benefits paid out from the Finnish health
insurance scheme. Increased health benefits are associated to worsened health conditions. In a similar
and somewhat more extreme way, CEO health shocks have been exploited also in Johnson et al. (1985),
who use CEO death, and in Bennedsen et al. (2012), who use CEO hospitalization.
When exploiting CEO health shocks, we can allow for direct contemporaneous effects of CEO
health on firm productivity as well as for the possibility that past firm performance affects current
CEO health. We need however to assume that current CEO health is not directly associated to future
firm productivity. In order to relax this assumption, one would like to exploit shocks that induce the
CEO to resign, but are completely orthogonal to any dynamics occurring within the firm. We consider
shocks to the CEO spouse health, and to make the test even sharper, we restrict to CEO spouses who
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are not working in the firm and have no direct effect on the firm operations.
These shocks may induce the CEO to leave and, when the CEO is also the majority shareholder,
they may induce an exogenous separation between ownership and control. In order to exploit this
variation, we cannot fix the firm-CEO pairs; rather, we define pairs in terms of firm and its largest
owner, and estimate changes in firm productivity, within the same firm-owner pair, in years in which
the owner is also the CEO vs. years in which the two are separated.
The IV estimates confirm our results, showing that firm productivity is significantly larger when
ownership and control are in the same hands. Estimated coefficients are similar across specifications,
and if anything larger than the OLS counterpart. This is confirmed in various robustness checks. We
further investigate the validity of our instruments by performing some placebo regressions in which
our instruments are used to induce changes in CEOs not associated to changes in ownership. We show
that it is not a change in CEO per se that drives our effects, but CEO changes associated to ownership
changes.
We then explore whether our effects are heterogenous across firms. In particular, we investigate
whether the estimates are similar in large or in listed firms, that are the typical focus of existing
studies. We show that agency costs are in fact larger in medium-sized private firms (51-250 employees).
We then replicate some existing results showing that in listed firms the effect CEO ownership on
productivity is inverted U-shaped, and it is overall negative. We show however that these effects
cannot be found outside the sample of listed firms. We believe these results highlight the importance of
exploring agency costs outside typical samples. The results one gets in our broader sample are richer,
and they suggest that agency costs may be particularly severe in firms that, due to data limitations,
are often excluded from corporate governance studies.
Finally, we explore some possible mechanisms trough which agency costs may affect firm productivity
(see Stein (2003) for a review). We first consider variables associated to empire building such as
investments, assets, capex, acquisition activities, cash holdings, leverage, dividends, and find no
significant changes in these variables in relation to our treatment. We then consider variables associated
to quiet life. We measure CEO’s effort at work by the number of employment relations the CEO has
in other firms and by the number of days the CEO has been absent from work. We show both in
OLS and in IV regressions that our treatment induces the CEO to take fewer external engagements
and fewer days off. While this analysis is preliminary, it suggests that the quiet life hypothesis is a
plausible mechanism behind our treatment effects. When the CEO is also the owner, she exerts more
effort at work.
Literature The literature has investigated the relationship between CEO ownership and firm
performance mostly by focusing on subsamples of listed or very large firms. Morck et al. (1988)
document an inverted U-shaped relation between CEO ownership and Tobin’s Q on Fortune500 firms;
a similar relation is found in McConnell and Servaes (1990) on a sample of listed firms. Lilienfeld-Toal
and Ruenzi (2014) show that firms with larger CEO ownership provide larger stock market returns
and suggest this is due to reduced agency conflicts. Fabisik et al. (2018) expand the sample to about
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1,800 firms in the US and show that the relation between CEO ownership and Tobin’s Q is negative.
Ang et al. (2000) is one of the few studies investigating small private firms. They define the Jensen
and Meckling’s zero agency costs benchmark as a situation in which the CEO is the only owner, and
show that firms further away from this benchmark are less efficient.
These estimates display substantial variation depending on the sample of firms under study and
on the estimation method. Most of the literature relies on cross-sectional comparisons, while effects
are hardly significant when adding firm fixed effects, possibly due to limited time-series variation in
these samples (Himmelberg et al. (1999), Zhou (2001)). Relative to this literature, our data cover
the universe of limited liability firms over a relatively long panel, that allows exploiting significant
time-series variations. We estimate our effects not only within firms, but within firms with the same
CEO or the same owner.
Our results are also related to the literature on family firms, and in particular to studies investigating
how having a member of the family as CEO affects firm value. Existing results are mixed; e.g., Pérez-
González (2006), Bennedsen et al. (2007), Bandiera et al. (2017) show a decrease in firm value, while
Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) provide a less negative view. Relatively to
this literature, we concentrate on the separation between ownership and control and, by fixing the
firm-CEO pairs, we can control for the quality of the CEO and of the firm-CEO matching.
More broadly, our work provides distinct and complementary insights to several themes in the
corporate governance literature. Relative to studies looking at how CEO characteristics affect firm
value (e.g. Bertrand and Schoar (2003)), we keep the identity of the CEO fixed in our baseline analysis
and vary her ownership share. Relative to studies on how ownership structure affect firm value (e.g.
Edmans and Holderness (2017)), our focus is on CEO ownership, keeping other characteristics of the
ownership structure fixed. Lastly, differently from the literature on majority vs. minority shareholders
(Shleifer and Vishny (1997)), we focus on the possibility of agency conflicts between the CEO and the
(majority) owner.
4.2 Data
We exploit data from the Finnish Longitudinal Owner-Employer-Employee database (FLOWN) con-
structed by Statistics Finland, which we match with balance sheet information from the business
register. We obtain a yearly panel from 2006 to 2014 covering the universe of limited companies
(osakeyhtiö) in the business sector. Balance sheet data provide a rich set of information on firms’
characteristics, operations and performance. The matched employer-employee structure allows to have
information on the employees of the firm, and in particular, as we explain below, to identify its CEO.
For our purposes, the key distinctive feature of these data is the detailed information on the firms’
ownership structure. The Finnish tax authority requires that firms report the identity of the 10 largest
shareholders or, if there are more than 10 shareholders, of any shareholder with more than 10% of
firm shares. Building on this information, Statistics Finland has identified the ultimate individual
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shareholders of a given firm.1
We exclude one-man companies and we are left with around 110,000 firms. Out of those (measured
when the firm first appears in the panel), 84% are micro firms with less than 10 employees, 13% are
small (10-50 employees), 2.4% are medium (51-250 employees), and 0.6% are large (>250 employees).
Manufacturing firms are 36% of the sample (including construction) while the rest are services (including
trade).
CEO We are interested in identifying the CEO in each firm, interpreted as the person who has
control on the firm’s operations. We employ the following sequential procedure, as e.g. in Queiró
(2016). First, we identify a person as the CEO if he or she is explicitly defined as such among the list of
employees. This is the case for 7% of the firms. For the remaining firms, we consider those employees
identified as having managerial responsibilities, and say that the CEO is the manager with the highest
salary. This identifies an additional 30% of the CEOs. For the remaining firms, we look at whether an
active entrepreneur (as classified by the tax administration) appears in the list of employees, in which
case the person is identified as the CEO.2 This is the case for 23% of our CEOs. The remaining 41%
of the CEOs are defined as the highest paid worker in the firm. As a validation test, we notice that
86% of the CEOs explicitly defined as such (our first criterion) also have the highest salary in the firm.
Ownership In terms of ownership structure, we have some information for 92% of the firms in our
sample; on average, we observe 82% of the firm ownership. In our sample, 39.5% have one shareholder,
the median number of shareholders is 2, and 29.9% of firms have more than 2 shareholders. In firms
with more than one shareholder, the average ownership share of the largest shareholder is 41%.
In order to investigate agency costs, we say that ownership and control are in the same hands in
firms where the CEO is also the majority shareholder. We define our treatment variable as the dummy
CEO Owner, which equals one when the CEO owns more than 50% of the firm shares. This is a simple
way to extend the Jensen-Meckling’s zero agency costs benchmark mentioned above to situations in
which firms have possibly multiple shareholders.
In our sample, the CEO is also the majority owner in 29% of the firms, and 10.5% of the firms
experience a change in the treatment, in 5.6% of the cases the CEO obtains majority, and in the
remaining 4.9% the CEO looses majority. As intuitive, these changes are more likely to occur in micro
and small firms. We observe large variations in CEO ownership. Conditional on observing a positive
change, the average ownership change is 50%; conditional on a negative change, the average is −43%.3
Out of these changes, 26% are associated to a change in the majority owner and so in our treatment
CEO Owner. Conditional on having a change in the treatment, the average ownership change is 73%
1Identifying the ultimate owners is complicated also by the possibility of linkages of firms and business owners via
holding companies and enterprise groups. Statistics Finland has implemented a procedure to track down the individual
owners behind each firm along the ownership chains. See Maliranta and Nurmi (2019) for a detailed presentation of the
data.
2The tax administration identifies an active entrepreneur in a firm if a person owns at least 30% of the shares and
receives a significant income from the firm (at least 9,663 euros in 2006).
3In fact, these figures are similar to observed changes in ownership of the largest shareholder (whether or not she is
the CEO) for which, conditional on a positive change, the average is 43% and, conditional on a negative change, the
average is −38%.
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for positive changes and −76% for negative changes.
As these figures suggest, the effects we obtain from our treatment CEO Owner are typically not
driven by small changes in CEO ownership around the 50% threshold. In fact, we do not assume
any specific effect around the threshold, and we perform several robustness checks by considering
alternative thresholds. We define CEO 100, that is a dummy equal to one when the CEO owns 100%
of the firm shares; and CEO 0, a dummy equal to one when the CEO owns any positive fraction of
firm’s shares. We also consider a dummy CEO Largest, which equals one when the CEO is the largest
(though not necessarily the majority) shareholder, as well as the continuous variable CEO shares, that
is the fraction of shares held by the CEO.
Productivity Our main interest is to investigate how our treatment affects firm’s productivity. In
most of our analysis, we define productivity as labor productivity, that is, value added (in real terms)
over full time equivalent units of labor.4 The measure is constructed directly by Statistics Finland in a
way that is comparable across firms and over time. The measure estimates the value of the output
generated by a worker in the firm without having to take a specific stand on the firm’s production
function nor to estimate the value of capital in the firm, which may be problematic for some firms in
our sample (e.g. micro service firms). It does not measure profit and it does not serve as a tax base, so
it may be less subject to discretionary accounting practices.
We will check the robustness of our results when employing other efficiency and profitability
measures (described in more details below). We will also consider productivity measures based on
standard TFP estimates, and we will account for possible biases induced by the inability to observe
firm level prices.
We winsorize all financial variables, including productivity measures, at the 0.25th and the 99.75th
percentiles. Descriptive statistics of our variables appear in Table 4.1.
4.3 OLS estimates
4.3.1 Basic results
The first set of results are based on fixed-effects OLS regressions in which we exploit variations in CEO
ownership within the same firm with the same CEO. Our basic specification is
yi,t = –i + —Ti,t +X
Õ
i,t“ + µt + Ái,t, (4.1)
where i denotes a firm-CEO pair, yi,t is the productivity of firm-CEO i in year t, –i and µt are
respectively firm-CEO and year fixed-effects, and Ti,t, is a dummy equal to one when the CEO owns
more than 50% of the firm shares. Our baseline set of controls X
Õ
i,t includes industry fixed effect (2
digits), firm’s age, leverage, a dummy indicating if the firm is part of a business group, the number
4Value added is defined as the value of sales minus the value of purchases, accounting for changes in stocks, other
operating incomes and product taxes. An industry specific index based on 2010 prices is used to deflate the nominal
value added.
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of workers by level of education and occupation (white vs. blue collar), the HHI index of ownership
concentration. In specifications without CEO fixed effects, we also include CEO’s education, age, years
of experience within the firm and in total. Our coefficient of interest is —, which measures productivity
differences within the same firm-CEO pair in years in which the CEO is the majority owner vs. years
in which ownership and controls are separated.
Table 4.2 reports our estimates. In column 1, we include no control and no fixed effects and observe
a negative relation between CEO Owner and firm productivity. Once we include our set of controls
(column 2) and firm fixed effects (column 3), the relation turns positive. Our preferred specification
is reported in column 4, which corresponds to equation (4.1) and includes firm-CEO fixed effects.5
According to these estimates, CEO Owner is associated to around 1, 000 euros larger output per
worker, that corresponds to a 1.9% increase relative to the unconditional mean. This effect is large.
As comparison, the average productivity growth of private sector Finnish firms in our sample period is
0.7% per year.6
In column 5, we exclude observations in which the CEO loses ownership (Ti,t − Ti,t≠1 = −1) and
focus on the effect of the CEO becoming a majority shareholder. Similarly, in column 6, we exclude
observations in which Ti,t − Ti,t≠1 = 1 and focus on the CEO losing ownership. These estimates
show no significant asymmetries between the two effects, an observation we will use again in our IV
estimates.
4.3.2 Robustness
We perform a series of robustness checks, starting by alternative definitions of our treatment. As
mentioned, we attach no specific value to the 50% threshold in terms of CEO ownership, and we now
consider alternative thresholds. In column 1 of Table 4.3, we consider CEO 100, a dummy equal to
one if the CEO is the only owner. In column 2, we consider CEO 0, a dummy equal to one if the CEO
has some ownership. In column 3, we focus on CEO Largest, that is a dummy indicating that the
CEO is the largest shareholder. In column 4, we consider the continuous variable CEO shares, that is
the fraction of shares held by the CEO. In all these cases, the effect on firm productivity is similar
to our main estimates. In particular, in column 4, we estimate that productivity increases by 1, 063
euros following an average increase of CEO ownership by 50% in positive changes, and about −43%
for negative changes. The effect is 6% larger than the coefficient on CEO Owner in Table 4.2, which
as mentioned corresponds to an average change in CEO ownership of about 74%. This may suggests
some concavity in the effect of CEO ownership, but not strong enough to reject linearity.7 In fact, we
explore more explicitly non-linear effects of CEO shares in column 5 and find no significant effect. We
will investigate again these patterns (and show they are different) in listed firms.
In order to support our interpretation, we make sure that our estimates capture the specific effect
5As we include firm-CEO fixed effects, we do not include controls for CEO’s education, age, experience; hence the
higher number of observations relative to column 3.
6The corresponding figure for EU countries is 0.9% and for the US is 1.13%, see the OECD’s website at data.oecd.org.
7A similar picture emerges from the estimates in columns 1 and 2. The average change in CEO ownership associated
to a positive change in CEO 100 is 78% and it is −75% for a negative change. The average change in CEO ownership
associated to a positive change in CEO 0 is 63% and it is −62% for a negative change. Out of all changes in CEO
ownership, 20% of them are associated to a change in CEO 100 and 64% are associated to a change in CEO 0.
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of changes in CEO ownership, as opposed to any change in the ownership structure. In column 6, we
consider the dummy Owner Change, which equals one when the majority owner changes from period
t− 1 to t and in any subsequent period, irrespective of whether or not this is associated to a change
in CEO ownership. We show no significant impact on productivity in this case, suggesting that our
effects are related to changes in CEO ownership and not to any change in ownership.
In Table 4.4, we report a set of robustness checks concerning our productivity measure. In column
1, we consider gross operating surplus (GOS), defined as VA minus personnel costs per unit of labor.
In column 2, we consider net profit margin, defined as net profit (VA minus personnel cost, overheads
and other costs, interest and taxes) over revenues. In column 3, we consider returns on assets, defined
as standard as net income over total assets. These regressions confirm that CEO Owner is associated
to higher operating efficiency and profitability.
In column 4, we consider a standard estimate of TFP, obtained as the residual of a Cobb-Douglas
in which value added is regressed over capital and labor for each 2 digit industry. In column 5, we
estimate TFP by adding the firm’s market share and fixed effects at the industry-year level. Controlling
for industry-specific time trends is a simple way to account for possible biases due to inability to
observe firm prices (see Beveren (2012) and De Loecker and Goldberg (2014) for excellent reviews). In
addition, in column 6, we exclude multiproduct firms that may be subject to price shocks in different
industries. Again, we observe a positive relation between CEO Owner and firm productivity, and our
coefficient of interest barely changes across these specifications.8
Finally, we perform some specification tests. We start by considering possible biases due to sample
selection. Importantly, our sample is not selected in the sense that at each point in time we consider
the universe of firms, we do not restrict to survivors. Our fixed effects specifications in equation (4.1)
may also mitigate sample selection biases (Verbeek and Nijman (1992)). As additional checks, we
repeat our regressions in equation (4.1) on various selected samples. The results are presented in
Table 4.5. In column 1, we restrict the sample to No Exit firms, these are firms that do not die in our
sample. In column 2, we consider Persistent firms, defined as those firms with number of observations
above the median, that is equal to 9 (that is, half of our firms are observed for the entire sample of
9 years). We repeat the same procedure in terms of firm-CEO pairs, considering in a similar way
No Exit firm-CEOs (column 3) and Persistent firm-CEOs, where the median number of observations
for firm-CEOs is 4 (column 4). The estimated impact of CEO Owner is similar across the various
specifications, and not statistically different from our baseline estimates on the entire population. This
further limits the concerns that our effects are biased due to sample selection.
In columns 5 and 6, we consider specifications in which, instead of firm-CEO fixed effects, we
control for lagged values of the dependent variable (one lag in column 5, and three lags in column 6).
These specifications are more appropriate if unobserved characteristics are not time invariant within a
given firm-CEO pair, but they are instead better captured by time-varying individual-specific past
productivity patterns. Estimated effects are still positive and (not significantly) smaller in size.9
8Similarly, controlling for industry-year fixed effects and market share in our baseline regressions on labor productivity
has no effect on our coefficient of interest.
9See e.g. Guryan (2004) for a discussion on how fixed effects and lagged dependent variable specifications provide
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Finally, as standard in diff-in-diff specifications, a causal interpretation of our estimates requires
that treated and control units are not exposed to different trends before the treatment. In order to
make sure this is the case, we consider the following regression
yi,t = –i +
4ÿ
s=1
—≠sµt≠sTi,t +
4ÿ
s=1
—+sµt+sTi,t +X
Õ
i,t“ + µt + Ái,t, (4.2)
where µt≠s and µt+s correspond to years before and after the treatment and the other variables are
as in (4.1). Figure 1 reports the estimated coefficients —≠4, ..., —4 and the associated 95% confidence
intervals. Within the same firm-CEO pair, there are no significant pre-treatment differences, which
supports the parallel trend assumption.
If we assume that unobserved characteristics are time invariant within a given firm-CEO pair, our
estimates in (4.1) can be interpreted in a causal sense. These estimates however cannot account for
firm-CEO specific shocks that may induce a change in the treatment and at the same time they affect
future productivity. We address these concerns in the next section.
4.4 IV estimates
A causal interpretation of our OLS estimates may be challenged for example on the basis that the CEO
may have private information on the future firm productivity, and decide to acquire majority shares in
anticipation of a productivity increase. More generally, changes in ownership and control structures
may be correlated to unobserved pair-specific shocks that may be also correlated to future productivity.
Ideally, one would like to exploit purely random changes in CEO ownership. For example, one would
like to observe a firm in which the CEO has majority ownership and for exogenous reasons she has to
step down as CEO while at the same time keeping her shares. The shock would exogenously generate
a separation between ownership and control within the same firm and the same ownership structure.
In the next analysis, we attempt to get as close as possible to such ideal situation by exploiting shocks
to CEO ownership induced by CEO’s retirement, by worsened health conditions of the CEO, and of
the CEO spouse.
4.4.1 Instruments
Our first instrument exploits changes in the CEO due to retirement. The retirement decision is partly
driven by reasons that are orthogonal to the future productivity of the firm and, in fact, it has been
used by the literature to investigate the effects of CEOs on firm value (Weisbach (1995), Denis and
Denis (1995)). We define the dummy CEO Retire that equals one if the CEO is older than the legal
retirement age (63 years old) or receives pension benefits at t.
A potential issue with retirement is that its decision is voluntary and as such may be related to
unobservable confounding factors. For example, a CEO may decide to retire when she expects a decline
in firm productivity. We address this concern by considering a second instrument, based on shocks to
bounds for the estimated causal effect.
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CEO health. For each CEO, we obtain the amount of health benefits paid out from the Finnish health
insurance scheme. The scheme is mandatory and universal and it compensates the beneficiary for
income losses related to health issues. As such, an increase in health benefit is due to worsened health
conditions. Relative to CEO changes induced by retirement, health shocks are less likely to be driven
by expected productivity shocks. The logic of the instrument generalizes, in a somewhat less extreme
way, a classic approach of using CEO death as a shock (Johnson et al. (1985)) and, more recently, the
approach by Bennedsen et al. (2012), who use CEO hospitalization events in Danish firms.
We use CEO health at t− 1 as an instrument for changes in the CEO from t− 1 to t. The validity
of our instrument does not rely on excluding direct effects of CEO health at t on firm productivity
at t, we use past health shocks to induce changes in CEO. One may also conjecture that past firm
performance may affect current CEO health. If the CEO changes associated to our health shocks were
driven by past firm productivity, however, we would observe a violation of parallel trends, which as
shown above is not the case. A remaining issue may be that current CEO health is directly associated
to future firm productivity.
In order to take this possibility into account, one should consider health shocks that induce the
CEO to resign, but are completely orthogonal to any dynamics occurring within the firm. One such
case is a shock to the CEO spouse health. The exceptional richness of the data allows us to recover
the amount of health benefit paid to the CEO spouse, again by the national health insurance scheme.
In fact, to make this test even sharper, we can restrict to CEO spouses who are not working in the
firm and so have no direct effect on the firm operations. To our knowledge, this instrument is novel
and in our view considerably less exposed to the above mentioned concerns.
4.4.2 Specifications
Before turning to our IV estimates, we start with an OLS estimate of
yi,t = –i + —Ti,t +X
Õ
i,t“ + µt + Ái,t, (4.3)
in which all terms are as in equation (4.1) except that we define a pair i in terms of a firm and its
largest owner. In equation (4.3), the coefficient — describes what happens to firm productivity, fixing
the firm and its largest owner, in years in which the owner is also the CEO vs. years in which the two
are separated. While equation (4.1) exploits variations associated to the CEO becoming (or stopping
being) the owner, equation (4.3) exploits variations associated to the owner becoming (or stopping
being) the CEO. For the purpose of estimating agency costs, both variations should lead to similar
insights. There are two reasons to focus on specification (4.3) for the next analysis. First, as further
discussed below, it helps addressing the above mentioned concerns about the CEO having private
information about the future profitability of the firm. Second, our instruments are shocks that may
induce the CEO to leave and exploiting them requires that the CEO is not fixed in our analysis.
In order to implement our IV approach, we consider two specific features of our setting. First, our
variable of interest Ti,t is a dummy. For this reason, we first estimate a probit regression in which Ti,t
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is regressed over a given instrument Zi,t≠1 and a set of controls. Then, we use the predicted Tˆi,t as an
instrument in a standard 2SLS regression. As shown in Wooldridge (2010), this allows improving the
efficiency of our estimator and obtaining an estimate of the average treatment effect, that is easier
to compare to OLS estimates. Moreover, the procedure is robust to possible misspecifications in the
probit equation and it does not require considering generated regressor issues.
A second observation is that the effect of a given instrument Zi,t≠1 on our treatment Ti,t depends
on Ti,t≠1. When the CEO is the owner at t − 1, the instrument (say, a shock to CEO health) may
induce the CEO to leave and so (if anything) a negative change to the treatment, from Ti,t≠1 = 1 to
Ti,t = 0. When the CEO is not the owner at t− 1, the instrument may induce (if anything) a positive
change in the treatment, from Ti,t≠1 = 0 to Ti,t = 1.
Accordingly, our IV estimates are based on the following procedure. First, we estimate the probit
regression
Ti,t = Φ(–+ —1Zi,t≠1 + —2Zi,t≠1(1− Ti,t≠1) + —3(1− Ti,t≠1) +X
Õ
i,t“), (4.4)
in which Zi,t≠1 is one of the above mentioned instrument and in which —1 measures the effect of
the instrument on Ti,t when Ti,t≠1 = 1. This case is of particular interest, as the instrument induces
a plausibly exogenous separation between ownership and control. As mentioned, we then use the
predicted Tˆi,t as instrument in a 2SLS in which the first stage is a standard OLS.
4.4.3 Results
We present our results in Table 4.6. In column 1, we report OLS estimates of equation (4.3), showing
that, in the same firm with the same owner, firm productivity is larger when the owner is also the
CEO. As mentioned, the result is useful to address the concern with specification (4.1) that the CEO
may decide to acquire ownership as she expects an increase in future profitability. In equation (4.3),
instead, it is the owner who decides to become the CEO and the variation is less likely to be driven by
the CEO’s private information.10 This result also confirms our estimates in Table 4.2 and it serves as
a useful benchmark for the next IV estimates.
The results of our IV procedure are reported in columns 2-5. The bottom part of the table reports
the probit estimates of equation (4.4), not the first stage of the 2SLS. The coefficient on Zi,t≠1 is
negative, showing that our instruments have a significant impact on the treatment. If the CEO is the
owner at t− 1 and, for example, she becomes sick, she is more likely to leave and so induce a negative
shock to the treatment. In column 2, the instrument is a dummy equal to one if the CEO has retired.
In column 3, the instrument is the amount of health benefits received by the CEO at t− 1 (in 10,000
euros). In column 4, the instrument is the amount of health benefits received by the CEO spouse.11
In column 5 the sample is restricted to cases where the CEO spouse is not an employee of the firm.
Results in columns 2-5 reveal a robust effect. Exploiting plausibly exogenous shocks, we show that
firm productivity is significantly larger when ownership and control are in the same hands. Estimated
10The CEO may decide to leave as he expects future productivity to decrease, but this would go against our results.
11In order to keep the same sample throughout columns 2-4, we set health benefit to zero when the CEO has no spouse
(that is, we make no distinction between having a spouse with no health benefits and having no spouse). Restricting our
sample to CEOs with a spouse would give very similar estimates in terms both of magnitude and of standard errors.
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coefficients are similar across specifications, and if anything larger than the OLS counterpart.
The validity of our instrument requires that our shocks affect firm productivity at t only thought
the induced change in the treatment. In order to investigate this further, we check whether any change
in CEOs induced by our instruments, whether or not it is associated to an ownership change, has
a similar effect on firm productivity. If this were the case, the validity of our instrument would be
questioned.
We report our results in Table 4.7, which replicates the structure of Table 4.6 but looks instead of
the effect of CEO Change, that is a dummy equal to one if the CEO changes from t− 1 to t and in
any subsequent period. In column 1, we report OLS estimates and show no significant effect. This can
be seen as a placebo test of the effect in column 1 of Table 4.6, showing that it is not a change in CEO
per se that drives our effects on firm productivity, but CEO changes associated to ownership changes.
This is confirmed in IV estimates in columns 2-5. The estimation procedure is the same as in Table 4.6,
except that there is no need to consider the interaction between Zi,t≠1 and CEO Change at t− 1 in the
probit. The probit coefficient on Zi,t≠1 is positive, showing that our instruments indeed significantly
increase the probability of having a change in the CEO. Importantly, however, these changes have no
significant impact on firm productivity unless they are associated to changes in ownership, as described
by our treatment. We view this as an important finding in support of the validity of our instruments.
As mentioned, our health instruments do not rely on excluding direct effects of CEO health at t on
firm productivity at t. In columns 1-2 of Table 4.8, we add health at t (that is, Zi,t) as control in our
2SLS estimates. In column 1, we see that CEO health at t has a negative impact on firm productivity
at t, while in column 2 the impact of CEO spouse health is not significant. Irrespective of these effects,
our estimated impact of CEO Owner is not affected. In our specifications, we fix the firm’s largest
owner, and any variation to the treatment Ti,t is due to changes in the identity of the CEO. In this
case, CEO health at time t− 1 is not correlated to health at t, precisely because the CEO is not the
same.12
We also consider alternative definitions of our treatment CEO 100 and CEO 0, as defined in
Section 3.2. Columns 3-4 present OLS estimates with firm-owner fixed effects, columns 5-6 present IV
estimates employing CEO spouse health as instrument and restricting to CEO spouses not working in
the firm. Results are robust and consistent in all these specifications.
Finally, in Table 4.9, we consider alternative IV specifications. In columns 1-3, we consider standard
2SLS estimates in which each instrument Zi,t≠1 is directly used in the first stage. In columns 4-6,
we use probit regressions and the predicted Tˆi,t as instrument, but differently from equation (4.4) we
include no interactions with Ti,t≠1. As instruments, we consider CEO retire, CEO health, and CEO
spouse health when the spouse is not employed in the firm. Estimated impacts of CEO Owner are still
positive and significant, confirming the robustness of our findings.
12If this were not the case, we could have for example cases in which the CEO gets sick at t − 1, she does not step
down, but she rather sells her majority shares. We would observe a change in the treatment, but not a change in the
CEO, which may be problematic since for a given CEO health at t − 1 is likely to be correlated to health at t and CEO
health at t may in turn affect firm productivity at t.
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4.5 Interpretation
4.5.1 Representativeness of typical samples
As mentioned, most of the literature on CEO ownership focuses on samples of very large and/or listed
firms. A question is whether the effects identified on those firms are representative of the population.
We explore this issue in Table 4.10.
In column 1, we check whether our estimates of agency costs vary with the size of the firm. We
interact our treatment indicator with the dummies Small, Medium, and Large, indicating respectively
that the firm has 10-50 employees, 51-250 employees, or more than 250 employees. The omitted
category are micro firms with less than 10 employees. Estimated agency costs appear largest for
medium-sized firms.
In column 2, we interact our treatment with a dummy indicating whether the firm is in the service
(as opposed to the manufacturing) sector. We observe that agency costs are significantly larger in
manufacturing firms.
In order to highlight the effects on listed firms, we consider the continuous measure CEO share
instead of CEO Owner. In listed firms, it is hardly the case that the CEO is the majority shareholder.
As shown in column 3, the effect on non listed firm is positive (and not surprisingly similar to the one
in Table 4.3) while the effect on listed firm is negative. That is, differently from the vast majority of
firms, larger CEO ownership is associated to lower productivity in listed firms. The result is consistent
with Fabisik et al. (2018) who focus on listed firms.
It has also been shown that, in listed US firms, the relation between CEO ownership and firm value
is inverted U-shaped (Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990)). Indeed, if we restrict to
listed firms, this is the case in our sample as well (column 4). As we have shown in Table 4.3, however,
such non-linearity is not so strong (in fact, the squared term is not significantly different from zero) in
the broader sample including non listed firms.
These results highlight the importance of exploring agency costs outside typical samples. The
results one gets in our broader sample are richer, and they suggest that agency costs may be particularly
severe in firms that, due to data limitations, are often excluded from corporate governance studies.
4.5.2 Mechanisms
Finally, we would like to investigate some possible mechanisms trough which agency costs affect firm
productivity. Indirectly, these results can also shed light on which types of agency costs matter the
most in our setting (see e.g. Stein (2003) for a review). We distinguish in particular between empire
building, according to which agency costs are driven by the manager’s tendency to undertake inefficient
projects (Jensen (1986)), and quiet life, according to which agency costs are driven by the manager’s
tendency not to put effort at work (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003)).
We first consider variables associated to empire building. Specifically, we test whether CEO Owner
is associated to changes in investments, assets, capex, acquisition activities, cash holdings, leverage,
dividends. None of these variable appear significantly related to our treatment.
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We then consider variables associated to quiet life. While direct measures of CEO’s effort are
hard to find, we can observe the number of employment relations the CEO has in other firms (e.g.
second job, board membership, or consultancy). We can also observe the number of days the CEO has
been absent from work, typically due to sick leave or for study reasons. In Table 4.11, we report our
estimates fixing the firm-CEO (columns 1 and 4), fixing the firm-owner (columns 2-3 and 5-6), and the
IV as in Table 4.6 with CEO spouse health as instrument, restricting to CEO spouses not working in
the firm (columns 5-6). We observe that our treatment induces the CEO to take fewer engagements
outside the firm and fewer days of absence from work, which is consistent with increased effort in the
firm.
While this analysis is preliminary, it tends to provide support to the quiet life hypothesis as a
plausible mechanism behind our treatment effects. When the CEO is also the owner, she exerts more
effort at work.
4.6 Conclusion
We have shown that agency costs are an important determinant of firm productivity. This result
has been established both in OLS regressions with firm-CEO or firm-owner fixed effects and in IV
regressions in which we exploit health shocks of the CEO and of the CEO spouse as a source of exogenous
separation between ownership and control. We believe this result is important as it establishes in a
direct way the magnitude and scope of agency costs.
The possibility to exploit ownership data on the universe of limited liability firms has allowed us to
estimate agency costs also in samples which had not been investigated in the previous literature. We
have found agency costs to be particularly important in medium-sized private firms that are usually
not the main concern for corporate governance regulation. We hope this can serve as motivation for
similar data collection efforts and investigations in other countries.
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4.7 Tables and Figure
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
LP 566,266 53,695 41,844
CEO Owner 566,266 0.29 41.18
CEO 100 566,266 0.18 0.39
CEO 0 566,266 0.57 0.5
CEO Largest 566,266 0.39 0.49
CEO Share 566,266 0.36 0.39
GOS 565,526 15,540 35,677
Profit 565,302 -0.018 0.341
ROA 564,847 2.284 28.94
TFP 556,013 0.0009 0.51
TFP2 556,000 -4.4e-10 0.54
CEO changes 566,266 0.36 0.47
Owner changes 566,266 0.08 0.28
Dependent 566,266 0.12 0.33
HHI ownership 566,266 5,484 3,656
Workers w/ Bac 566,266 10.88 94.1
Workers w/Master 566,266 1.37 24.82
Workers w/ PhD 566,266 0.07 1.74
White Collars 566,266 5.05 62.04
Blue Collars 566,266 11.09 117.91
CEO tenure 555,431 7.04 6.74
CEO age 566,266 44.68 10.33
CEO experience 536,651 19.46 5.31
CEO job mobility 566,266 15.25 23.46
CEO retires 566,266 0.04 0.197
CEO health benefits 566,266 98.83 978.19
Spouse health benefits 566,266 94.52 890.12
Services 566,266 0.64 0.47
Micro 566,266 0.78 0.42
Small 566,266 0.18 0.39
Medium 566,266 0.03 0.18
Large 566,266 0.008 0.09
Listed 566,266 0.001 0.038
Free cash flow (1000) 566,266 121 274
Capex (1000) 566,266 64 221
Dividends 566,264 32,076 214,335
Leverage (D/E) 566,260 77,016 471,247
Investments 566,266 87,693 546,818
Acquisition activities 566,266 0.005 0.07
Assets (1000) 566,260 5,132 151,000
CEO Engagement 555,688 1.241 0.739
CEO days leave 561,715 7.60 36.31
Note: This table reports summary statics of all the variables used in our analysis. Minimal and maximal values cannot
be reported due to confidentiality.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
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Dep Variable Labor Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEO Owner -3,556 1,491 856.48 1,001 958.65 1,057
(-33.75)*** (13.19)*** (5.98)*** (3.30)** (2.47)** (3.11)***
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects No No Firm Firm-CEO
Sample All 0/1 0/-1
Number of Obs 566,266 555,431 555,431 566,260 557,372 557,438
Number of Groups 109,503 214,077 214,077 214,077
R-squared 0.002 0.17 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is labor productivity. CEO Owner is a
dummy equal to one if the CEO has majority ownership in the firm. In column 3, regressions include firm and year fixed
effects. In columns 4-6, regressions include firm-CEO and year fixed effects. In column 5, we exclude observations in
which the CEO loses ownership. In column 6, we exclude observations in which the CEO gains ownership. In columns
4-6, controls include industry fixed effect (2 digits), firm’s age, leverage, a dummy indicating if the firm is part of a
business group, the number of workers by level of education and occupation (white vs. blue collar), the HHI index of
ownership concentration. In addition, in column 3, controls include CEO’s education, age, years of experience within the
firm and in total. Robust t-statistics are in brackets. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
Table 4.2: Main Result
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Dep Variable Labor Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEO 100 867.62
(2.60)***
CEO 0 586.33
(2.84)***
CEO Largest 1,380
(5.13)***
CEO shares 1,063 1,755
(4.06)*** (1.91)*
CEO shares squared -769.81
(-0.81)
Owner changes 241.52
(0.99)
Number of Obs 566,260 566,260 566,260 566,260 566,260 566,260
Number of Groups 214,077 214,077 214,077 214,077 214,077 214,077
R-squared 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.013
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is labor productivity. CEO 100 is a
dummy equal to one if the CEO has 100% ownership in the firm. CEO 0 is a dummy equal to one if the CEO has some
ownership in the firm. CEO Largest is a dummy equal to one if the CEO is the largest shareholder in the firm. CEO
share is the fraction of CEO ownership in the firm. Owner changes is a dummy equal to one if the majority owner in the
firm changes from any previous period. All regressions include firm-CEO and year fixed effects. Controls include industry
fixed effect (2 digits), firm’s age, leverage, a dummy indicating if the firm is part of a business group, the number of
workers by level of education and occupation (white vs. blue collar), the HHI index of ownership concentration. Robust
t-statistics are in brackets. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 4.3: Robustness
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Dep Variable GOS Profit ROA TFP TFP2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEO Owner 1007 0.006 1.26 0.014 0.015 0.018
(3.85)*** (2.25)** (2.73)*** (2.75)*** (2.86)*** (3.35)***
Mean Dep Var 15,540 -0.018 2.28 0.0009 -4.4e-10
Number of Obs 565,526 565,302 564,847 556,007 556,000 513,033
Number of Groups 213,692 213,590 213,422 209,853 209,848 197,448
R-squared 0.025 0.010 0.024 0.007 0.007 0.007
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. In column 1, the dependent variable is Gross Operating
Surplus. In column 2, the dependent variable is net profit margin. In column 3, the dependent variable is Returns on
Assets. In column 4, the dependent variable is TFP, obtained as the residual of a Cobb-Douglas in which value added is
regressed over capital and labor for each 2 digit industry. In column 5, TFP is estimated by adding firm’s market share
and fixed effects for industry-years. In column 6, TFP is estimated as in column 5 but multiproduct firms are excluded.
CEO Owner is a dummy equal to one if the CEO has majority ownership in the firm. All regressions include firm-CEO
and year fixed effects. Controls include industry fixed effect (2 digits), firm’s age, leverage, a dummy indicating if the
firm is part of a business group, the number of workers by level of education and occupation (white vs. blue collar), the
HHI index of ownership concentration. Robust t-statistics are in brackets. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% level, respectively.
Table 4.4: Robustness (2)
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Dep Variable Labor Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEO Owner 1,033 815.37 998.35 1,024 660.29 699.93
(2.98)*** (2.09)** (2.45)** (2.84)*** (5.32)*** (3.90)***
LP(t-1) 0.71 0.51
(571.81)*** (178.11)***
LP(t-2) 0.19
(60.46)***
LP(t-3) 0.14
(51.47)***
Sample Firm Firm-CEO
No Exit Persistent No Exit Persistent
Fixed Effects Firm-CEO No
Number of Obs 418,868 264,535 255,621 310,669 308,547 121,616
Number of Groups 140,487 74,907 66,485 53,123
R-squared 0.012 0.016 0.012 0.015 0.609 0.693
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is labor productivity. CEO Owner is a
dummy equal to one if the CEO has majority ownership in the firm. In column 1, we restrict the sample to firms that do
not die in our sample. In column 2, we restrict the sample to firms with number of observations above the median (equal
to 9). In column 3, we restrict the sample to firm-CEO pairs that do not die in our sample. In column 2, we restrict the
sample to firm-CEO pairs with number of observations above the median (equal to 4). In columns 5 and 6,
LP(t-1)-LP(t-3) are lagged values of labor productivity with 1-3 lags. Regressions in columns 1-4 include firm-CEO and
year fixed effects, regressions in column 5-6 include year fixed effects. Controls include industry fixed effect (2 digits),
firm’s age, leverage, a dummy indicating if the firm is part of a business group, the number of workers by level of
education and occupation (white vs. blue collar), the HHI index of ownership concentration. Robust t-statistics are in
brackets. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 4.5: Robustness (3)
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Figure 4.1: Parallel Trends
Note: This figure plots the estimated coefficients of equation (4.2). T-4/T-1 correspond to beta coefficients before
the treatment, T+1/T+4 correspond to beta coefficients after the treatment. The bars correspond to 95% confidence
intervals.
82
Dep Variable Labor Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CEO Owner 775.43 1,795 1,674 1,656 1,744
(4.95)*** (2.88)*** (2.64)*** (2.61)*** (2.18)**
Probit
Z(t-1) -0.807 -0.515 -0.13 -0.194
(-37.05)*** (-12.20)*** (-2.52)** (-3.10)***
Z(t-1)*(1-T(t-1)) 0.767 0.66 -0.030 0.050
(24.66)*** (9.19)*** (-0.40) (-0.52)
Instrument Retire CEO Health Spouse Health
(10k) (10k) (not working)
Fixed Effects Firm-Owner
Number of Obs 555,425 367,911 367,911 367,911 290,006
Number of Groups 145,579 74,642 74,642 74,642 63,004
R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Note: This table reports results of OLS regressions (column 1) and of Probit and IV regressions (columns 2-5). The
dependent variable is labor productivity. CEO Owner is a dummy equal to one if the CEO has majority ownership in
the firm. The bottom panel of columns 2-5 report probit regressions of equation (4). In column 2, the instrument is a
dummy equal to one if the CEO is classified as retired in the previous period. In column 3, the instrument is the amount
of health benefits received by the CEO in the previous period (in 10,000 euros). In columns 4-5, the instrument is the
amount of health benefits received by the CEO spouse in the previous period (in 10,000 euros). In column 5, the sample
is restricted to cases where the CEO spouse is not an employee of the firm. All regressions include firm-owner and year
fixed effects. Controls include industry fixed effect (2 digits), firm’s age, leverage, a dummy indicating if the firm is part
of a business group, the number of workers by level of education and occupation (white vs. blue collar), the HHI index
of ownership concentration. Robust t-statistics are in brackets. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respectively.
Table 4.6: Exogenous Variations
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Dep Variable Labor Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CEO Change 190.32 -5,681 -1,561 3,277 -346.7
(1.24) (-1.31) (-0.35) (0.74) (-0.07)
Probit
Z(t-1) 0.322 0.157 0.105 0.067
(27.21)*** (5.83)*** (4.38)*** (2.33)**
Instrument Retire CEO Health Spouse Health
(10k) (10k) (not working)
Fixed Effects Firm-Owner
Number of Obs 555,425 367,921 367,921 367,921 290,016
Number of Groups 145,579 74,643 74,643 74,643 63,004
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
Note: This table reports results of OLS regressions (column 1) and of Probit and IV regressions (columns 2-5). The
dependent variable is labor productivity. CEO Change is a dummy equal to one if the CEO has changed in any previous
period. The bottom panel of columns 2-5 report probit regressions as in equation (4) without interactions with T(t-1).
In column 2, the instrument is a dummy equal to one if the CEO is classified as retired in the previous period. In
column 3, the instrument is the amount of health benefits received by the CEO in the previous period (in 10,000 euros).
In columns 4-5, the instrument is the amount of health benefits received by the CEO spouse in the previous period (in
10,000 euros). In column 5, the sample is restricted to cases where the CEO spouse is not an employee of the firm. All
regressions include firm-owner and year fixed effects. Controls include industry fixed effect (2 digits), firm’s age, leverage,
a dummy indicating if the firm is part of a business group, the number of workers by level of education and occupation
(white vs. blue collar), the HHI index of ownership concentration. Robust t-statistics are in brackets. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗
denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 4.7: Exogenous Variations: Placebo
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Dep Variable Labor Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEO Owner 1,692 1,746
(2.48)** (2.03)**
Z(t) -867.42 -479.61
(1.79)* (-0.76)
CEO 100 727.75 1,501
(3.65)*** (2.05)**
CEO 0 596.98 5,141
(4.19)*** (1.92)*
Probit Probit
Z(t-1) -0.515 -0.194 -0.166 -0.224
(-12.20)*** (-3.10)*** (-1.87)* (-5.03)***
Z(t-1)*(1-T(t-1)) 0.66 0.05 0.045 0.15
(9.19)*** (0.52) (0.37) (2.12)**
Instrument CEO Health Spouse Health Spouse Health
(10k) (not working) (not working)
Fixed Effects Firm-Owner
Number of Obs 367,911 290,006 555,425 555,425 312,348 312,470
Number of Groups 74,642 63,004 145,579 145,579 85,437 85,462
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Note: This table reports results of OLS regressions (columns 3-4) and of Probit and IV regressions (columns 1-2 and
5-6). The dependent variable is labor productivity. CEO Owner is a dummy equal to one if the CEO has majority
ownership in the firm. CEO 100 is a dummy equal to one if the CEO has 100% ownership in the firm. CEO 0 is a
dummy equal to one if the CEO has some ownership in the firm. The bottom panel of columns 1-2 and 5-6 report probit
regressions of equation (4). In column 1, the instrument is the amount of health benefits received by the CEO in the
previous period (in 10,000 euros). In columns 2,5,6, the instrument is the amount of health benefits received by the CEO
spouse in the previous period (in 10,000 euros) and the sample is restricted to cases where the CEO spouse is not an
employee of the firm. In columns 1 and 2, Z(t) correspond to the amount of health benefits received the current period.
All regressions include firm-owner and year fixed effects. Controls include industry fixed effect (2 digits), firm’s age,
leverage, a dummy indicating if the firm is part of a business group, the number of workers by level of education and
occupation (white vs. blue collar), the HHI index of ownership concentration. Robust t-statistics are in brackets. ∗, ∗∗
and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 4.8: Exogenous Variations: Robustness
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Dep Variable Labor Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEO Owner 1,773 1,534 1,566 6,393 5,574 5,749
(2.41)** (2.02)** (1.51) (5.60)*** (4.84)** (4.80)***
First Stage Probit
Z(t-1) -0.146 -0.077 -0.01 -0.28 0.269 -0.123
(-18.15)*** (-6.45)*** (-0.78) (-19.38)*** (8.90)*** (-3.34)***
Z(t-1)*(1-T(t-1)) 0 .158 0.101 0.007
(18.19)*** ( 7.09)*** (0.44)
Instrument Retire CEO Health Spouse Retire CEO Health Spouse
Fixed Effects Firm-Owner
Number of Obs 367,921 367,921 290,016 367,911 389,668 290,006
Number of Groups 74,643 74,643 63,004 74,642 74,642 63,003
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
Note:This table reports results of IV and Probit regressions. The dependent variable is labor productivity. CEO Owner
is a dummy equal to one if the CEO has majority ownership in the firm. The bottom panel of columns 1-3 report first
stage OLS regressions. The bottom panel of columns 4-6 report probit regressions as in equation (4) without
interactions with T(t-1). In columns 1 and 4, the instrument is a dummy equal to one if the CEO is classified as retired
in the previous period. In column 2 and 5, the instrument is the amount of health benefits received by the CEO in the
previous period (in 10,000 euros). In columns 3 and 6, the instrument is the amount of health benefits received by the
CEO spouse in the previous period (in 10,000 euros) and the sample is restricted to cases where the CEO spouse is not
an employee of the firm. All regressions include firm-owner and year fixed effects. Controls include industry fixed effect
(2 digits), firm’s age, leverage, a dummy indicating if the firm is part of a business group, the number of workers by level
of education and occupation (white vs. blue collar), the HHI index of ownership concentration. Robust t-statistics are in
brackets. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 4.9: Exogenous Variations: Robustness (2)
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Dep Variable Labor Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treat 906.93 2,004 657.99 1,027 460,801
(2.13)** (3.53)*** (1.63) (2.67)*** (2.01)**
Treat*Small 1,401 2,017
(2.59)*** (2.98)***
Treat*Medium 6,761 5,829
(3.31)*** (2.41)**
Treat*Large 1474.00 9,180
(0.19) (0.6)
Treat*Services -1,249
(-1.98)**
Treat*Listed -196,271
(-1.69)*
Treat*Treat -1,787,041
(-2.15)**
Treat CEO Owner CEO Shares
Sample All Listed
Number of Obs 313,789 313,789 313,789 313,789 839
Number of Groups 112,875 112,875 112,875 112,875 308
R-squared 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.098
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is labor productivity. In columns 1 and
2, Treat is CEO Owner, that is a dummy equal to one if the CEO has majority ownership in the firm. In columns 3-5,
Treat is CEO Shares, that is the fraction of CEO ownership in the firm. Small is a dummy equal to one if the firm has
10-50 employees, Medium is a dummy equal to one if the firm has 51-250 employees, Large is a dummy equal to one if
the firm has more than 250 employees. Services is a dummy equal to one if the firm is in the service sector. Listed is a
dummy equal to one if the firm is listed. In column 5, the sample is restricted to listed firms. All regressions include
firm-CEO and year fixed effects. Controls include industry fixed effect (2 digits), firm’s age, leverage, a dummy
indicating if the firm is part of a business group, the number of workers by level of education and occupation (white vs.
blue collar), the HHI index of ownership concentration. Robust t-statistics are in brackets. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 4.10: Effects by Size and Industry
87
Dep Variable CEO Engagements CEO Days Off
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEO Owner -0.01 -0.31 -0.07 -1.42 -13.24 -4.63
(-1.82)* (-54.59)*** (-4.12)*** (-3.75)*** (-48.39)*** (-5.46)***
Fixed Effects Firm-CEO Firm-Owner Firm-CEO Firm-Owner
Estimates OLS IV OLS IV
Number of Obs 555,682 555,682 389,588 561,709 561,709 387,678
Number of Groups 209,292 145,593 96,391 212,669 146,551 96,110
R-squared 0.012 0.023 0.113 0.003 0.016 0.019
Note: This table reports results of OLS regressions (columns 1,2,4,5) and of IV regressions (columns 3 and 6). In
columns 1-3, the dependent variable is the number of employment relations of the CEO in other firms. In columns 4-6,
the dependent variable is the number of days of leave of the CEO. In columns 3 and 6, the instrument is the amount of
health benefits received by the CEO spouse in the previous period (in 10,000 euros) and the sample is restricted to cases
where the CEO spouse is not an employee of the firm. In columns 1 and 4, regressions include firm-CEO and year fixed
effects. In columns 2,3,5 and 6, regressions include firm-owner and year fixed effects. Controls include industry fixed
effect (2 digits), firm’s age, leverage, a dummy indicating if the firm is part of a business group, the number of workers
by level of education and occupation (white vs. blue collar), the HHI index of ownership concentration. Robust
t-statistics are in brackets. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 4.11: Mechanisms
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Chapter 5
How Business Group Affiliation
Improves Productivity of Small
Firms: Evidence from Finnish
Administrative Data
Henri Luomaranta
Statistics Finland and TSM, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France
Abstract
I inspect how business group affiliation impacts firm productivity and job growth. Rich administrative data on
the universe of Finnish limited liability firms reveals that joining a business group increases productivity, and
decreases job growth within firms. This is driven by small firms that are mainly in the service sector. I provide
suggestive evidence of mechanisms. I document changes in (key) employees, decrease in cost of borrowing and
risk levels, and significant transfers of financial resources. Based on the results, the role of business groups in
the economy might be most relevant in the context of small firms, which are usually not analyzed due to lack
of data.
JEL Classifcation Code: D22, E24, E32, L25
Keywords: dependencies;business groups; firm size; growth;productivity
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5.1 Introduction
Business group is a very widespread phenomenon in modern economies, and its role is debatable. For
example, in developing countries, it is an easy argument to say that business groups can alleviate
capital market inefficiencies, rendering business group affiliated firms more profitable. Yet, the evidence
is not conclusive across different developing countries (see, e.g. Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). In developed
countries, for example in the U.S., several studies have documented the diversification discount (see,
e.g. Schoar, 2002), where conglomerate firms’ stocks are traded at a discount compared to other
comparable firms.
Whether business groups are "paragons" or "parasites", as dubbed by Khanna and Palepu (2000),
remains an open question. After a careful meta-analysis of the business group literature, Carney et al.
(2017) concludes that business groups should be analyzed in detailed contexts or within specific legal
frameworks from many angles.
For instance, it is an often overlooked fact, that large groups own numerous small affiliates, and they
are usually grouped together with other small firms in economic statistics and empirical research. A
recent Eurostat report (Airaksinen et al., 2015) shows that the share of dependent1 firms’ employment
within the SME2 category is substantial in several European countries, accounting for as much as half
of the SMEs’ employment in some economies. This is why firm size and enterprise group dependency
is an important research question. Especially so, because small firms have major potential to provide
positive productivity and job creation dynamics in the economy (see, e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 2009
and Neumark et al., 2011).
This paper studies productivity and growth of Finnish firms joining or leaving a business group,
and demonstrates that size is a key determinant that can explain how business group affiliation is
related to those variables. I show what happens to productivity and job growth when a firm joins or
leaves a business group in the within firm context, and show evidence of the potential mechanisms. The
sample is obtained from a comprehensive business register, which allows to examine heterogeneity of
the results by size and industry. The business register captures virtually all the ownership relationships
between firms. While many benchmark studies concentrate on larger listed firms (e.g. Maksimovic
and Phillips, 2013) or manufacturing industry (e.g. Atalay et al., 2014) it is important to incorporate
total populations of firms in the analysis, because most of the firms in a typical economy are small (in
Finland, around 99% are SMEs) and most of the new jobs are created in the service industry, which is
employing more people than the goods producing sector.
Disregarding the group relationship, a small dependent firm can appear exactly the same as an
independent firm. Dependent firms have their own ownership structures, they are independently legally
liable, and they may have considerable autonomy in decision-making. It is somewhat difficult to
draw a hypothesis regarding what kind of impact dependency from a group may have on growth and
1Dependent from a group, including any firm that is controlled by or controls a group. Control is defined as having
50% of votes directly or indirectly
2Throughout the analysis, we use the EU recommendation 2003/361 for the cut-off points for defining micro (<10),
small (10-49), medium (50-249), and large (>=250) size categories by using persons employed, measured in full time
equivalents.
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productivity. The dependent firm might have to compete for resources (see, e.g. Giroud and Mueller,
2015), or the business group as a whole might be more resilient against competition, and it might be
easier to engage in wasteful investments, leading to higher growth and lower productivity. On the other
hand, dependent firms can have access to different tangible or intangible resources, such as financing
options or managerial talent (see, e.g., Atalay et al., 2014, who provide evidence that transfers of
intangible resources are quantitatively important in vertically integrated firms). Therefore, the effect
we might expect is not clear-cut.
I employ fixed effects panel regressions, and find evidence that dependency is positively related to
labor productivity (2.3% increase from the unconditional sample average), and negatively related to
growth rate of employees. Both relationships seem to be driven by small firms, mostly in the service
sector. Given that endogeneity is an issue, and we are not able to find suitable instruments, I try to
eliminate various alternative explanations in order to motivate the interpretation of the results.
Furthermore, I explore some potential mechanisms and document several subsequent changes
related to firm policies and market outcomes that might explain the results. Risk level of sales and
cost of borrowing decreases, CEO and management are reshuffled, and investment in high skilled staff
is increased. I also document significant transfers of financial resources, notably in the form of loans
from the enterprise group. I obtain some indicative evidence, that it is the human resources policies
that have the most explanatory power behind the results (changes in key staff members and wage
structures).
The results underline the importance of studying business group activities in the total populations
of firms, and highlight how small and large firms are interlinked by ownership channel, on top of the
usual input-output relationships.
Literature Business groups and affiliate performance are studied in the management literature with
varying results. Recently, Carney et al. (2017) carries out an extensive meta-analysis of business group
literature, and concludes that one cannot yet draw a conclusive explanation of why business groups
are still prevalent in modern economies, and the economic impact should be analyzed in more detailed
contexts. Productivity of firms in integrated ownership structures are more widely studied using data
on large manufacturing firms (see, e.g. Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002 and Maksimovic and Phillips,
2013). Related literature has also been interested in foreign direct investments and affiliates of foreign
large multinationals, and has shown superior productivity of foreign affiliates (e.g. Criscuolo, 2005).
However, most of the dependent firms in the Finnish economy are domestically owned (80% of the
sample) and tend to be smaller in size.
Merger and acquisitions literature is also typically focused on large and listed firms, and empirical
research on mergers among small firms is relatively scarce. Recent examples I find are Arvanitis and
Stucki (2015) who study Swiss small firm mergers, and Xiao (2015) who uses register based data from
Sweden to study new technology firm acquisitions by business groups.
Directly related to this study is Boccara (1997), where job creation of small and medium French
firms belonging to enterprise groups is computed over the 1984–1992 period, finding that the small
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firms which are part of a corporation exhibit higher job creation rates. Bamiatzi et al. (2014) analyses
data from the U.K., and shows that business group affiliation has a positive impact on small firms
especially in declining industries. A recent example studying business group affiliate performance from
emerging economy is Bhaumik et al. (2017)), that suggests for example that the insurance mechanism
is an important advantage of belonging to a business group for firms willing to take risk.
There is evidence from Finland on the impact of dependent firms in the SME category, and the
focus is on analyzing the aggregate effects. Fornaro and Luomaranta (2016) shows that the small
independent firms are behind most of the positive net job creation3, and Fornaro and Luomaranta
(2017) shows, in the light of a productivity growth decomposition model, that the dependent SMEs
have larger productivity contributions than their independent counterparts. This is mostly due to
more efficient reallocation of labor towards more productive firms, and due to highly productive new
dependent entrants. These latter papers point towards the fact that business groups have an influential
role in the Finnish economy and in its business renewal process through creative destruction among
small firms.
Methodological aspects and causal interpretation Studies interested in firm performance in
a business group are plagued by endogeneity issues due to our inability to randomly impose group
structures on firms. For example Larrain et al. (2018) proposes a technique to establish causal
relationships in the cases where firm leaves a business group, but the replication of this methodology for
Finland would require more observations, since they select a very specific sample of exactly 2 industry
groups. In the absence of exogenous variations, the approach of studying the within dynamics of firms
where the dependency status changes, observing virtually all such cases in the economy (improving
external validity), offers a partial solution. Due to richness of the data, I can control for many of
the known determinants of productivity and firm outcomes, alleviating concerns for omitted variable
problem (in Section 5.3.3). Furthermore, I eliminate other possible explanations more specifically
in Section 5.3.2. I show what happens to firms when main owner changes, and what happens when
administrative records reveals an M&A event (where physical resources are transferred), in order to
see if these alternative explanations, that plausibly can happen simultaneously with the dependency
status change, are driving the results. I also separately look at what happens if firm becomes a
foreign affiliate, to see if it would be sufficient to only look at FDIs in our setting. These alternative
explanations do not mask the impact of the main treatment of joining a business group. Another
important consideration is reverse causality. We might capture the effect of small firms being more
successful and therefore being acquired by other firms. An important check against this possibility is
the parallel trends assumption, which turns out not to be violated. Regardless, I avoid making causal
statements based on the regressions.
Definition of a business group In the European context, Eurostat’s official definition for an
enterprise group reads as follows.
An enterprise group is an association of enterprises bound together by legal and/or financial links and
3the paper is included in the next chapter of the thesis
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controlled by the group head. A group of enterprises can have more than one decision-making centre,
especially for policy decisions on production, sales and profits. It may centralize certain aspects of
financial management and taxation. It constitutes an economic entity which is empowered to make
choices, particularly concerning the units which it comprises. Eurostat, 2019.
Similar structures in the U.S. are known as conglomerates, but the slight conceptual difference is
that conglomerates should operate in several industries. The main focus in this paper is the Finnish
konserni, which is defined as its European enterprise group counterparts. To be more precise, a business
group in this paper is defined as a group of firms, consisting of a mother and affiliates, where a mother
has a controlling stake (over 50% of votes) in each of the affiliated firms. These kind of enterprise
group structures are common, and large firms in Finland (and Europe) are typically organized as such.
The focus of this paper is on changes in the business group membership status, where at one point we
observe ownership links, and do not observe such links at another point in time during the firm panel.
The business group membership does not imply transfers of physical assets to another firm, although
this can happen, but rather transfers of voting rights. It also implies that the mother will supply a
consolidated financial statements on behalf of the entire group (on top of its own). The enterprise
group itself is not a legal entity or liable to pay taxes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the data and dependent
variables, Section 5.3 provides the main results, showing what happens when the dependency status
changes within firms and discusses possible alternative explanations, Section 5.4 provides indicative
evidence on the various mechanisms that can explain the results, Section 5.5 summarizes Fornaro and
Luomaranta (2017) to highlight what the aggregate effects are in the light of an productivity growth
decomposition model, and Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Data and dependent variables
The main data source is the Finnish structural and financial statistics database, and the sample
includes the universe of limited liability firms active in Finland, spanning the years 2006 to 2014. The
data includes balance sheet information that firm discloses annually. The database covers all active
enterprises in the non-financial business economy (NACE Rev.2 sections B to N, excl. K). I use the
deflated value added at factor cost (VA), computed by the statistical office, as the measurement for
firm output. VA is calculated by deducting the costs of operating activities from the income. Costs
exclude the costs related to personnel. The statistical office tries to clean the measure from the effects
of transfer pricing, which is an important quality consideration in our case. Employees are converted
to full time equivalents so that, an employee working half-time represents one half of a person and
similarly two employees working half-time during one year represent one annual FTE. I exclude firms
with less than 1 FTE (one man companies).
Labor productivity (LP) for firm i at t is
LPi,t = V Ai,t/FTEi,t, (5.1)
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where V A is in real terms, deflated using the implicit price deflator at 2-digit industry level, and FTE
stands for full-time equivalent units of labor.
Job creation measure is obtained from a specific monthly level data source (the statistical office’s
short term business statistics database) where employment figures, measured in FTEs, are adjusted to
represent the organic growth, disregarding the effects of mergers, split-offs and other legal restructuring.
I aggregate these monthly observations to yearly level. The data is manually inspected for the cases of
restructuring for the most important firms by the statisticians. In addition, an automated correction
procedure for mergers and split-offs is adopted (Appendix B contains the details of this procedure).
The file on job creation is merged with the one obtained from the structural and financial statistics
database, with slightly different coverage. From the original 566,037 firm year observations I give up
30,824 observations when I use the job growth variable.
The annual growth rate is computed as:
Growthi,t = (FTEi, t− FTEi,t≠1)/FTEi,t≠1 (5.2)
Finally, I link data from the Finnish Longitudinal Employee-Employer Database (FLEED) and the
Finnish Longitudinal Owner-Employee Database (FLOWN). The FLEED data includes the professional
classification and salaries of firm employees, and FLOWN includes the identities of the main owners4.
I use these two datasets to identify CEOs, executives, and share of wages paid to high-skill staff5 for
each firm6. More detailed data description is in the Appendix A.
Financial variables are winsorized at 0.25% and 99.75% of their empirical distributions. In general,
one would like to keep as much information as possible, without biasing the results. The job growth
variable is somewhat sensitive to this issue and winsorizing 0.25th and 99.75th percentile would still
leave large outliers, which seem to be related to mistakes in recording restructuring events. I therefore
winsorize job growth at 1% and 99% of its distribution. I define a dummy, Dependent, which takes
value 1 if the firm belongs to a business group, and 0 otherwise. This variable serves as the main
treatment of interest throughout the analysis.
5.3 Main results: how dependency status change relates to
productivity and growth
The first set of regressions analyzes what relationship the dependency status change has with produc-
tivity and employment growth rates, keeping other firm characteristics fixed. The main specification
4Ownership is reported if a shareholder holds >=10% of shares, we observe at least the largest shareholder for 92%
of the firms.
5I define high-skill staff as the job category of "professionals" in the ISCO-08 (major group 2)
6Very small firms do not always have a professional category of a CEO, because the classification is based on the
main activity of the employee (in small firms, the entrepreneur does not spend most of her time in managerial duty). In
cases where I fail to identify a CEO by the job category, I use the information on ownership and salaries (I check if one
of the entrepreneurs is working at the firm, and rank employees based on salary). Similar procedures have been applied
to Portuguese data in Queiró (2016). The details are left in the Appendix.
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is
yi,t = –i + —Ti,t +X
Õ
i,t“ + µt + Ái,t, (5.3)
where i denotes the firm, yi,t is the productivity measure or job creation rate of firm i in year t,
Ti,t = 1 if firm is dependent and X
Õ
i,t controls for characteristics of the firm, –i and µt are firm and
year fixed-effects. Throughout, I control for 2-digit NACE industries, size category (indicator variables
for Micro (left out), Small, Medium and Large), leverage, age and age2.
The following table provides the main results. It also provides a simple robustness check against
biases arising from the fact that we are not able to observe prices (see Beveren (2012) and De Loecker
and Goldberg (2014) for reviews).
Dep Variable LP LP Job growth Job growth LP log(LP) LP Job growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent 25,660 17,725 -0.28 -0.11 1,254 0.01 1,245 -0.049
(92.2)*** (59)*** (-63.6)*** (-19.35)*** (2.2)** (1.76)* (1.97)** (-2.70)***
Mkt Share 4,920
(3.00)***
Individual Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO Firm Firm Firm Firm
Controls NO YES NO YES YES YES YES + time*industry YES
Number of Obs 566,266 566,260 535,442 535,436 566,037 550,116 522,693 535,436
Number of Groups 110,453 107,831 106,827 103,470
R-squared 0.04 0.16 0.004 0.06 0.018 0.018 0.04 0.05
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01
In column 7, controls include interaction terms year*NACE, otherwise controls are: year, 2-digit
NACE industries, size category (indicator variables for Micro (left out), Small, Medium and Large),
leverage, age and age2.
Table 5.1: Main result: how dependency status is related to productivity measures (LP, log of LP)
and job growth. In regressions 1-4, I show the cross sectional relationship. In 5 I fix the firm to
give a baseline result in the within firm context. To make sure that our results would be robust for
alternative trimming practices, in 6 I follow e.g. Hyytinen and Maliranta (2013) who uses a strategy
proposed by Mairesse and Kremp (1993) to handle outliers, removing 4.4 standard deviations above
or below the input weighted industry distributions of log of labor productivity. In column 7, I use a
restricted sample by removing firms with multiple plants, and control for time specific industry trends
and market share (firm turnover/industry turnover), in order to eliminate possible biases arising from
our inability to observe prices, and shocks arising from firm’s other industries. In column 8 the Job
growth is the dependent variable fixing firm.
From Table 5.1 above, we obtain significant positive relationship with labor productivity and
negative relationship with job growth. Notice that the sample on job growth is slightly different, but
the results on productivity are similar if I use exactly the same sample (and are available upon request).
Log transformation of LP is somewhat problematic, because firms may have negative value added
measures. This is caused by input costs being higher than output can generate income, and can occur
naturally in rapid expansions or start-up phases, or indeed during adverse business conditions. The
log-level regression in column 6 suggests 1% increase in labor productivity if the firm joins a business
group. The coefficient in the 5th column translates to 2.3% increase from the sample average, and
e1,254 increase in firm productivity. Column 7 has coefficient of similar size, and it includes controls
for market share and industry interacted with time to control for possible industry specific shocks and
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price fluctuations due to demand, or due to price setting ability of the firm. Based on column 8, one
can expect 4.9% decrease in job growth rate once the firm joins a business group. In economic terms,
the size of the coefficients are substantial, as the average productivity growth of Finnish firms in our
sample period is 0.7% per year.7
The role of size and industry A key element in this paper is the use of total population of firms,
making it possible to inspect heterogeneities with respect to size and industries. The table below
provides evidence, that it is the smallest firms in the service sector that are driving the results. I
interact size categories with treatment, and industries with treatment, in order to see if there are size
and industry differences in the relationships we have uncovered. I have explored heterogeneity by age
without seeing a different impact on young firms.
Dep Variable LP Job growth LP Job growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent 5,457 -0.15 -370.66 -0.009
(5.89)*** (-6.03)*** (-0.66) (-0.18)
Small*Dependent -6,621 0.15
(-6.15)*** (5.70)***
Medium*Dependent -9,971 0.32
( -6.06)*** (7.7)***
Large*Dependent -19,887 0.34
(-4.45)*** (2.42)**
Services*Dependent 2249 -0.10
(1.78)* (-2.93)***
Individual Fixed Effects Firm Firm Firm Firm
Controls YES YES YES YES
Number of Obs 566,260 535,436 566,260 535,436
Number of Groups 110,453 103,470 110,453 103,470
R-squared 0.018 0.05 0.013 0.05
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01
Controls: year, 2-digit NACE industries, size category (indicator variables for Micro (left out), Small,
Medium and Large), leverage, age and age2
Table 5.2: Interaction with size and services industry with the dependency status change. I provide
interactions with Micro, Small, Medium and Large categories in columns 1 and 2 and the service sector
in columns 3 and 4, for LP and job growth. Micro category is left out in the size interactions, and
other than service industries are left out in the service interaction. The services sector is defined by
2-digit NACE codes 49-96
In Table 5.2 above, there appears to be significant size dependent differences in the statistical
relationship with LP and growth. The coefficient is largest for micro firm category in both LP (column
1) and job growth (column 2). Micro firms indeed seem to be the driver of the result. Looking at the
services interaction, we obtain evidence that the relationship is driven by the service industries. The
coefficient is twice the size of the main treatment (in Table 5.1). If we control for service interaction,
7The corresponding figure for EU countries is 0.9% and for the US is 1.13%, see the OECD’s website at data.oecd.org.
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the coefficient is no longer significant for the rest of the industries. Similarly for job creation (column
4), the coefficient about doubles from the one appearing in Table 5.1, and the coefficient is no longer
significant for the rest of the firms.
In other words, the positive (negative) dynamics in terms of productivity (job growth) are driven
by the small firms in the service sector, which forms a major part of the Finnish economy in terms of
employment.
Based on this evidence, the implications of joining a business group are not homogeneous across
sizes and industries, and the role of business groups in the economy might be most relevant in the
samples which are usually not analyzed due to lack of data.
Next, we will explore the model assumptions and address some concerns about endogeneity.
5.3.1 Parallel trends
Within firm regressions suggest that there is a positive relationship with labor productivity and a
negative relationship with growth rate. The standard assumption in DiD specifications is the condition
on pre-treatment trends, requiring that there is no statistically different trend prior to the treatment.
I obtain evidence of this point by inspecting the time periods before and after treatment using the
following specification:
yi,t = –i +
4ÿ
s=1
—t≠sµt≠sTi,t +
4ÿ
s=1
—+sµt+sTi,t +X
Õ
i,t“ + µt + Ái,t, (5.4)
where µt≠sT and µt≠sT are interactions with the treatment. They take values 1 during the years
t − s before and t + s after the treatment. –i, µt are firm and year fixed-effects, and Xi,t contains
the firm specific time varying characteristics (as above). I plot the — coefficients obtained from these
regressions in the following figures.
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Figure 5.1: LP, firm joins a business group, 95% CI, T+1 indicates the first period of treatment
Figure 5.2: Growth rate, firm joins a business group, 95% CI, T+1 indicates the first period of
treatment
The figures above do not display pre-treatment trends different from 0. For labor productivity
(Figure 5.1), the treatment seems to have a significant impact already at t+1. Interestingly, the
negative job growth is statistically different from 0 starting from t+2 onwards (Figure 5.2). This
observation can have a natural explanation in fixed nature of employment contracts. Based on these
graphs, we cannot conclude that the result is not causal due to violation of pre-treatment trends.
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5.3.2 Further evidence and other explanations
The results based on the within firm regressions can be questioned at least on the grounds that a
simultaneous event affects both the decision to join a business group and future productivity. Indeed
there are several possibly related events that may occur at the same time as the dependency status
changes, which might explain the results. For instance, the main person owner may change, mergers of
physical resources may occur, or foreign direct investments can be the reason for dependency status
change. I try to control for these alternative explanations below. Moreover, it is useful to provide
more details on the change in dependency status. A firm may become dependent by joining a group
as an affiliate, or it may become a mother by establishing a group either by obtaining ownership of
other firms, or by reorganizing its existing activities. The data allows to distinguish these different
roles. I use the specification (5.1), and look at different controlling variables (defined as dummies, 1
for the duration of the event) besides the dependency status change. First I fix the firm and the main
owner, to see if the result holds for any given firm-owner pair, making the regression more neutral
to the possible matching effect. I also add indicator variables for the following events: firm becomes
foreign affiliate, firm changes the main owner (largest shareholder), firm is involved in a merger, firm
becomes group head, or firm becomes an affiliate. Merger data is obtained from the tax office, and it
is defined as an event where some resources are transferred between enterprises (including split-off
and other legal restructuring). Firm can join an enterprise group as a result of a merger, but it is
conceptually different to transfer voting rights than to transfer productive assets between firms. Even
though the statistical office has adjusted the growth rates to represent organic growth rate, there can
still be positive impacts within the firm trend on growth. For example, the firm may be on the decline
before the merger, and during the subsequent period after the merger firms involved will be sharing
the same growth pattern, leading to higher growth rates (the adopted methodology computes growth
rates as if the merged firms were operating as one already the year before).
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Dep Variable LP Jobs LP Jobs LP Jobs LP Jobs LP Jobs LP Jobs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent 1,476 -0.07 1,170 -0.045 1,240 -0.05 1,254 -0.05
(2.24)** (-3.59)*** (2.02)** (-2.45)** (2.75)** (-2.78)*** (2.2)** (-2.7)***
Foreign affiliate 911 -0.04
(0.15) (-1.01)**
M&A 1,566 0.08
(1.29) (2.99)***
Owner change -100 0.02
(-0.72) (2.26)**
Mother 1,533 -0.007
(1.56 ) (-0.31)
Affiliate 553 -0.05
(0.89) (-2.74)***
Individual FE Firm-Owner Firm-Owner Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of Obs 566,260 535,436 566,260 535,436 566,260 535,436 566,260 535,436 566,260 535,436 566,260 535,436
Number of Groups 147,394 136,024 110,453 103,470 110,453 103,470 110,453 103,470 110,453 103,470 110,453 103,470
R-squared 0.018 0.05 0.018 0.05 0.018 0.05 0.018 0.05 0.018 0.05 0.017 0.05
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01
Controls: year, 2-digit NACE industries, size category (indicator variables for Micro, Small, Medium
and Large), leverage, age and age2
Table 5.3: Further evidence: the dependency relationship with LP and job growth by different related
variables and alternative specifications. The first two regressions are fixing firm and owner - as opposed
to fixing only the firm (columns 1-2). The other regressions analyze what happens when firm becomes
a foreign affiliate (columns 3-4), is involved in M&A (columns 5-6), owner changes (columns 7-8), firm
becomes a mother (columns 9-10), or firm becomes an affiliate (columns 11-12).
In Table 5.3 above, once I fix the firm and main owner, the relationship with dependency is positive
with labor productivity and negative with job growth (columns 1 and 2), both quantitatively stronger
than in the case where the main owner is not fixed. Fixing firm, foreign ownership has a negative
coefficient in job growth regression, but does not have a statistically significant coefficient in LP
regressions (columns 3 and 4). Merger has a positive relationship with job growth, and we do not
observe a significant relationship with LP (columns 5 and 6). In columns 9-12 the negative correlation
on growth rate is significant only if the firm becomes an affiliate, and we do not obtain statistically
significant coefficients if mothers and affiliates are separated. This result indicates that the job creation
dynamics are mostly driven by the instances where the firm becomes a part of a group as an affiliate.
5.3.3 More controls
I go a step further to clarify the impact on productivity and try to make sure the results are not
plagued by omitted variables bias. I add multiple productivity related controls to the baseline set, and
then try to abstract from the effects of higher quality managers (CEO) and the effect of ownership
structure, by fixing firm-CEO, firm-main owner-CEO. By fixing CEO and owner we can also abstract
from the endogenous matching effects.
The literature has discussed several aspects that can be related to productivity (see, e.g. Syverson,
2011 for a survey). I control for size of the business group by summing up the observed domestic
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employment8, I also include CEO salaries, CEO tenure, CEO age, HHI ownership concentration index,
average salaries, market share, and the interactions of year and 2-digit NACE codes. This set of
controls should account for improved management quality, labor input quality, ownership structures
and for the bias arising from unobserved prices. As we have seen, the improved productivity levels are
mainly associated with small services firms (which are more labor intensive), and therefore wage levels
and employee quality should be an important part of the explanation. Although salaries in particular
suffer from the issue of reverse causality (see, e.g.Van Reenen (1996)), it will serve as a tight controlling
variable in our case.
Dep Var LP LP LP LP LP LP LP LP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent 823.3 597 1,206 1,284 1,339 1,174 1,553 1,666
(1.45) (0.96) (2.15)** (2.03)** (2.03)** (1.59) (2.01)** (1.93)*
Fixed Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm-CEO Firm-CEO Firm-CEO-Owner Firm-CEO-Owner
Controls YES YES no wages no wages YES YES YES YES
Obs 555,406 512,942 555,418 512,954 555,406 512,942 555,406 512,942
Groups 109,499 105,844 109,500 105,845 209,064 196,807 237,159 222,479
R-squared 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.065 0.08
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01
Controls: Year, leverage, firm age, firm age squared, size categories, NACE2, CEO salaries, CEO
tenure, CEO age, HHI ownership concentration index, average salaries, market share, interactions of
year*NACE2
Table 5.4: Further controls and fixed effects: Dependent variable is always LP. I fix first only the firm
(1-4), then firm-CEO (5-6), and then firm-CEO-main owner (7-8). I add a large set of controls that
can potentially explain productivity. In columns 3 and 4 I drop wages as controls. In columns 2, 4, 6
and 8 I exclude multiplant firms in order to conduct a very strict tests, controlling for the possibility
of shocks spilling over from firm’s other industries.
In the above Table 5.4, regressions in columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 exclude multiplant firms in order to
make sure that shocks spilling over from other industries of the firm do not affect our results. Columns
1 and 2 describes the regression fixing the firm only, and using the full set of controls as explained above.
We see that the treatment is not significant, and this can be explained by the inclusion of wage levels
of employees, as seen from columns 3 and 4 which yield positive significant coefficients in a regression
where firm is fixed and average wages are removed from the set of controls. The confounding effect of
wage structures is not surprising given that large part of the positive relation of LP and dependencies
comes from small (services) firms, which should be more labor intensive. It is fairly obvious that
the reverse causality is a problem, and wage bill can simply increase due to higher margins that are
distributed to employees. Nevertheless, wages are a good control for the quality of the workforce.
Business group may impose human resource policies that lead to changes in employees (including the
CEO) and invest in new higher skilled employees. We can try to abstract from some of the changes in
personnel that happen in the firm by fixing its key members, such as the CEO and main owner. Fixing
firm-CEO, and including the full set of controls in columns 5 and 6, the coefficient is significant in 5,
8we don’t observe the foreign parts
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and its size is similar than in the main results (Table 5.1). Fixing firm-CEO-owner yields significant
coefficients, and their size are even slightly larger than in Table 5.1. The test we perform in 8 is very
demanding also in terms of controlling for factors outside the firm. If I estimate regressions where the
key members of the firm are not allowed to change, I am unable to find productivity related observables
that have the capacity to confound the impact of dependency on productivity increase9.
The evidence seems to imply that in the Finnish data, where the business group membership have
a positive association with small services firms, an important mechanism works through changes in
human resource policies, but many simultaneous dynamics do occur, as we are going to see next.
Overall, using a large set of productivity related controls on employees, owners, firm, group,
demand shocks, and ability to set prices, business group membership has a positive relationship with
productivity for each firm-CEO pairs and each firm-CEO-owner in the sample.
5.4 Indicative evidence on mechanism
The different mechanisms for improving productivity at dependent firms are not well documented
in the empirical literature. However, several hypotheses can be drawn, based on prior literature on
productivity and size.
Various market selection models explain differential growth rates of small and large firms by the
uncertainty they face (the seminal paper is Jovanovic (1982)), where the basic intuition is that new
firms entering the market are not aware of their true "type", i.e. their competitiveness in relation to
the incumbent firms in the industry. The intuition is as follows: After entering, firms start receiving
information of their true ability from the realized earnings, and in the early post-entry years the
updating effect is stronger and leads to higher growth rates among survivors. This can be interpret
also in terms of experimentation processes (see e.g. Brynjolfsson et al., 2007, Hyytinen and Maliranta,
2013, and Gabler and Poschke, 2013), where firms deliberately expose themselves to productivity risk
in order to achieve higher levels of productivity, and this effect is stronger among young firms that
fight for survival. This is why I’m interested in a measure of risk after the firm becomes dependent.
Another important explanation of firm outcomes are financial constraints. In particular, because it
is costly to fire and hire employees, firms that are financially constrained cannot fire enough people
during bad times (see,e.g. Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2012). In terms of productivity, there is
an intuitive link with financial constraints. Firms that are constrained cannot organize production
optimally, because it is costly to invest in e.g. IT systems, machinery, or hire the most skilled individuals
(for empirical evidence of the link between financial constraints and productivity, see e.g. Ferrel et al.
(2016)).
It has been suggested that transfers of intangible resources, such as management practices and know-
how are an important part of the dynamics. Atalay et al. (2014) show with U.S. manufacturing data,
that firms do not transfer tangible resources particularly intensively, but rather intangible resources
9I have added cost of debt, sales volumes, share of high skilled staff, job turnover. I choose not to report those
because adding cost of debt or job turnover removes many observations, sales volume is already incorporated in value
added, and wage structure should incorporate the information on high skill share.
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are transferred in a vertically integrated structure. Bloom et al. (2016) finds that European affiliates
owned by American firms were able to benefit from more advanced IT systems and management
practices, thus leading to improved productivity levels. Exploring the employment data, I assess
whether dependency status change is associated with changes in CEO and other executives, which
would be a straightforward way to implement new policies at the firm.
In the spirit of the property rights approach to firm boundaries (see, e.g. Hart and Holmström,
2010), another way that a firm may become more productive is that fewer executives are needed to
run it, and that higher quality managers are now responsible for more productive assets. This is why I
look at number of executives and their salaries. I posit that CEO salary should be related to CEO
quality in a competitive labor market. The impact of CEO quality on firm outcomes is also a topic of
large literature (e.g. Bertrand and Schoar (2003)).
Furthermore, if the explanation on financial constraints affecting the ability to fire and hire is
correct, we should observe an increase in job turnover after the treatment. Job turnover may also
play an important part in productivity, if the firm is able to hire new skills to replace old redundant
ones. Related to this, I also look at investments in skills, such as the proportion of wages paid out
to high-skilled staff, and changes in wage structures more generally. In a competitive labor market,
higher salaries would imply more productive and more skilled workforce (Abowd et al., 2005 and Fox
and Smeets, 2011).
We inspect these variables within firms by looking at post-treatment years. The within regression
is specified as
yi,t+1 = –i + —Ti,t +X
Õ
i,t“ + µt + Ái,t, (5.5)
where yi,t+1 is the lead of the dependent variable, in order to make sure that the potential policy
change occurs after the treatment. I regress 1) standard deviation of sales, measured from monthly
turnovers and averaged over the year, 2) cost of debt, measured as interest payments over external
capital, 3) Dummy indicating a change of CEO, 4) CEO salary, 5) number of executives working at
the firm, 6) average salary of the executives, 7) share of wages paid out to skilled staff, 8) job turnover,
defined as (number of job terminations / average workforce)*100, 9) job turnover is also inspected with
an interaction term coinciding with a particularly interesting year, 2009, when the Finnish economy
experienced a dramatic fall, making financial constraints more binding, 10) average salary in the firm.
103
Dep Var ‡sales Cost debt Change CEO CEO salary Executives Salary exe Skilled Job Turnover Job Turnover Salary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent -0.60 -0.0007 0.04 4,968 -0.25 15,952 0.01 2.22 2.17 1,256
(-3.37)*** (-5.03)*** (5.63)*** (6.47)*** (-5.44)*** (1.92)* (3.92)*** (6.28)*** (6.12)*** (4.95)***
Dependent *Crisis (2009) 0.66
(2.53)***
Fixed Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Obs 424,006 443,715 443,715 443,715 443,715 177,563 443,715 384,985 384,985 443,712
Groups 86,675 90,761 90,761 90,761 90,761 44,757 90,761 85,119 85,119 90,761
R-squared 0.01 0.94 0.001 0.01 0.004 0.004 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.011
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01
Controls: year, 2-digit NACE industries, size category (indicator variables for Micro, Small, Medium
and Large), leverage, age and age2
Table 5.5: Indicative mechanisms: Dependent variables are leads of standard deviation of sales (col.
1), cost of debt (col. 2), dummy indicating a change of CEO (col. 3), CEO salary (col. 4), number of
executives (col. 5), average salary of executive (col. 6), share of salary by skilled workers (col. 7), job
turnover (col. 8-9), and average salary (col. 10). Treatment is 1 if firm is part of a business group, and
I add interaction with crisis year (2009) in a regression 9 with job turnover as the dependent variable.
We observe interesting dynamics that take place after the treatment in Table 5.5. In column 1
we see that the impact on standard deviation of sales is negative, indicating that the risk levels of
the firm goes down. This finding is consistent with the market selection or experimentation process
explanations where the risk levels, or uncertainty is a key element in explaining growth. The results in
column 2 indicates that the cost of debt goes down, pointing towards the fact that financial constraints
should be less binding for the dependent firm. Column 3 shows, that the probability of CEO change
increases and column 4 shows, that the salary of CEO goes up. These two observations together form
an important channel by which the mother firm can influence the decision-making in the affiliated
firm. The new CEO is appointed to implement new policies, and the new CEO might be of a better
quality than the previous one, which is evidenced by the salary increase. Columns 5 and 6 show that
the number of executive positions goes down, while the average executive salary increases. The firm
may benefit from the better management practices and managers of the mother firm, thus allowing
gains in productivity. Column 7 documents increased investments in skilled staff and this might help
firm to become more productive. Columns 8 and 9 show that the job turnover rates increase, and
that job turnover increases relatively more if dependency status was changed during the crisis year of
2009. This finding is consistent with the idea that financial constraints prevent especially small firms
from adjusting labor input optimally during economic downturns. While the management literature
usually has found that job turnover has a negative impact on productivity (see, e.g. Hancock et al.,
2013), it might be an important element of the creative destruction process (e.g. Aghion and Howitt,
2009) and especially so if the firm is able to replace low productivity positions with higher productivity
ones. This is evidenced in column 10, which shows that the average salary is positively affected by
the dependency status change. Overall, we document changes in risk levels, cost of debt, changes
in key management positions and changes in human resources policies of the firm that are related
to productivity and job creation dynamics. The results are similar, if we consider these dependent
variables contemporaneously.
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The most obvious advantage of the group structure is the possibility to shift financial resources
among members. In those instances, the firm should report these as a separate items in the balance
sheet. The group can extend either loans, or provide direct transfers (called "concern aid"). Direct
transfers can be useful in order to minimize taxes (receiver records these transfers as part of income,
and donor gets to deduct these from the final result, thus reducing the overall taxable amount if the
receiver is running losses). We obtain these two items for our treated firms, and compute concern
aid/turnover, and enterprise group debt/ external capital, after the treatment has occurred. The
following table provides a t-test to show that these amounts are not negligible for the treated firms
after dependency status change.
Concern aid/turnover enterprise group debt/ external capital
Mean 0.0019 0.129
t-statistic (2.6) ∗ ∗∗ (71.47) ∗ ∗∗
Note: H0=0.
úp<0.1; úúp<0.05; úúúp<0.01
Table 5.6: Financial transfers: t-test with null hypothesis: concern aid=0 or enterprise group debt
over total debt = 0
In our sample of treated firms, direct transfers amount to 0.19% of turnover, and enterprise group
debt is around 13% of the total debt, as seen from Table 5.6. It seems that the lending mechanism is
quantitatively quite important. This points towards gains in terms of diversification, which reduces
the overall risk levels, and it may allow the mother firm to negotiate better interests on behalf of the
group members.
While interesting in terms of showing the micro level dynamics within firms, the results in this
subsection are not enough to document the aggregate effects of dependencies. The aggregate effects
are important in order to see if these dynamics have persistent and sizable economic effect.
5.5 Aggregate productivity contributions of dependent small
firms
This section is based on Fornaro and Luomaranta (2017)
Fornaro and Luomaranta (2017) uses a productivity growth decomposition model to reveal evidence
of dependent and independent small companies’ contribution to the aggregate productivity growth
dynamics, explaining how dependent small firms can positively contribute to the economic outcomes.
The idea of the model is to decompose productivity growth into its micro-level components by firm
categories. The components of interest are: 1) within (productivity growth of an average employee
within the firm), 2) between (productivity growth due to reshuffling of labor inputs between firms in the
105
category), 3) exit (contribution to productivity by the exiting firms, which is positive if exiting firms
have lower than average productivity) and 4) entering (which is negative if the entering firms have lower
productivity than the average incumbent). The cross terms are a residual terms meant as a corrective
measure to force the different components to add up to the industry totals (see Maliranta, 2003 for a
thorough discussion of the model). The following table describes the contribution of dependent small
firms to the aggregate outcomes in the light of the adopted decomposition model. Notice that the right
hand side of the table includes normalized components (taking into account the labor input share),
and the left hand side includes the absolute components.
Absolute Components Normalized Components
Prod. Within Between Entry Exit Cross terms Prod. Within Between Entry Exit Cross Terms
Micro
Dependent 0.13 0.047 0.003 0.06 −0.034 0.04 10.9 4.18 0.30 5.01 −2.73 4.12
Independent 0.34 0.48 0.056 −1.00 0.94 −0.14 2.59 3.61 0.42 −6.52 6.11 −1.02
Small
Dependent 0.62 0.21 0.08 0.15 −0.01 0.17 7.62 2.71 1.06 1.85 −0.22 2.22
Independent 0.63 1.04 0.01 −1.54 1.46 −0.35 2.28 3.73 0.07 −5.09 4.84 −1.26
SME
Dependent 1.39 0.64 0.14 0.15 0.08 0.35 5.81 2.72 0.61 0.63 0.37 1.45
Independent 0.56 1.14 −0.03 −1.75 1.61 −0.42 1.79 3.56 −0.10 −5.05 4.68 −1.30
Table 5.7: Adopted from Fornaro and Luomaranta (2017): Contributions of dependent and independent
SMEs to the productivity of the business economy (2002-2014). Results are in real terms and are
reported in percentage points.
The findings in Table 5.7 indicate that in absolute terms, dependent micro and small firms have
lower productivity contributions than the independent firms in those categories, but dependent firms
have larger contribution if also the medium category is included. Dependent firms in all the size
categories have larger productivity contributions if we look at normalized components, where the labor
input shares are taken into account. Among dependent SMEs, it is the micro firms that create the
largest normalized productivity contribution. This pattern emerges because there are much more
independent small and micro businesses. However, in the SME category as a whole, it is indeed the
firms in business groups that provide most of the productivity contribution. The dependent SMEs are
responsible for almost 3 times more of the aggregate productivity growth. Another interesting pattern
emerges: the between component of dependent firms is much higher than the one of independent
firms. This means that the more productive firms receive more labor inputs, and less productive firms
receive less labor inputs. This can be interpret as the creative destruction component. Also, the
entering and exiting dependent firms have an opposite impacts as one would normally expect. The
dependent entries have immediate positive effect on productivity (entering firms are more productive
than incumbents). The opposite is usually true for independent businesses. Overall, there is a strong
presence of dependent SMEs, and their contribution to aggregate SME productivity is substantial.
This is why more detailed (industries, and individual groups) studies are still needed for assessing how
business groups contribute to the business renewal and competitiveness.
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5.6 Conclusions
In this work, I contribute to literature on the role of enterprise groups in the economy by analyzing
job creation and productivity dynamics of firms joining/leaving business groups. I find that business
group dependency has heterogenous implications, depending on size and industry.
Small firms that become dependent of a business group, experience a notable increase in productivity
and a decrease in job creation. I provide suggestive evidence of mechanisms that can explain these
results. First of all, the risk levels go down. In the light of experimentation process or market selection
mechanisms, this might have a negative relationship with growth. Second, the cost of borrowing
goes down, giving support to the explanation that credit constraints are alleviated. This has been
proposed as one mechanism by which small firms have different growth patterns (e.g. Moscarini and
Postel-Vinay, 2012). Finally, and importantly, we observe a number of changes in firm employees.
Notably, the CEO is likely to change, number of managers is reduced, job turnover increased, and
there is an increased investments in high-skilled staff. If firm is fixed, adding average wages as control
renders the statistical relationship with productivity insignificant. Abstracting from changes in CEO
and owner by fixing Firm, CEO and owner, and adding average wages as control, yields significant and
large coefficients explaining the relationship between labor productivity and dependency. These results
would indicate that the human resource policies (by changing the key members of the firm) are an
important reason behind the obtained results.
If we keep the key members of the firm fixed, dependency status change has significant positive
(unexplained) impact on productivity. This result is obtained by using a large set of productivity
related controls on industries, employee quality, ownership structure, firm characteristics, group size,
possible demand shocks, and ability to set prices.
The findings can be taken together with the observations in Fornaro and Luomaranta (2017) where
the small dependent firms drive productivity of SMEs. It seems that business groups have a significant
role in improving aggregate productivity through ownership relationships. In addition, group structures
is an important channel by which the small and large firms are interlinked, besides the input-output
networks.
One may draw conflicting policy implications. The support of new start-ups as providers of new
jobs might be justified, but if the policy goal is to improve productivity, then the ability to promote
activities and ownership of business groups can be an advantage.
The analysis conducted in this paper can be extended in many ways. First of all, one can examine
different aspects of dependent and independent SMEs. For example, the dependency status as a
binary variable hides potentially interesting dynamics in relation to the entire ownership or production
network, such as the channels by which the headquarters direct investments inside the firm. Moreover,
an interesting direction of research is to analyze the aspects of allocative efficiency of business groups’
internal markets, versus that of external markets. Finally, more industry specific investigation is
warranted in order to see why service firms become more productive in a group.
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5.7 Appendix A: Data description
Variable Firm-years Mean Std. Dev.
LP 566,266 53,695 41,844
log LP 550,336 10.75 0.539
CEO changes 566,266 0.36 0.47
Owner changes 566,266 0.08 0.28
Mergers 566,266 0.005 0.07
Dependent 566,266 0.12 0.33
Foreign affiliate 566,266 0.026 0.159
Mother 566,266 0.041 0.199
Affiliate 566,266 0.085 0.279
Employees 566,266 16.957 150.756
Firm age 566,266 14.589 12.606
Firm age2 566,266 371.7 780.3
HHI ownership 566,266 5,484 3,656
Job growth 535,442 0.39 1.58
Leverage (D/E) 566,260 77,016 471,247
STD. sales 515,306 33.266 15.837
Cost capital 566,266 0.0217 0.025
Change CEO 566,266 0.238 0.426
Average salary 566,253 32,002 19,554
Average Salary Exec 210,219 55,371 37,578
CEO salary 566,266 48,334 58,307
CEO tenure 555,431 7.04 6.74
CEO age 566,266 44.68 10.33
Firm executives 566,266 1.012 11.009
Salary executives 210,219 199,097 1,870,860
High-skill share 566,266 0.120 0.261
Employment turnover 406,079 5.400 22.351
Micro 566,266 0.78 0.42
Small 566,266 0.18 0.39
Medium 566,266 0.03 0.18
Large 566,266 0.008 0.09
Services 566,266 0.64 0.47
Mkt Share (%) 563,303 0.1 1.26
Group Debt 565,461 0.03 0.13
Group transfers 566,253 0.007 2.2
Table 5.8: Descriptive statistics of all the variables that appear in the analysis
Our sample consists of mostly small firms, as can be seen from Table 5.9 below:
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Firm-year Employees LP job growth rate
Large 4, 691 850.9 70, 889 0.03
Medium 19, 066 99.6 63, 051 0.08
Small 103, 364 20.3 56, 612 0.20
Micro 439, 145 3.7 51, 289 0.45
Table 5.9: Average FTE, LP and job growth rates by firm-years divided into size categories. Size
classes are defined, in terms of FTEs, as: micro (<10), small (10-49), medium (50-249) and large
(>250).
Most of the variation in the dependency status (-1,0,+1) is from small firms in our within regressions.
-1 0 +1
Large 6 4, 022 21
Medium 108 15, 965 445
Small 344 87, 634 1, 663
Micro 366 343, 496 1, 743
Table 5.10: Dependency status change in firm-years divided into size categories. Size classes are defined,
in terms of FTEs, as: micro (<10), small (10-49), medium (50-249) and large (>250).
5.8 Appendix B: Adjustment for legal restructuring.
In this appendix, we discuss the details the procedure adopted by Statistics Finland to control for
merger and split-offs in a set of enterprises. Assume that firm 1 is examined after an event (merger
or split-off) where N firms are involved. Then the estimated employment of firm 1 one year ago is
calculated by:
emp(firm1,t≠12) =
emp(firm1,t) ∗ emp(firm1,t≠12, firm2,t≠12...firmN,t≠12)
emp(firm1,t, firm2,t...firmN,t)
where t is the time periods in which the adjustment is computed, and N is the number of firms involved
in a merger or split-off. The sum of the previous year employment levels in all the firms involved in
the event is divided for each continuing firm weighted by their relative size at present time t. Let us go
through some simple numerical examples to see how this works:
1. Assume a firm A with 2 employees in period t, that had 1 employee in t-12. Firm A acquires
firm B with 1 employee at time t, m and 1 employee one year ago. Firm A, which continues
existing, will be assigned a new estimated number of employees for the comparison year, in order
to make the growth rates comparable year-on-year. The comparison values of firm A is estimated
as 2(1+1)(2+1) = 4/3, and the rate of change for A becomes (2 + 1)/(4/3) = 2.25 (as opposed to 3 if
no correction is done)
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2. Consider the situation where firm A is split into smaller units, say B and C. A has 3 employees
at time t− 12, B has 3 employees at t and C has 2 workers at t. B and C did not exist at t− 12,
so their comparison values become: (3/3)3 = 3 and (2/3)3 = 2, resulting in the rate of change
for B and C to be 3/3 and 2/2 (equal to 1 for both firms). The growth rate is forced to be the
same among the continuing firms after a split-off.
5.9 Appendix C: Identifying the CEO
We are interested in identifying the CEO in each firm, interpreted as the person who has control on
the firm’s operations. We employ the following sequential procedure, as e.g. in Queiró (2016). First,
we identify a person as the CEO if he or she is explicitly defined as such among the list of employees.
This is the case for 7% of the firms. For the remaining firms, we consider those employees identified
as having managerial responsibilities, and say that the CEO is the manager with the highest salary.
This identifies an additional 30% of the CEOs. For the remaining firms, we look at whether an active
entrepreneur (as classified by the tax administration) appears in the list of employees, in which case
the person is identified as the CEO.10 This is the case for 23% of our CEOs. The remaining 41% of
the CEOs are defined as the highest paid worker in the firm. As a validation test, we notice that 86%
of the CEOs explicitly defined as such (our first criterion) also have the highest salary in the firm.
10The tax administration identifies an active entrepreneur in a firm if a person owns at least 30% of the shares and
receives a significant income from the firm (at least 9,663 euros in 2006).
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Job Creation and the Role of
Dependencies
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Abstract
We contribute to the extensive literature on the relationship between firm size and job creation, by examining
dependencies between enterprises. Using Finnish monthly data encompassing the population of Finnish private
businesses, we calculate the gross job creation and destruction, together with the net job creation, for different
size classes and industries. Importantly, we divide firms into a dependent (i.e. owned, at least partially,
by a large company) and independent category. Due to the quality of the data, we are able to isolate the
’organic’ growth of firms, disregarding the effects of mergers, split-offs and other legal restructuring. We
find that independent companies have shown a considerably higher net job creation, regardless of their size
class. However, dependent firms do not show particularly different behaviors with respect to the sensitivity
to aggregate conditions, compared to their independent counterparts. Once we control for age, we find that
independent firms generate more (net) jobs during the early years of their existence but destroy more jobs once
they become older.
JEL Classifcation Code: D22, E24, E32, L25
Keywords: dependencies; firm size; firm age; employment creation
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6.1 Introduction
The relationship between employment generation and firm’s size has been the focus of extensive
research. Since the seminal article of Birch (1981), there has been a lot of discussion about whether
small firms are the main force underlying employment growth. This view has been the center of
political debate, where public support to small businesses has been advocated in the light of their large
growth enhancing capabilities. However, the original insights by Birch have been contested in multiple
empirical works, which have pointed out issues underlying the data and the methodology adopted. For
example, Davis et al. (1996) argue that the procedure that Birch (1981) uses to classify a firm as small
or large (i.e. using the base year on which the growth rate is computed) leads to an overestimation of
the job creation stemmed from smaller businesses. Subsequent works studying the effects of firms’ size
and job creation are, among many others, Davis et al. (1996) and Neumark et al. (2011). In these
papers it has been found that, after adjusting for the statistical biases of Birch (1981), small firms do
not create more net jobs compared to large ones, or at least not in such a dramatic way as found in
Birch’s work. For the Finnish economy, there has been a number of studies where the relation between
firm sizes and net job flows is examined. Some examples of these analyses comprise Hohti (2000),
Ilmakunnas and Maliranta (2003) and, more recently, Wit and Kok (2014) and Anyadike-Danes et al.
(2015).
The enterprise size has not been the only firm’s characteristic analyzed in regards to employment
creation. Another important feature that has been considered as a contributing factor to net job
growth is firm’s age. A key study in this respect is Haltiwanger et al. (2013), where the authors show
that once we control for firm’s age, small and large firms do not show discrepancies in net job creation.
Other studies which are interested in the effect of the firms’ age on job creation are Criscuolo et al.
(2014), Distante et al. (2014) and Anyadike-Danes et al. (2015). The common finding of these studies
is that young firms are the main drivers of job creation, with start-ups being especially important.
In this paper, we investigate another possible source of heterogeneity among firms which might affect
job growth, i.e. external ownership and dependence. In particular, we look at how firms belonging to
an enterprise group contribute to the employment generation (both gross and net), within different
size classes. Large corporations are a key player in modern economies, accounting for a large share
of aggregate output and potentially have substantial effects on the business cycle (see, e.g., Gabaix,
2011). However, as pointed out in the previous literature, large firms are usually associated with
lower job creation compared to small enterprises. The fact that previous analyses do not separate
dependent and independent enterprises might be a decisive factor behind these results. In a recent
Eurostat report (Airaksinen et al., 2015), the share of dependent firms’ employment within the small
and medium enterprises (SME) category is documented to be substantial in several European countries,
including Finland. This consideration casts doubt on many previous conclusions in the small versus
large literature, where the SME status is systematically defined by the number of employees only,
regardless of the ownership structure. For example, the statistical result that small firms tend to
create more jobs, on average, could stem from large firms investing through affiliates. Even in the
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case of looser control, it is arguable the employment generation of small dependent enterprises could
be impacted by the decisions of the mother company. If dependent, small firms are behind the large
job creation rates of SMEs, then the narrative of small businesses being the driver of employment
generation should actually be interpreted in the light of large corporations creating jobs through
subsidiaries.
The contribution to job creation by dependent and independent enterprises has not been studied
extensively in the literature. A notable exception is Boccara (1997), where the author examines the
job growth stemmed from small and medium firms belonging to enterprise groups in France during
the 1984-1992 period, finding that the small firms belonging to large business groups exhibit higher
job creation. Another work which touches the issue of dependencies and employment growth is the
OECD report Schreyer (2000), in which the author discusses possible economic channels behind
the relationship. Small firms might have multiple benefits from belonging to a large corporation.
Subsidiaries owned (even partly) by a large company might have a better access to financing (both
internal and external), together with more informal advantages such as access to a wider human capital
and information related to market conditions and technology. However, there are possible channels
leading to a negative impact of dependencies onto job creation. Large firms could consider their small
subsidiaries as a small part of the production chain, which must perform a well defined and limited
amount of tasks, without the need to grow in size.
We use monthly employment data of Finnish firms to study how the dependence to large companies
affect the job creation (both gross and net) of enterprises, controlling for size and age. The data,
extracted from the Statistics Finland database, allows us to verify if an enterprise belongs to a business
group and how large is the share of the firm owned by the mother company, giving us the possibility
to disentangle control from more informal dependencies and networks. The employment figures are
adjusted to represent the "organic" growth of the firms, disregarding the effects of merger, split-offs
and other legal restructuring. In addition, we examine the possible heterogeneity between the different
industries of the economy (e.g. manufacturing and services), which might have an impact on how
belonging to an enterprise group affects the job creation of a company. For example, it is likely that in
the service industry, where human capital plays a larger role, firms benefits more from dependencies
and connections than in, e.g., constructions. Finally, we analyze how dependent and independent
enterprises respond to different aggregate economic conditions. In particular, we examine the job flows
of firms with different ownership structures during periods of economic expansion (which we identify
as periods in which monthly output is above trend) and economic downturns (output below trend).
We find that small, medium and micro independent firms have experienced consistently higher
growth rates compared to their dependent counterparts, regardless of the size classification methodology
and size class considered. Once we control for age, we find that young independent firms have generated
more jobs compared to their dependent counterparts, but this relationship is reversed for older
companies. This pattern can be explained by the fact that young independent firms are more uncertain
about their productivity potential, causing them to create more jobs during the early stages of their life
and subsequently destroy more jobs when they get older. We also find that the effect of dependencies
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is not unique across industries. In particular, while dependent firms exhibit lower job creation rates
inside the trade, services and construction industries, the negative effect of dependencies disappears or
reverts in the manufacturing and financial sectors. Finally, we do not find a clear effect of dependencies
onto the sensitivity to the business cycle for small and medium firms.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 6.2 we introduce the main
methodological issues underlying the analysis, in Section 6.3 we briefly describe the data and in Section
6.4 we present the results. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 Methodological issues
The analysis of job creation and its relation with the firm size is highly sensitive to the data source
and the methodology adopted. For example, the criterion to determine if a given enterprise should be
included in the small or large size class is not uniform over the literature and using different selection
procedures can yield very different results. In the work of Birch (1981), firms are included in the small
class if the number of employees during the base year of the job growth calculation is below a threshold.
This criterion, as argued by Davis et al. (1996) among others, can lead to a serious overestimation
of the job creation stemmed from smaller businesses. In particular, using the base year to classify a
firm will cause the inclusion of many enterprises affected by temporary negative shocks in the small
class (this phenomenon is addressed in the literature as the regression to the mean bias). Neumark
et al. (2011) find that, using the base year classification of Birch (1981), small firms are generating a
substantially larger share of employment compared to big enterprises. However, when they use the
firms’ average size to classify them, the gap between the job creation of small and large businesses
shrinks substantially.
In this analysis, we use two size classification methodologies. The first one is the dynamic size
classification method: enterprises are classified each year, using the average size between the two
years on which the growth is computed. The number of full time equivalents (FTE) obtained is then
compared to the cutoff points used by Statistics Finland to determine the size class of a company. As
discussed in papers such as Davis et al. (1996) and Haltiwanger et al. (2013), this type of classification
is robust to the regression to the mean bias. However, allowing companies to change size class over
time tends to exacerbate the sensitivity of small enterprises to the business cycle. As discussed in
Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012), during times of economic hardship we can expect firms to move to
the small category and vice versa during expansions.
The second size classification criterion we use is called average size classification and it is based on
the average number of employees (full time equivalents in our case) computed over the existence of
the firm. As in the case of the dynamic classification, this methodology is robust to the regression
to the mean bias. However, contrary to the dynamic classification, this methodology does not suffer
from procyclicality issues. One problem with the average size classification is that it relies on the
assumption that firms reach a long-term scale of operations during their lifespan, implying that the
process underlying a firm’s size is stationary.
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The key measures of the analysis reported in Section 6.4 are the gross job creation, gross job
destruction and net job growth. The gross job creation is defined as the sum of positive changes in
the number of FTEs within a certain firm category, i.e. we have jct =
qN
i dE
+
it where dE
+
it are the
positive changes in employment between time t and t− 12 and which are then summed over the N
firms belonging to a certain class. Job destruction is defined as jdt =
qN
i |dE
≠
it |, with dE
≠
it being
the negative change in the number of FTEs for company i. Importantly, we use the adjusted values
for the FTEs in the base year, to control for mergers and acquisitions (details on the methodology
are provided in the Appendix) and to obtain a measure of the organic growth of a firm. The net
job creation is defined as the difference between gross job creation and job destruction. Finally, we
compute two measures of net job creation rate. The first one is used to compute the contribution
to the overall creation of jobs in the economy due to a category of companies. Denoting the net job
creation at time t for category C as NJCt,C , we compute
NJCR1t,C =
NJCt,C
(1/2Et + 1/2Et≠1),
(6.1)
where Et is total employment. The denominator in (6.1) is suggested throughout the literature (e.g.
Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2012) because it is more robust the regression to the mean bias. Another
interesting measure is
NJCR2t,C =
NJCt,C
(1/2Et,C + 1/2Et≠1,C),
(6.2)
where Et,C indicates the total number of employees in category C, making (6.2) an indicator of how a
certain category is growing over time.
A final issue worth discussing in this section is the role of firms’ age. As pointed out in Haltiwanger
et al. (2013), the age of a company is a key determinant in explaining its job creation. In particular
they show that, after controlling for age, there is no clear difference in the net job creation rate of small
and larger companies. To make sure that our results are not driven by the longevity of the firms we
examine, we consider a subset of companies which are present throughout our sample period. Moreover,
we analyze the impact of dependencies onto job creation while separating SMEs into different age
categories.
6.3 Data Description
The data is extracted and anonymized at the premises of Statistics Finland, the Finnish national
statistical agency, from the short term business statistics dataset (which is used internally to produce
aggregate indexes). The data contains monthly observations of persons employed (as full time
equivalents, FTEs) for the entire business sector, excluding public sector and primary producers.
Thus, we analyze the employment generation patterns of enterprises that are active in the business
economy. The analyzed enterprises are classified by Statistics Finland into broad activity categories
based on the classification of economic activities system in the EU (NACE Rev. 2). In order to
control for heterogeneities arising from the different activity categories, we group the enterprises into
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manufacturing, construction, trade, services and finance industries.
The Finnish Business register contains information on ownership links between the enterprises that
belong to a group. Furthermore, the register holds information on the nationality of the enterprise
group, and thus the Statistics agency is able to distinguish between foreign and domestically owned
enterprise groups. By linking these data sources at micro-level, we are able to pinpoint whether at any
given time an enterprise is "independent" (no enterprise group links), "dependent" (the enterprise is at
least partly owned by a mother company, or the enterprise is a mother company itself), "controlled"
(the mother company owns over 50% of the enterprise), or "foreign controlled" (the enterprise group
head is foreign, and its ownership exceeds 50%). After applying these classifications to the enterprises,
we use two sets of data. The first sample includes monthly observations of employment destruction
and creation for all the enterprises that are active at any given month between January 1998 and
September 2014, and the second sample includes employment creation and destruction of only those
enterprises that are present for the full sample period, thus excluding entries and exits. Net job creation
computation are based on adjusted FTEs, where the effects of mergers and split-offs are eliminated by
the methodology of Statistics Finland. For the foreign controlled enterprises, the data is available only
from January 2007 onward and hence is analyzed in a separate subsection.
The sample including entries and exits contains 253,685 enterprises in September 2014 and 234,257
enterprises in January 1998. The sample where only long lasting enterprises are included contains
70,356 enterprises. The following tables provide the number of enterprises in each of the analyzed
categories by industry (Table 6.1) and size category (Table 6.2) in 09/2014 for both samples, in order
to characterize the data and the Finnish business economy.
Manufacturing Construction Trade Services Finance
Full sample
Independent 20, 716 37, 565 41, 813 124, 439 2, 021
Dependent 2, 541 804 2, 543 6, 216 631
Controlled 2, 340 758 2,438 5,532 597
Foreign controlled 543 87 1,023 937 141
Long lasting enterprises
Independent 7, 952 8, 104 12, 902 29, 910 338
Dependent 1, 307 339 1, 299 2, 035 195
Controlled 1, 230 320 1, 270 1, 855 186
Foreign controlled 246 22 505 307 42
Table 6.1: Number of enterprises in September 2014, divided by industry and dependency status.
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Micro Small Medium Large
Full sample
Independent 216, 093 9, 634 775 52
Dependent 6, 643 3, 816 1, 727 549
Controlled 5, 840 3, 611 1, 672 542
Foreign controlled 1, 110 918 500 203
Long lasting enterprises
Independent 54, 041 4, 728 400 37
Dependent 2, 163 1, 862 855 287
Controlled 1, 963 1, 783 832 283
Foreign controlled 313 448 261 100
Table 6.2: Number of enterprises in September 2014, divided by size class and dependency status.
While the figures reported in Table 6.1 point toward dependent firms being a small share of
the overall population of enterprises, Table 6.2 provides key information to motivate this analysis.
The number of dependent medium-sized and small enterprises represents a large share of the total,
highlighting the fact that disregarding the possible links between larger companies and subsidiaries
might bias the results for two important size class of firms such as the small and medium enterprises.
6.4 Results
We start our empirical analysis by studying the relationship between firm size and the measures of
interest reported in Section 6.2. In this fashion, we can compare the Finnish setting with the findings
obtained in studies as, e.g. Davis et al. (1996) and Haltiwanger et al. (2013).
In particular, in Table 6.3, we report the total number of employees, the gross job creation and
destruction, together with net job creation, for large and SMEs (i.e. the category encompassing small,
medium and micro firms) companies. Moreover, we compare enterprises with different dependencies
status, even though we do not separate firms of different size class within the same dependency class.
We report results for both dynamic and average size classification and the results are expressed in
terms of FTEs.
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Total Number of Employees Gross Creation Destruction Net Job Creation
Average Size Classification
Large 495, 383 28, 465 43, 924 −15, 458
Medium 235, 594 21, 627 26, 558 −4, 930
Small 256, 658 34, 670 33, 554 1, 115
Micro 317,340 74, 912 69, 480 5, 431
Dependent 695,932 50,470 60,589 −10, 119
Control 678,087 48,344 58,826 −10, 482
Independent 609,046 109,205 112, 929 −3, 723
Dynamic Size Classification
Large 513,171 29, 137 42, 663 −13,526
Medium 230, 965 21, 051 27, 377 −6,325
Small 254, 768 33, 466 33, 596 −130
Micro 306, 072 76, 020 69, 881 6, 139
Dependent 695,932 50,470 60,589 −10, 119
Control 678,087 48,344 58,826 −10, 482
Independent 609,046 109,205 112, 929 −3, 723
Table 6.3: Average number of total number of employees, gross creation, destruction and net job
creation. Enterprises are divided by size class and dependency status. All values reported are FTEs.
The figures reported in Table 6.3 are somewhat similar to what has been found in the literature.
Firms of smaller size exhibit large gross job creation and destruction, especially the enterprises in
the micro category. Independently from the size classification methodology, large firms are the most
important employer of the Finnish economy, considering the average number of FTEs between 1998
and 2014. At the same time, they have experienced the lowest net job creation, shredding on average
more than 10,000 jobs on a year-on-year basis. Micro enterprises, on the other hand, seem to be the
ones contributing the most to net job growth. This result holds regardless of the size classification
method, even though the net job creation of these enterprises is slightly smaller if we use the average
classification methodology. Interestingly, by using the dynamic size classification, micro firms are the
only ones generating positive net job creation.
From this very simple analysis, we can already draw some interesting conclusions regarding the
dependency effect on job creation. On average, dependent firms represent the majority of the population,
employing almost 100,000 employees more than the independent enterprises (but this is most likely
due to the presence of large mother companies). Moreover, the vast majority of employees within the
dependent firms class work in controlled enterprises. In other words, most dependent enterprises are
tightly controlled by their mother company (in terms of ownership). Independent firms, on the other
hand, have a much higher gross creation and destruction, together with the highest net job growth.
However, in Table 6.1 we are not separating the size effect and the dependency effect. For example, it
might be that very low net job creation of dependent firms is due to the fact that larger companies
are more likely to belong to this category and hence distort their actual contribution to job creation.
Below, we report similar figures for SMEs and considering different type of dependency.
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Total Number of Employees Gross Creation Destruction Net Job Creation
Average Size Classification
Medium Dependent 161, 656 13, 288 16, 513 −3, 224
Small Dependent 72, 757 8,665 9, 608 −942
Micro Dependent 16, 137 3,341 3, 378 −36
SMEs Dependent 250, 551 25,296 29, 500 −4, 203
Medium Controlled 155, 015 12, 594 15, 953 −3, 359
Small Controlled 67, 371 7, 937 9, 028 −1, 090
Micro Controlled 14, 223 2, 945 3, 028 −82
SMEs Controlled 236, 609 23, 477 28, 010 −4, 533
Medium Independent 73, 938 8,339 10, 045 −1, 706
Small Independent 183, 901 26, 004 23, 946 2, 058
Micro Independent 301, 202 71, 570 66, 102 5, 468
SMEs Independent 559, 042 105, 913 100, 093 5, 819
Dynamic Size Classification
Medium Dependent 152, 675 12, 970 16, 278 −3, 307
Small Dependent 67, 119 8, 308 9, 299 −991
Micro Dependent 14, 736 3, 253 3, 562 −309
SMEs Dependent 234, 531 24, 532 2, 9141 −4, 608
Medium Control 146, 267 12, 332 15, 746 −3, 414
Small Control 61, 856 7, 585 8, 749 −1, 164
Micro Control 12, 883 2, 816 3, 218 −401
SMEs Control 221, 007 22, 735 27, 715 −4, 979
Medium Independent 78, 289 8, 080 11, 098 −3, 017
Small Independent 187, 649 25, 158 24, 297 861
Micro Independent 291, 335 72, 767 66, 318 6, 449
SMEs Independent 557, 274 106, 006 101, 714 4, 292
Table 6.4: Average number of total number of employees, gross creation, destruction and net job
creation for small, medium and micro enterprises, divided by dependency status.
The results reported in Table 6.4 underline some substantial differences between dependent and
independent firms, with respect to employment creation and destruction. Within the small and medium
enterprises, independent firms represent the largest category, with more than the double the FTEs of
dependent companies. Moreover, independent firms have experienced a much larger gross job creation
and destruction, during our sample. Finally, companies which belong to the independent category
seem to be the main source of the positive net job creation observed for small and micro enterprises.
The channels underlying the effect of dependency on firms’ job creation does not have a clear
a priori positive or negative impact. On the one hand, we expect that small firms belonging to a
corporation benefits to the access of a large stock of human capital and knowledge which is likely to be
available to the mother company. Moreover, the subsidiary can benefit from participation to the formal
and informal networks of a large corporation, e.g. the ability to reach new clients and suppliers. These
benefits can lead to a better performance of the small company, which in turn can lead to an increase
in its size and hence to a larger job creation. On the other hand, a mother company can consider its
subsidiaries as small parts of its production process, which are highly specialized. For example, a large
mother company might be in charge of the administrative side of multiple subsidiaries, which would
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not require separate staff to handle managerial duties. In this way, the small enterprises belonging to a
large corporation would be organized in a way to achieve maximum productivity and hence they might
actually reduce the number of employees, leading to a lower job creation of dependent companies.
The findings outlined in this subsection point toward a negative impact of dependency onto
job growth, with small companies belonging to a corporation showing negative job creation. Small
dependent firms seem to be restricted to a specialized task and do not increase in size. The fact that
they have been shredding jobs can be interpreted as an attempt of their mother companies to achieve
high levels of productivity. Another possible explanation is that small dependent enterprises have been
dragged down by the poor performance of their large mother companies, which have been declining in
terms of job creation.
6.4.1 Dependencies and the role of age
Even though the results of Table 6.4 are extremely interesting in the light of showing the dependency
effect against the size effect in job creation, we should examine another factor that has been regarded
in the literature (see, e.g., Haltiwanger et al., 2013) as key in explaining the net job creation of different
types of enterprises, i.e. firm age. To address this issue, we use two different datasets containing
dependent and independent SMEs. The first dataset is the same adopted to obtain the results in Table
6.3 and 6.4 and considers entries and exits of firms, while the second one includes only continuous firms,
i.e. present throughout our sample. In this way, we compare companies which have been long lasting,
at least toward the end of the sample, and hence the effect of age should be milder. For example,
Haltiwanger et al. (2013) show that the effect of age on the job creation of firms of different size is
especially strong on start-up companies, while it reduces substantially for older enterprises.
In Table 6.5, we report the net job creation rates for dependent and independent medium, small
and micro firms, computed using (6.1) and (6.2). To keep the analysis contained, we consider the
results for the average size classification methodology only.
NJCR1% NJCR2% NJCR1% Continuous NJCR2% Continuous
Medium Dependent −0.23 −1.71 −0.03 0.04
Small Dependent −0.07 −1.04 −0.006 0.11
Micro Dependent −0.002 -0.45 −0.007 −0.74
SMEs Dependent −0.31 −1.39 −0.04 0.07
Medium Controlled −0.25 −1.85 −0.04 −0.05
Small Controlled −0.08 −1.52 −0.01 −0.12
Micro Controlled −0.006 −0.92 −0.006 −0.21
SMEs Controlled −0.33 −1.62 −0.06 −0.05
Medium Independent −0.12 −3.21 0.15 0.80
Small Independent 0.17 0.87 0.28 0.79
Micro Independent 0.43 2.07 0.19 0.46
SMEs Independent 0.47 0.97 0.63 0.64
Table 6.5: Net job growth rates for micro, small and medium sized enterprises, divided by dependency
status. Both the dataset with entries and exits and the one with long-lasting firms only are considered
and results are obtained using the average size classification.
120
The results included in Table 6.5 confirm the strong effect of dependencies on the net job creation
and the rate of growth of firms of different size class. Enterprises which depend or are controlled
by a mother company have lower job creation rates and seem to grow less. The effect is especially
pronounced for small and micro enterprises, while medium independent enterprises seem to have
a lower growth rate, with respect to their initial size (i.e. looking at NJCR2), compared to their
dependent counterparts. However, they have a larger net job creation with respect the overall number
of employees.
These considerations are not affected by shifting our focus to continuous enterprises. When we
consider more stable companies, the net job creation rates and the growth rates of dependent firms
become less negative or even turn positive. However, independent firms are still the ones that have
contributed the most to employment generation.
As additional robustness check, we look at the effect of dependencies on the net job creation rate
of SMEs of different age groups. We divide firms in "new" (0-1 year), "young" (2-5 years)," middle-age"
(6-10 years) and "old" (10 or more years) and compute their net job creation rates using both formula
(6.1) and (6.2). Notice that category "new" includes the very important entrant group, for which net
job creation corresponds to their gross job creation.
The age of a firm is based on the procedure adopted by Statistics Finland, i.e. by looking at
the age of the legal unit. This method is not flawless because a legal unit can be considered new if
it is the result of legal restructuring. As pointed out in Hyytinen and Maliranta (2013), using the
administrative age tends to make the firms look younger. Notice that we are interested in comparing
dependent and independent enterprises, so the problem is centered on how the administrative age of
dependent and independent firms is sensitive to this issue. It is arguable that young subsidiaries tend
to include older enterprises which are formed after restructuring. However, if there is no new legal unit
formed after the dependency status change, the age of the enterprise does not change (in other words,
the age of the firm does not reset after becoming dependent or independent).
There are however some adjustments that milden this issue: first of all we are not considering large
firms, which are the most sensible to this problem. Moreover, in case a firm is considered new because
of a restructuring, we have access to its adjusted previous year value. In case that value is present
for a given entrant, we omit that firm because it is not a real new entrant (greenfield entry). Finally,
we want to stress that we are looking at organic changes of FTEs, so we are already filtering out the
effects of mergers and split-offs when calculating the net job creation of the different groups. To see the
effect of this adjustment, we also report the results where we consider all new firms based on the age of
the legal unit (i.e. without making a greenfield entry adjustment). Results are reported in Table 6.6.
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NJCR1% NJCR2%
Greenfield Dependent 0.13
New Dependent 0.14 36.50
Young Dependent −0.014 −0.28
Middle-age Dependent −0.06 −2.14
Old Dependent −0.40 −2.91
Greenfield Controlled 0.11
New Controlled 0.12 34.46
Young Controlled −0.02 −0.79
Middle Age Controlled −0.06 −2.46
Old Controlled −0.40 −3.09
Greenfield Independent 1.13
New Independent 1.16 95.36
Young Independent 0.35 4.75
Middle-age Independent −0.10 −2.19
Older Independent −1.01 −3.75
Table 6.6: Net job growth rates for SMEs, divided by dependency status and age. Results are reported
in percentage points.
First of all a word on the difference between greenfield entries and entrants based on their
administrative age. As it can be seen, for all categories, the job creation of greenfield entrants is
very similar to the net job creation of formal entrants. We have checked the average number of firms
that are not real entrants and find that the proportion of non-greenfield entrants in the dependent
category is 37% while it is 22% for independent firms. Moreover, looking at the results, it seems that
most of the net job creation of new firms is due to greenfield entrants. Finally, and most importantly,
using greenfield entrants does not remove the effect of dependencies, with the job creation of new
independent firms 1% higher than the one of dependent firms. Notice that we do not report NJCR2
for the greenfield entrants because the number of workers in that group corresponds to the job creation
for that group.
Looking at the rest of the results in Table 6.6, we see that after we control for different age groups,
we find an interesting pattern in the effect of dependency status. In particular, it seems that there
is an inverse relationship between the effect of dependency on net job creation and the age of the
enterprise. For new and young firms, we clearly see that being dependent has a negative effect on the
net job creation, especially for new firms. The employment generated by new enterprises which are
independent is almost 10 times higher than their dependent counterparts, while for young firms we
find that dependent firms have a negative job creation rate against the positive one of independent
companies. These considerations are even more clear when we look at the NJCR2, i.e. how the group
we are examining grew. We find that independent young firms have experienced an average yearly
growth of 4.75% while dependent firms have a mildly negative job creation. Moreover, we can see that
the group of independent new firms has experienced a growth rate which is almost three times the one
of dependent new companies (notice that the very large values for NJCR2 can be explained by the
strong effect of entrants).
Things become radically different when we look at older enterprises. For middle-age firms (6 to 10
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years old), we find that the dependency status does not have a large effect, especially when looking at
the NJCR2. However, when looking at older firms, we find that independent companies have had a
substantially lower net job creation rate, both with respect to the overall economy (i.e. NJCR1) and
to their own size (even though to a smaller extent).
This interaction between firm age and the dependency status can be explain by the experimentation
process (see Brynjolfsson et al., 2007, Hyytinen and Maliranta, 2013, and Gabler and Poschke, 2013)
that new firms face when entering the market. It is plausible that a newly formed or young dependent
enterprise has a better idea of its productivity potential (for example because it needs to perform
a specific task for its mother company), compared to an independent one. This can be reflected in
young independent firms creating more employment because they are too optimistic of their production
possibilities. In time, when they achieve their long-run level of productivity, independent companies
need to shred excessive jobs which they have created during the learning phase. On the other hand, a
dependent or controlled company hires less during the initial stage of its life and hence does not need
to decrease its labor input as much as its independent counterpart, when it gets older.
To sum up the results of this subsection, we find that controlling for age does not render the
dependency status uninfluential in explaining the heterogeneity in the net job creation of Finnish
enterprises. However, we find that the impact of dependencies changes as firms get older.
6.4.2 Cyclical Analysis
The results discussed in the previous subsections evidence the strong impact of ownership structure
onto the average gross and net job creation. It is also interesting to analyze how dependency from
a mother company affects the sensitivity of a firm to the business cycle. To do this we compute the
euclidean distance between the mean net job creation of a certain category of firms during periods of
low and high economic growth. A contractionary period is defined as month in which the indicator of
real economic activity1 is below its trend and vice versa for an expansionary period.
In other words, our measure of sensitivity to aggregate economic conditions is given by:
ΓC =
Ò
NJC2Rec,C +NJC
2
Exp,C
EC
, (6.3)
where NJCRec,C is the average net job creation for category C during periods of slow economic
growth and NJCExp,C is the same measure taken during period of good aggregate economic conditions.
Finally, EC is the average number of FTEs for category of firms C, which is used to make the figure
comparable across companies of different class sizes and dependency status. Intuitively, a low value of
ΓC indicates that the employment generation of a certain type of enterprises does not vary substantially
during different macroeconomic conditions. On the other hand, a large value of this indicator points
toward a remarkable sensitivity of certain classes of firms to the business cycle.
We report, in Table 6.7, this measure of sensitivity to the business cycle for SMEs of various
1We use the Trend Indicator of Output (TIO), produced by Statistics Finland, as monthly measure of real economic
activity.
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ownership structure, considering both the dataset which includes entry and exit and the one with only
continuous companies.
ΓC% ΓC % Continuous
Medium Dependent 3.70 2.32
Small Dependent 3.10 2.10
Micro Dependent 1.86 1.82
SMEs Dependent 3.37 2.22
Medium Control 3.89 2.37
Small Control 3.45 2.20
Micro Control 2.10 1.94
SMEs Control 3.63 2.29
Medium Independent 4.25 3.37
Small Independent 2.86 2.95
Micro Independent 2.89 1.60
SMEs Independent 2.36 2.04
Table 6.7: Sensitivity of micro, small and medium sized enterprises to aggregate economic conditions.
Higher numbers indicate more sensitivity to the business cycle. Both the dataset with entries and exits
and the one with long-lasting firms only are considered.
Looking at Table 6.7, we see that the sensitivity to business cycles varies widely across different
types of firms. First of all, it seems that micro firms tend to be more stable with respect to different
aggregate economic conditions. While this can be surprising in the light of works such as Gertler and
Gilchrist (1994), where smaller enterprises are seen as especially sensitive to economic downturn, it
resembles the conclusions obtained in Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012). In their analysis, the authors
found that larger firms employment behavior exhibits stronger correlation to the business cycle.
Firms’ age also plays an influential role in terms of the sensitivity to the macroeconomic cycle. This
comes as no surprise, given that we expect older firms to fluctuate less and because we omit entries and
exits, which are heavily affected by different economic conditions. The dependency status, however,
does not seem to have a clear effect on the cyclicality of job creation. For example, independent medium
and micro enterprises seem to be more sensitive to the aggregate economic environment compared to
their dependent counterpart, while the opposite holds for small firms and SME category as a whole.
Overall, while dependencies have a strong effect on the average job creation, it does not seem to
have a substantial impact on their cyclical behavior.
6.4.3 Sectoral Analysis
So far, we have analyzed firm-level data without distinguishing the industry to which a certain enterprise
belongs to. We can expect the effect of dependencies to vary across different industries. For example,
the sharing of know-how between the mother company and its subsidiaries might be more relevant in
firms working in the service sector compared to the ones working in the construction or manufacturing
sector.
In Table 6.8, we examine the net job creation rate defined following (6.1), where we use the total
number of employees belonging to an industry as the denominator. We do this for dependent and
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independent SMEs belonging to various industries. For the sake of brevity, we limit our analysis to the
dataset including entries and exits, and to the average size classification method.
Dependent Independent
Medium Construction −0.003 0.03
Small Construction −0.01 0.76
Micro Construction −0.01 1.44
SMEs Construction −0.036 2.23
Medium Finance 0.11 −0.16
Small Finance 0.023 0.07
Micro Finance 0.04 0.15
SMEs Finance 0.18 0.06
Medium Trade −0.07 -0.04
Small Trade −0.07 0.14
Micro Trade −0.03 0.11
SMEs Trade −0.17 0.21
Medium Services −0.10 0.03
Small Services −0.01 0.39
Micro Services −0.01 0.83
SMEs Services −0.12 1.25
Medium Manufacturing −0.65 −0.40
Small Manufacturing −0.17 −0.16
Micro Manufacturing 0.03 −0.06
SMEs Manufacturing −0.80 −0.62
Table 6.8: Net job creation for micro, small and medium sized enterprises, divided by industry and
dependency status. We consider only the average classification methodology and the dataset with
entries and exits.
Table 6.8 highlights some interesting industry specific features to the relationship between depen-
dency and job creation. Importantly, there is no a unique effect of dependency across industry. While
we see that independent companies belonging to the service, trade and construction industries show
substantially larger net job creation with respect to their dependent counterparts, the same cannot be
said for the finance and manufacturing industries. In particular, the net job creation of enterprises in
manufacturing do not seem to be affected greatly by the dependency status. Moreover, we find that
independent firms in the finance industry have experienced lower growth compared to the dependent
ones.
The results reported in this subsection shed some more light onto the possible interpretation of
the general finding of the negative impact of dependency on job creation. One can argue that in
the service and trade industries the mother company can intervene strongly in the administration
side of its subsidiaries, which are then limited to some specialized tasks. On the other hand, in the
manufacturing industry it is likely that the mother company cannot centralize some activities in the
same fashion.
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6.4.4 The Role of Foreign Ownership
As mentioned before, our data on foreign controlled enterprises start in January 2007. Given that
this period is of particular importance, in the light of the Great Recession, and given the possible
idiosyncrasies characterizing firms belonging to a foreign corporation, we decided to analyze them
separately. In tables 6.9 and 6.10, we report both net job creation rate measures defined in Section 6.2
and the business cycle sensitivity indicator, respectively. We compare foreign controlled firms with
the behavior of independent companies during the same sample period and consider both the data
including entry and exit and the one with continuous firms only.
NJCR1% NJCR2% NJCR1% Continuous NJCR2% Continuous
Medium Foreign −0.13 −1.61 −0.08 −1.89
Small Foreign −0.03 −1.62 −0.01 −0.76
Micro Foreign 0.01 0.83 −0.0003 −0.07
SMEs Foreign −0.15 −1.42 −0.10 −1.52
Medium Independent −0.47 −5.40 −0.016 −0.35
Small Independent −0.20 −0.73 −0.050 −0.35
Micro Independent 0.71 1.53 −0.08 −0.44
SMEs Independent 0.03 0.08 −0.14 −0.40
Table 6.9: Net job growth rates for micro, small and medium sized enterprises, divided by dependency
status. Both the dataset with entries and exits and the one with long-lasting firms only are considered
and results are obtained using the average size classification.
ΓC% ΓC % Continuous
Medium Foreign 5.67 4.22
Small Foreign 4.67 3.21
Micro Foreign 4.73 1.75
SMEs Foreign 4.75 3.82
Medium Independent 3.27 2.07
Small Independent 3.34 2.34
Micro Independent 2.30 1.80
SMEs Independent 2.81 2.03
Table 6.10: Sensitivity of micro, small and medium sized enterprises to aggregate economic conditions.
Higher numbers indicate more sensitivity to the business cycle. Both the dataset with entries and exits
and the one with long-lasting firms only are considered.
Tables 6.9 and 6.10 highlight some surprising results which go in a different direction compared
to what we have found so far. Medium and small foreign-controlled firms show a higher (albeit still
negative) net job creation rate from 2007 to 2014, compared to their independent counterparts. On the
other hand, micro independent enterprises had a much better performance, in terms of job creation.
Looking at the overall SMEs group, we find that both net job creation rate measures indicate a
superiority of independent firms in generating employment. For long-lasting enterprises we find that
the for all SMEs the dependence status has a positive effect on the net job creation rate, but they
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have grown less (as evidenced by lower NJCR2).
The results contained in Table 6.10 evidence a clear characteristic of foreign-controlled firms, i.e.
their high sensitivity to the business cycle. Enterprises that are controlled by a foreign corporation
adjust better to different economic conditions and adjust their employment level accordingly. This
holds true for both the data including entry and exits and the one with only continuous firms. An
explanation for this result can be found in the fact that a foreign corporation can adjust production
across different countries and reallocate resources based on the business cycles of the various economies
in which it operates more easily.
6.4.5 A possible explanation: cross correlations of net job creations
So far, we have described the data agnostically, i.e. we did not seek a possible explanations to why
dependent and independent SMEs show different patterns of employment behavior. In particular, we
have found that independent firms have been more successful in creating new jobs, even though we
have not determined a possible cause.
One of the most simple explanations is that dependent small enterprises are heavily affected by the
performance of their mother company. This kind of relationship would be reflected in substantially
higher correlations between the net job creation of large and dependent companies against the one
between small independent enterprises and big firms. We report these correlations in Table 6.11, where
we use the average size classification methodology and examine both data with entry and exit and
continuous firms.
Medium Small Micro
Dependent 0.773 0.740 0.275
Controlled 0.776 0.743 0.244
Foreign 0.398 0.429 −0.056
Independent 0.664 0.662 0.601
Continuous Firms
Dependent 0.814 0.766 0.641
Controlled 0.813 0.743 0.634
Foreign 0.761 0.808 0.648
Independent 0.747 0.811 0.675
Table 6.11: Correlations of net job creation rates between SMEs and large firms.
In Table 6.11, we can see that the net job creations of independent firms are substantially less
correlated with the one of large firms, compared to the controlled and dependent enterprises. This
can point out to a "dragging down" explanation for the lower net job growth of dependent companies.
However, there is a caveat: the performance of large companies, especially in a small economy as the
Finnish one, can be an indicator of aggregate economic conditions and a lower correlation to the net job
creation of large companies can simply indicate a lower sensitivity to the business cycle of independent
firms. We touched on this point in section 6.4.2, but we could not identify a clear relationship between
dependence status and business cycle sensitivity. For the micro enterprises, however, it seems that
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independent firms are more correlated to large enterprises than the dependent ones. This result might
be driven by the very small values of net job creation of micro dependent enterprises.
Another interesting fact is the low correlation between foreign controlled firms and big Finnish
companies. We have found, in Section 6.4.4, that foreign controlled enterprises are especially sensitive
to the aggregate conditions of the Finnish economy. In the light of these results, the low correlations
of Table 6.11 can be explained by the effect of large Finnish companies performance and not by a
business cycle explanation, giving support to a possible dragging down effect underlying the lower net
job growth of dependent firms.
Finally, in the case of continuing firms, we see slightly higher correlations coefficients with the net
job growth of large companies (especially for the foreign controlled SMEs). This can be explained by
the intrinsically higher stability of this kind of enterprises which show a common correlation with the
overall trend underlying the economy.
6.5 Conclusions
We contribute to literature on the relationship between firms’ size and job creation by investigating an
additional source of heterogeneity within the SMEs, i.e. their dependency status. In particular, we
separate the small and medium enterprises population using different degrees of control and examine
their gross job creation and destruction, together with their net job growth.
We find that independent SMEs have experienced, on average, higher net job creation compared to
firms which depend on a mother company. This result holds for all the size classes and different degrees
of control. Moreover, we find that the negative effects of dependency onto job creation is present also
when we examine only long-lasting enterprises. However, controlling for firm age introduces an inverse
relationship between the effect of dependencies on job generation and the age of the company. In
particular, young independent firms generate much more employment than their dependent counterparts,
but older independent companies have slightly lower net job creation rates compared to subsidiaries.
We also find that SMEs in different industries exhibit different patterns. Importantly, dependency
status does not seem to play a large role in the job creation for the manufacturing industry, or at least
not to the same extent as in the services and trade sector. Finally, we do not find a specific impact of
dependencies onto the sensitivity of SMEs to the business cycle.
There are multiple channels that can explain the negative effect of being a subsidiary on the job
creation of small firms. First of all, dependent enterprises are more than likely influenced by their
mother company in their hiring decisions. If the mother company is shredding jobs, as it can be seen in
the very negative net job creation of large companies in Table 6.3, it will probably impact its subsidiary,
by blocking the creation of new jobs or even imposing job cuts to its small affiliates. This explanation
is partially supported by the findings reported in Table 6.11, where dependent firms exhibit higher
correlations with large companies. Another explanation can be found in the attempt to achieve higher
productivity. It is possible for the mother company to centralize some tasks which were previously
conducted within the subsidiary. In this view, the mother company sees the small subsidiary as a small
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part of the production process and does not have particular incentives in increasing the scale of its
controlled firms. This reasoning can explain the results of Table 6.6, where dependent firms hire less
during the early years but destroy fewer jobs once they get older.
The analysis conducted in this paper can be extended in multiple ways. First of all, we can examine
different aspects of dependent and independent SMEs, other than employment. For example, we could
look at labor productivity or the value added produced in different types of small enterprises, based
on their dependency status. This productivity study could indicate if mother companies focus on
keeping their subsidiaries small and efficient, explaining their lower job creation. Moreover, it could be
interesting to analyze the share of firms contributing to the negative and positive job creation inside
a given category. In this way, we could see if the negative job creation is generated by the largest
companies within a size class or if the contribution to the job creation is evenly distributed.
6.6 Appendix: Adjustment for legal restructuring
In this appendix, we discuss the details the procedure adopted by Statistics Finland to control for
merger and split-offs in a set of enterprises. Assume that firm 1 is examined after an event (merger
or split-off) where N firms are involved. Then the estimated employment of firm 1 one year ago is
calculated by:
emp(firm1,t≠12) =
emp(firm1,t) ∗ emp(firm1,t≠12, firm2,t≠12...firmN,t≠12)
emp(firm1,t, firm2,t...firmN,t)
where t is the time periods in which the adjustment is computed, and N is the number of firms involved
in a merger or split-off. The sum of the previous year employment levels in all the firms involved in
the event is divided for each continuing firm weighted by their relative size at present time t. Let us go
through some simple numerical examples to see how this works:
1. Assume a firm A with 2 employees in period t, that had 1 employee in t-12. Firm A acquires
firm B with 1 employee at time t, m and 1 employee one year ago. Firm A, which continues
existing, will be assigned a new estimated number of employees for the comparison year, in order
to make the growth rates comparable year-on-year. The comparison values of firm A is estimated
as 2(1+1)(2+1) = 4/3, and the rate of change for A becomes (2 + 1)/(4/3) = 2.25 (as opposed to 3 if
no correction is done)
2. Consider the situation where firm A is split into smaller units, say B and C. A has 3 employees
at time t− 12, B has 3 employees at t and C has 2 workers at t. B and C did not exist at t− 12,
so their comparison values become: (3/3)3 = 3 and (2/3)3 = 2, resulting in the rate of change
for B and C to be 3/3 and 2/2 (equal to 1 for both firms). The growth rate is forced to be the
same among the continuing firms after a split-off.
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Administrative registers maintained by statistical offices on vastly heterogeneous firms have much
untapped potential to reveal details on sources of productivity of firms and economies alike.
It has been proposed that firm-level shocks can go a long way in explaining aggregate fluctuations.
Based on novel monthly frequency data, idiosyncratic shocks are able to explain a sizable share of the
Finnish economic fluctuations, providing support to the granular hypothesis.
The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 has challenged the field of economic forecasting, and nowcasting
has become an active field. This thesis shows that the information content of firm-level sales and
truck traffic can be used for nowcasting GDP figures, by using a specific mixture of machine learning
algorithms.
The agency problem lies at the heart of much of economic theory. Based on a unique dataset linking
owners, CEOs and firms, and exploiting plausibly exogenous variations in the separation of ownership
and control, agency costs seem to be an important determinant of firm productivity. Furthermore, the
effect appear strongest in medium-sized firms.
Enterprise group structures might have important implications on the voluminous literature on firm
size, as large share of SME employment can be attributed to affiliates of large business groups. Within
firm variation suggests that enterprise group affiliation has heterogeneous impacts depending on size,
having strong positive impact on productivity of small firms, and negative impact on their growth. In
terms of aggregate job creation, it is found that the independent small firms have contributed the most.
The results in this thesis underline the benefits of paying attention to samples encompassing the total
population of firms in order shape more comprehensive policies. Researchers should continue to explore
the potential of rich administrative data sources at statistical offices and strive to strengthen the ties
with the official data producers.
Keywords: Granular effect, nowcasting, agency costs, CEO ownership, firm productivity, job creation,
business group affiliation, firm size
Mots clés: choc granulaire, Prévisions du PIB en temps-réel , dilemme de l’agence, propriétaires-
dirigeants, productivité de l’entreprise, création d’emplois , groupe de sociétés, taille des enterprises
